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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1960's, there has been a growing consensus among health 
professionals and philosophers that psychotherapy involves a question of values. 
During that time, most contemporary work has been directed at two questions: 1) 
What are the values that therapist's make use of when treating a client? and 2) What is 
the justification for the presence of and reliance on these values? Current debate in 
this arena has been fueled by differing responses to these questions. As a result, little 
agreement exists regarding the number, nature, ordering and grounding of these values. 
The aim of this dissertation is to encourage some consensus in this arena by 
clarifying a proper locus for a discussion of values in therapy. In contrast to authors 
that establish a basis for values in various philosophical or religious ideologies, I 
argue that scholars need to look to the school of thought to which a therapist adheres. 
I believe that if scholars analyze the philosophical assumptions implicit in paradigms 
of psychotherapy, including notions of mental illness, view of reality, etc., they may 
begin to see the normative force that these assumptions create both within the 
therapeutic context and as the goal of therapy. It could be agreed, then, that while 
values in therapy are relative to a school of thought, universal prescriptions and 
prohibitions are made use of by the therapist and transmitted to the patient. In this 
way, psychotherapists and clinical ethicists could generate a consistent, rational plan of 
vii 
action for the benefit of the client. 
Three historically significant paradigms of psychotherapy are analyzed in this 
dissertation, namely Freud's psychoanalysis, Sullivan's interpersonal theory of 
psychiatry and Frankl's logotherapy. Their implicit philosophical assumptions are 
explored along with considerations of their normative force for the client who seeks 
this kind of treatment. A final concluding chapter considers the contemporary state of 
psychotherapy and a modem school of thought, short-term dynamic therapy. 
viii 
INTRODUCTION 
And are we to believe that a man who takes in hand a 
shield or any other instrument of war springs up on that 
very day a competent combatant in heavy armor or in any 
other form of warfare -- though no other tool will make a 
man be an artist or an athlete by his taking it in hand, nor 
will it be of any service to those who have neither acquired 
the science of it nor sufficiently practiced themselves in its 
use?1 
Where pity is preached today -- and if you listen closely, 
this is the only religion preached now -- psychologists 
should keep their ears open: through all the vanity, 
through all the noise that characterizes these preachers 
(like all preachers) they will hear a hoarse, groaning, 
genuine sound of self-contempt ...... The man of "modem 
ideas," this proud ape is immeasurably dissatisfied with 
himself; that is certain. He suffers -- and his vanity 
wants him to suffer only with others, to feel pity.---2 
Since the 1960's, there has been a growing consensus among health 
professionals and philosophers that psychotherapy involves a question of values. 
During that time, most contemporary work has been directed at two questions: 1) 
What are the values that therapist's make use of when treating a client? and 2) What is 
the justification for the presence of and reliance on these values? Current debate in 
1 Plato. The Republic, in The Collected Dialogues including the Letters, ed. by 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, (New Haven: Princeton University Press, 
1961), II, 374d, 621. 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil, trans. and with commentary by 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966), 149-150. 
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this arena has been fueled by differing responses to these questions. As a result, we 
presently find ourselves with little agreement regarding the number, nature, ordering 
and grounding of these values. 
2 
The aim of this dissertation, as originally conceived, was to attempt to achieve 
some consensus in this arena by clarifying a proper locus for a discussion of values in 
therapy. In contrast to authors that establish a basis for values in various 
philosophical or religious ideologies, I wished to argue that those who wish to write 
on this topic needed to look within the paradigm/school of thought to which a therapist 
adheres. I believed, then, that if one were to sufficiently analyze the philosophical 
assumptions implicit in schools of thought, an analysis if you will of their notions of 
mental illness, view of reality, etc., one could begin to see the normative force that 
these assumptions created both within the therapeutic context and as the goal of 
therapy. If the normative force of these philosophical assumptions could be 
established, then it could be agreed that while values in therapy are relative to a 
school of thought, universal prescriptions and prohibitions are made use of by the 
therapist and transmitted to the patient. In this way, psychotherapists and clinical 
ethicists could generate a consistent, rational plan of action for the benefit of the 
client. In sum, I believed that if values could be discussed as intra-paradigm 
phenomena, at the very least, consensus could be achieved regarding values based 
upon the commitment of the therapist - if one were to identify themselves as a 
Freudian, Sullivanian, Frankelian Logotherapist, etc. To my knowledge and to date, 
no study exists on the nature of norms within paradigms of psychotherapy. Not only 
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for its benefit to clients, but also for its novelty, I pursued this idea. 
So conceived, the thesis itself depended upon two assumptions only. Since 
these assumptions still operate in this work, I will address them now. The first 
assumption is that there are such things as "schools of thought" or paradigms as I 
choose to call them, firmly established and adhered to by psychotherapists. The use of 
the term, paradigms, is inspired by Thomas Kuhn. In the Function of Dogma in 
Scientific Research, Kuhn articulates both the definition and the main features of 
scientific paradigms. He says: 
A paradigm is a possession of which enabled scientists 
to take the foundation of their field for granted and to push 
on to more concrete and recondite problems. Features: 1) 
A paradigm is a fundamental scientific achievement and one 
which includes both a theory and some exemplary applications 
to the results of experiment and observation. 2) A paradigm is 
an accepted achievement in the sense that it is received by a 
group whose members no longer try to rival it or create 
alternatives for it. 3) A paradigm is an open-ended achievement, 
one which leaves all sorts of research to be done. 3 
In terms of definition as well as the main features, most importantly that paradigms 
articulate a "theory and some exemplary applications" of it, I believe that there are 
identifiable paradigms in psychotherapy. While presently, there is much debate as to 
the number and kinds of legitimate forms of psychotherapy are operative in the 
disciplines, the fact that there are schools of thought in psychotherapy, conceived of 
broadly, as Kuhn articulated them is sufficient to generate my thesis. For the purposes 
3 Thomas Kuhn. "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research," in Readings 
in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by Baruch Brody. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 
368-71. 
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of this dissertation, I have chosen to confine my analysis to four such paradigms, of 
which all share the features of Kuhn's paradigms. They are: Freud's Psychoanalysis, 
Harry Stack Sullivan's Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry and Viktor Frankl's 
Logotherapy. In addition to meeting the requirements of Kuhn's paradigm, all are 
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate competing metaphysical and normative 
commitments. But also, the most currently accepted and widely practiced form of 
therapy, Short-Term Dynamic Therapy has its historical and philosophical foundations 
in these schools of thought. 
The second assumption of the project has to do with my attempt to derive 
normative assumptions from philosophical assumptions. By declaring to do so, I 
have automatically chosen a side in the continuing debate on the fact/value distinction. 
Historically, it is David Hume who forged the distinction between descriptive claims 
and prescriptive claims, which commonly falls under the rubric of the Naturalistic 
Fallacy. He says: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, 
.I have always remark'd that the author proceeds for some 
time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human 
affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz' d to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, 
I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, 
or ought not. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou' d be 
observ' d and explain' d; and at the same time that a reason 
should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which 
5 
are entirely different from it.4 
While Hume rightly was attacking the metaphysicians, or the zealots, when he wrote 
this, today, I would argue that in the absence of metaphysical truths, Hume's 
naturalistic fallacy is a rather mute point. There is a large and growing tradition, those 
who honestly and despairingly are forced to acknowledge the death of metaphysics as 
a discipline and concomitantly inspired by Kantian epistemology, upon which I can 
soundly rest assured that a hard and fast distinction between facts and values must be 
sufficiently blurred. 
Provided that the reader could accept the two assumptions, the project itself 
seemed doable and necessary. As the work proceeded, I kept myself abreast of the 
current scholarly contributions to the discussion of values. Again, while most 
contributors are aware of the fact that there are values in therapy; there seemed to be 
a growing movement away from any base-line consensus regarding values in 
psychotherapy. Much to my dismay, the growing disparity in treatment of values, I 
believe, covertly contributes to a growing belief that values are arbitrary or relative. 
For the sake of acquainting the reader with how values have been and are discussed, I 
offer the following schematization or review of the literature. 
1) Multi-Cultural Values: These authors suggest that in their practice, 
therapists should take into consideration cultural or gender values of their clients. See 
for example: Harry J. Aponte. Bread and Spirit: Therapy with the New Poor: Diversity 
of Race, Culture and Values (New York: Norton, 1994).; Rosemarie Perez Foster, 
Michael Moskowitz and Rafael Art Javier, eds. Reaching Across Boundaries of 
4 David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed. Edited and with ~ 
analytical index by L.A. Selby-Bigge. With text revised and variant readings by P.H. 
Nidditch. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), III, i, i, 470. 
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Culture and Class: Widening the Scope of Psychotherapy (New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 
Inc., 1996).; J. Pamela Weiner and Pauline Boss. "Exploring Gender Bias Against 
Women: Ethics for Marriage and Family Therapy. Special Issue: Values and Ethics in 
Family Therapy," Counselling and Values 38(1) (October, 1985): 9-23. 
2) Religious/Philosophical Values: These scholars argue that the proper 
foundation for a discussion of values in therapy rests with religious or philosophical 
values. Examples include: Everett L. Worthington, ed. Psychotherapy and Religious 
Values. (Michigan: Baker Book House, 1993).; Martin Lakin. Ethical Issues in the 
Psychotherapies. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).; Allen E. Bergin. 
"Psychotherapy and Religious Values," in Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology 48 (1980): 95-105.; P. London. The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy. 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964). 
3) Personal Values: For several decades, researches have conducted studies 
which verify that a therapist's personal values do impact clinical practice. A ware of 
this, some scholars have suggested that therapists explore their own personal value 
system prior to practice. The literature includes: Morris B. Parloff, Norman Goldstein 
and Boris Iflund. "Communication of Values and Therapeutic Change," Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 2 (1960): 300-4.; Hans H. Strupp. "Humanism and 
Psychotherapy: A Personal Statement of the Therapist's Essential Values," 
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 17(4) (Winter, 1980): 396-400. 
Paul Chodoff. "Ethical Dimensions of Psychotherapy: A Personal Perspective," 
American Journal of Psychotherapy, vol. 50, no. 3 (Summer, 1996), 298-310.; Janet 
A. Khan and Darryl G. Cross. "Mental Health Professionals: How Different are there 
Values?" American Mental Health Counselors Association Journal, 6 (January, 1984): 
32-51.; E. Weisskopf-Joelson. "Values: The Enfant Terrible of Psychotherapy," 
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 17 (1980): 459-66.; Jerry Dragan. 
"An Examination of the Role of Values in Counselling and Psychotherapy," Canadian 
Counsellor 8(4) (October, 1974): 272-9.; John C. Norcross and Michael Wogan. 
"Values in Psychotherapy: A Survey of Practitioner's Beliefs," Professional 
Psychotherapy: Research and Practice (18)1 (February, 1987): 5-7. 
4) Political Values: Several scholars have argued that all therapists implicitly 
transmit accepted political values to their clients. As such, therapy is construed as 
"applied politics." For example, see: Peter Breggin. "Psychiatry and Psychotherapy as 
Political Processes," American Journal of Psychotherapy, vol. 29 (1975): 369-87.; S. 
Halleck. The Politics of Therapy. (New York: Science House, 1971).; Jonas 
Robitscher. The Powers of Psychiatry. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1980). 
5) Therapy as Value-Neutral: Some commentators are adamant that therapy is a 
value-neutral process. If clients adopt values at the end of therapy, it is argued that 
they have freely chosen to do so. In principle, though, therapists are not in the 
business of advancing values to their clients. Rather, they only encourage the client to 
become a fully autonomous agent. See: Thomas Szasz. The Myth of Mental Illness 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1974).; and The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Basic Books, 1965). H. Tristram Englehardt. "Psychotherapy as Meta-ethics," in 
Psychotherapy and Ethics, ed. by Rem B. Edwards, (New York: Prometheus Books, 
1982). 
There is much overlap in these categories; however, I list them so as to familiarize 
the reader with how values have been discussed in the past and presently. And 
presently, with this growing proliferation of views, the possibility of consensus so as 
to provide a coherent, rational plan of action for the client seems sadly out of reach. 
Having identified the four paradigms to be analyzed, I began the work on this 
project, in the only way possible, at the beginning -- with the theoretical articulation 
of these schools of thought. Guided by the view that theory is linked to practice, I 
focused my research on their respective descriptions (philosophical assumptions) of 
mental illness, reality (both internal and external, as conceived of by the therapist and 
the client, and at various times in the course of therapy), the therapeutic techniques of 
the school of thought and the purported goals of treatment. I read the secondary 
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literature which sought to clarify or to further develop these descriptions. In the end, I 
was forced to conclude that while in the abstract my original thesis was still on target, 
the theory of these schools of thought was often poorly articulated, at times 
inconsistent and at its worst moments, positively confused. The implications of this 
discovery were manifold. 
First and foremost, it stands to reason that if the theory upon which practice is 
supposed to be based is skewed, then practicing within a school of thought must be 
equally ambiguous. This caused me to wonder what exactly practitioners of 
8 
psychotherapy purport to be "doing" in the confines of therapy and how they are 
justifying the methodology behind their practice. In a very real sense, those who 
claim that a therapist's personal values enter into therapy, are in the end, somehow 
correctly speaking to what actually occurs in practice. However, I am not convinced 
that their reasons for believing this claim rest on the appropriate arguments. In my 
view, if, therapists rely on personal values, it is often because the theory to which they 
adhere allows for a random selection of nonnative claims. In a very real sense, 
because of the deeply entrenched meta-analytical confusion, therapists who base their 
practice on these paradigms are unwittingly led to a reliance on their personal values. 
This was especially the case with Frankl's Logotherapy and Short-Tenn Dynamic 
Therapy. 
But secondly, since the task of uncovering the philosophical assumptions 
proved to be enormous; and given that there was seldom a meaning, but rather 
multiple plausible meanings of these philosophical assumptions, my belief in the 
possibility of establishing a clear, consistent and coherent ethic for each of the 
paradigms was turning into a distant dream. The original thesis underwent a severe 
modification. I decided that turning the spotlight on the theory of these paradigms 
itself -- a clarification of the philosophical assumptions-- was where work needed to 
be done. The project has since been construed as a meta-analysis of the philosophical 
assumptions inherent in these schools of thought with the intent of understanding what 
implications they might have for a nonnative ethic and/or where scholars need to focus 
their attention in order to clarify the nonnative ethic. This has especially been true of 
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Chapters 1: Freud's Psychoanalysis and Chapter 2: Harry Stack Sullivan's Interpersonal 
Theory of Psychiatry. 
My greatest desire would be that psychotherapists would use this dissertation as 
a tool by which to begin investigating the interpretation that they give to the 
descriptive assumptions within their schools of thought in order to understand the 
normative force that this has for their client. A more modest desire would be that 
therapists use this dissertation as a tool by which to begin reflecting about the 
assumptions within and behind their practice. Yet, greater or smaller, I am doubtful 
that many therapists will do this. As I worked on this dissertation, I came across 
many warrants in the exposition of theory that precluded therapists from rationally 
examining any theory whatsoever. In sum, there are rather obvious prohibitions 
directed at therapists to not think too deeply; for, to travel too far into critical thought 
might risk one being labelled as "obsessional." The following passages are worth 
citing and critiquing: 
For obsessional neurosis "seduces" the obsessional neurotic 
to a particular philosophical position, namely that world-view 
of hundred-per-centness of which we have spoken above. A 
case that shows the obsessional-neurotic world-view in its 
incipient stages is that of a young man in late puberty. Amid 
the labor pains of adolescence it became plain that an 
obsessional-neurotic world-view was setting in. 
The young man in question was filled with a Faustian urge 
to know the roots of everything. "I want to get back to the origin 
of things," were his words. "I want to be able to prove everything; 
I want to prove everything that is immediately obvious -- for 
example, whether I am living." 
We know that the obsessional neurotic's sense of obviousness 
10 
is defective. 5 
I fmd it fascinating that Vik.tor Frankl, trained in philosophy himself, has not the 
patience to make clear distinctions between the following concepts, namely: a) one's 
desire for absolute proof, b) the possibility of achieving absolute proof and c) the 
pejorative and unjust labelling of someone as showing the symptoms of obsessional-
neurosis. A desire to know has long been deemed the hallmark of what separates 
human beings from the animal kingdom. Indeed, it is this desire which founded and 
propelled the entire discipline of philosophy, also known as the most divine science, 
according to Aristotle. With respect to b ), whether or not it is possible to know all 
things has long been debated by the greatest scholars in the halls of academia. Yet, b) 
is a philosophical question and should be debated as such, not treated by therapy. By 
claiming that a pre-adolescent suffers the symptoms of obsessional neurosis because he 
wonders about the world around him is nothing short of an affront to the entire human 
race. I would humbly urge that Frankl should rather escort this youth to the halls of 
the university and out of the logotherapist's office. From Aristotle's point of view, 
after treatment in this therapist's office, something less than a human being would 
emerge -- and ultimately, thanks to the professional work of the logotherapist. 
There is hardly a criticism that has not been leveled 
at psychotherapy: it is ineffective; it is dangerous; it is 
too limited, too long, too expensive; carried on in the 
secrecy of the consulting room, its techniques remain 
arcana unavailable to scientific scrutiny ... , etc. 
The dedicated (emphasis added) psychotherapist is 
5 Vik.tor E. Frankl. The Doctor and the Soul: From Psychotherapy to 
Logotherapy. rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 195-6. 
undaunted by these frequently contradictory comments. He 
knows from his own experience that his treatment methods 
work (emphasis added), and he is aware that the demand for 
rigorous proof comes from those who like their world to be an 
orderly place and expect natural phenomena to conform to the 
clear definitions and sharply delineated categories of ideal reason. 
God is less obsessional (emphasis added), and the real world of 
creation is full of stubborn facts that refuse to be marshalled or 
quantified; nowhere is this more true than in the realm of human 
subjective experience and the psychology that studies it.6 
A ware of the criticisms, this psychiatrist urges other dedicated psychiatrists to rest 
assured that their expertise is based upon the individual practitioner's experience that 
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his treatment method works. This kind of reasoning is viciously circular. It is akin to 
my saying that this chapter is "good" simply because I say it is good. As such, this 
view makes a mockery of psychotherapy because it suggests that the theory upon 
which therapists base their practice is something wholly subjective. In addition, and 
much like my criticism of Frankl's remarks, it insults an individual's rationality, but in 
particular it denigrates the rationality of all therapists. It precludes any attempt to 
understand objectively the nature of their own expertise or profession. Individuals 
who attempt to understand it, instead, are accused of trying to be God-like and/or are 
guilty of obsessionality. After reading this passage, the rational reader may query: 
who really is afflicted with the madness of God-like hubris? 
But paradoxically, one of the most discomfiting passages I encountered was 
written by an esteemed psychologist and one who is himself a critic of psychotherapy. 
I call this paradoxical because given the nature of his criticism, Robyn Dawes is 
6 Dr. Nemiah. Introduction to Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Therapy: A 
Treatment Manual by Peter E. Sifneos. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), vii-viii. 
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clearly an individual who is quite willing to be labelled as "obsessional" and challenge 
the credibility of many established principles of psychotherapy. In his recent book, 
House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth, he has the following 
advice for clients who seek therapy. He advises them as follows: 
There is no reason, however, to seek out a highly paid, 
experienced therapist with a lot of credentials. If verbal 
therapy is sought, paraprofessionals are equally effective, 
especially empathetic ones. If the problems appear to 
require behavioral modification, as do phobias and lack 
of impulse control, a paraprofessional who understands 
behavioral principles is as effective as a highly credentialed 
professional. But, success in therapy is far from assured, 
even though it works overall in a statistical sense. Someone 
who is dissatisfied with their current progress in therapy 
should not be inhibited about changing therapists or mode 
of treatment. (The therapist that is abandoned may attribute 
this decision to the depth of the clients pathology, but so what).7 
But so what? So what is the client is not a professional therapist and does not know 
if he suffers from an illness that requires "behavioral modification" such as "phobias 
and lack of impulse control." And, so what if a client believes that persons who call 
themselves professional therapists, require a fee, and purport to help them can not 
assure them of "success" in therapy? And, so what if a client is told that their 
pathology is so severe and that this is the reason why therapy has not worked even 
though the real reason may lie elsewhere? And so what if a client is so mentally 
disabled that he may not even be able to believe in the truth -- let alone even to 
cognize - his own so what? 
7 Robyn Dawes. House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on 
Myth (New York: Free Press, 1994), 73. 
What about the person who is the client? 
What about psychotherapists whose sole professional 
and moral justification for engaging in the work they 
do is to help clients? 
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I conclude this introduction with two comments. First, I would like to invite 
psychotherapists to peruse this dissertation. Those who are willing to invoke critical 
reason and who risk being labelled as "obsessional," at the very least may personally 
benefit from examining the foundational assumptions of four historically and 
comprehensive theoretical paradigms of psychotherapy. These paradigms, though not 
exhaustive, have served as the disciplinary bedrock of the professional status of 
psychotherapists. Though the chapters do not promise a complete account of the 
normative commitments implicit in these theories, as I dreamed they might, I believe 
they point toward important implications for further investigating the integral role that 
descriptions and prescriptions play within the paradigm of which they are a part. In 
this respect, I would gladly welcome a further articulation of the thoughts presented 
here -- for the sake of theory, practice and the welfare of clients treated in this 
profession. 
Finally, I began this introduction with two quotes: one from Plato which 
emphasizes the importance between the relationship between theory and practice, but 
the second was from Nietzsche. With his prophetic aphorisms, Nietzsche scorned the 
history of western philosophy and Christianity because of their preaching a morality to 
human beings which actually further enslaved man to a mythology and destroyed that 
which is most ennobling to him. Nietzsche warns that "psychology" might- become the 
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new, modem religion -- and psychotherapists, its new missionaries. But, this is only a 
warning. If psychotherapists are to accomplish what society and their professions 
believe that they will do, psychotherapists must heed his warning and look critically at 
their practice. He says: 
In short, my dear psychologists, study the philosophy 
of the "norm" in its fight against the "exception:" there 
you have a spectacle that is good enough for gods and 
godlike malice! Or, still more clearly: vivisect the "good 
man," the homo bonae voluntatis" -- yourselves/8 
I have only one additional clause to add to this warning: ... do so for your clients! 
8 Nietzsche, Beyond, 14 7. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE NORMATIVE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ANALYST IN FREUD'S 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 
But there is one question which I can hardly evade. If the 
development of civilization has such a far-reaching similarity to 
the development of the individual and if it employs the same 
methods, may we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that, 
under the influence of cultural urges, some civilizations, or some 
epochs of civilization -- possibly the whole of mankind -- have 
become 'neurotic?' An analytic dissection of such neuroses 
might lead to therapeutic recommendations which could lay 
claim to great practical interest. I would not say that an attempt 
of this kind to carry psycho-analysis over to the cultural 
community was absurd or doomed to be fruitless. But we 
should have to be very cautious and not forget that, after all, we 
are dealing only with analogies and that it is dangerous, not only 
with men but also with concepts, to tear them from the sphere in 
which they have originated and been evolved. Moreover, the 
diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with a special 
difficulty. In an individual neurosis we take as our starting-
point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his 
environment, which is assumed to be 'normal' (emphasis added). 
For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the 
same disorder no such background could exist; it would have to 
be found elsewhere. And as regards the therapeutic application 
of our knowledge, what would be the use of the most correct 
analysis of social neuroses, since no one possesses authority to 
impose such a therapy upon the group (emphasis added)? But 
in spite of all these difficulties, we may expect that one day 
someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural 
communities. 1 
1 Sigmund Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works 
of Sigmund Freud, trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-
1974), 21: 144. 
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The above quote is taken from the last pages of Freud's, Civilization and Its 
Discontents. As he states, a final problem which he can "hardly evade" has to do with 
the possibility of the existence and modes of understanding along psychoanalytic lines 
of a culture/civilization -- indeed a whole race of mankind -- that suffers from 
neurosis. It is interesting to note that as soon as he raises the thought experiment and 
points out the potential difficulties in addressing it, Freud dismisses it and leaves it to 
his future scholars to undertake an investigation of the pathology of cultural 
communities. Only one and one-half pages later, Freud concludes Civilization and Its 
Discontents. 
Let me state at the outset, that in this chapter my aim is not to take up the task of 
sketching out the pathology of cultural communities. Rather, I quoted Freud's thought 
experiment at length because it seems to me that in later years, when his inquiries 
became more philosophical in nature, Freud was the first to acknowledge that 
psychoanalysts take as their starting point a vision of the environment which they 
assume to be "normal." Indeed, it is this knowledge of the "environment" (or 
civilization) which justifies the authority of psychoanalysts and makes its practice 
possible. 
Contemporary discussions of the legitimacy of psychotherapy as a discipline 
could benefit from a reconsideration of Freud's claim. In a recent critical review of 
the literature on psychotherapy, Stephen Logan remarks: 
Modern psychotherapy is vexed with the problem of its 
own authority. A number of influential therapists --
among them Peter Lomas, Adam Phillips and Anthony 
Storr -- have recently written books which agonize over 
the question of the kind and degree of authority a 
therapist should claim. In a liberal society with an 
eroded moral consensus, moral guides are likely to be 
needed and resented equally. The former sources 
-- religion, social tradition, literature -- are either not 
available, or else the practice of consulting them has 
come to feel naive. Therapists, who have often 
laboriously rebuilt some degree of the moral 
confidence their patients lack, are therefore apt to 
be regarded as gurus. 2 
I believe that Freud would have been disconcerted with Logan's 
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characterization of the state of psychotherapy today. Repeatedly in his writings, Freud 
emphasizes the need to keep psychoanalysis firmly entrenched in the medical 
community in order to avoid analysts being viewed as charlatans. It seems to me that 
in light of the passage in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud was well aware of the 
fact that psychoanalysis involved some normative considerations and he offered the 
suggestion that civilization itself provides the proper grounding for these values. After 
all, the psychoanalyst uses as his starting point a vision of the "environment which he 
assumes to be normal." In this way, were he alive today, Freud might respond to 
Logan's remarks by saying that the "authority" with which psychoanalysis -- indeed 
any form of therapy -- is derived is from civilization itself. 
In this chapter, I intend to engage in a limited excursion into the Freudian 
corpus in order to elucidate his conception of the nature of this "normal environment." 
This description, as offered in his later works, comes replete with an exposition of the 
2 Stephen Logan, "The Charisma of Uncertainty: Challenges to Psychotherapy 
in the Postmodern Age," Times Literary Supplement, (September 27, 1996), 27-28. 
See also: Peter Kramer, Moments of Engagement: Intimate Psychotherapy in a 
Technological Age (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 187-219. 
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kinds of characters and social institutions that are found in society. By assessing the 
nature of these institutions, it is hoped that readers may begin to glimpse its 
normative force. I believe that it is this understanding of "reality" that serves as the 
starting point for the practice of psychoanalysis. However, since there are ambiguities 
surrounding the term "reality" as used by Freud, an initial portion of this chapter will 
be devoted to categorizing the many meanings of this word. Having done so, I will 
then limit my analysis solely to Freud's conception of phenomenal reality and 
demonstrate how it is imbued with pain and misery. It is this kind of "reality" which 
functions as the horizon against which Freudian psychoanalysts treat their clients. 
In order to establish this thesis, this chapter will assume the following structure: 
1) Review of the literature: the role of the psychoanalyst 
2) Transition 
3) Stipulation of texts 
4) The many meanings of reality 
5) The nature of phenomenally shared reality 
6) Summary and transition to private property 
7) Private property 
8) Considerations of religion 
9) Conclusion 
1) Review of the literature: the role of the psychoanalyst 
The Freudian corpus contains a host of passages which allow for competing 
interpretations regarding the role of the psychoanalyst. In my view, there are at least . 
three qualitatively different ways in which Freud characterizes this role and each 
implies different normative notions. After identifying these passages in Freud's works, 
I then wish to align them with three contemporary understandings of the role of the 
psychoanalyst. All of these interpretations are partially correct, in my view, yet, they 
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fail to take into account the ultimate "starting point" for the practice of psychoanalysis, 
namely civilization itself. In this section, each contemporary view will be presented 
and followed by a brief critique. This will pave the way for the normative 
considerations assumed in Freud's description of civilization. 
Let us begin by considering three groups of citations which allow for 
competing views. Each of the passages falls under the following three headings, 
namely: 1) The psychoanalyst as impartial, 2) The psychoanalyst as engaged in a 
hermeneutic endeavor; and 3) The psychoanalyst as suggesting personal values. The 
reader should be aware that in these passages, Freud is not addressing the 
psychoanalyst's methods per se; but rather, the analyst's demeanor that is presupposed 
prior to his application of the methods, specifically of free association and dream 
interpretation. In addition, it is important to note that in this chapter, I am not 
concerned with the therapeutic "relationship" that is formed in psychoanalysis, but only 
the normative vision of reality that is assumed on the part of the psychoanalyst. 
Having made these stipulations, consider the following passages: 
View 1: The psychoanalyst as impartial 
But psycho-analysis has already weathered many storms 
and now it must brave this fresh one. In point of fact 
psycho-analysis is a method of research, an impartial 
instrument, like the infinitesimal calculus, as it were. 3 
Psychoanalysis, in my opinion, is incapable of creating a 
Weltanschauung of its own. It does not need one; it is a 
part of science and can adhere to the scientific We/tan-
3 Freud, SE 21: 43. 
schauung. 4 
I cannot advise my colleagues too urgently to model 
themselves during psychoanalytic treatment on the 
surgeon, who puts aside all his feelings, even his human 
sympathy, and concentrates his mental forces on the 
single aim of performing the operation as skillfully as 
possible. . . . . The justification for requiring this emotional 
coldness in the analyst is that it creates the most 
advantageous conditions for both parties; for the doctor a 
desirable protection for his own emotional life and for the 
patient the largest amount of help that we can give him 
today.5 
View 2: The psychoanalyst engaged in a hermeneutic endeavor 
But it is far from being the case that his ego is content to 
play the part of passively and obediently bringing us the 
material we require and of believing and accepting our 
translation of it. A number of other things happen, a few 
of which we might have foreseen but others of which are 
bound to surprise us. The most remarkable thing is this. 
The patient is not satisfied with regarding the analyst in 
the light of reality as a helper and advisor who, 
moreover, is remunerated for the trouble he takes and 
who would himself be content with some such role as 
that of a guide on a difficult mountain climb. 6 
Accordingly, the first part of the help we have to offer is 
intellectual work on our side and encouragement to the 
patient to collaborate in it. 7 
As a rule we put off telling him of a construction or 
explanation till he himself has so nearly arrived at it that 
only a single step remains to be taken, though that step is 
4 Ibid., 22: 181. 
5 Ibid., 10: 115. 
6 Ibid., 23: 174. 
7 Ibid., 23: 177. 
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in fact the decisive synthesis. 8 
View 3: The psychoanalyst as suggesting personal values: 
We serve the patient in various functions, as an authority 
and a substitute for his parents, as a teacher and educator; 
and we have done the best for him, if as analysts, we 
raise the mental processes in his ego to a normal level, 
transform what has become unconscious and repressed 
into preconscious material and thus return it once more to 
the possession of his ego. 9 
On that particular matter our knowledge will then have 
become his knowledge as well. 10 
However much the analyst may be tempted to become a 
teacher, model and ideal for other people and to create 
men in his own image, he should not forget that is not his 
task in the analytic relationship, and indeed that he will 
be disloyal to his task if he allows himself to be led on 
by his inclinations. I I 
The flavor of each of these passages suggests different understandings of the 
role of the psychoanalyst and consequently, implies different values assumed in 
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practice. Scholars have used these passages for explaining the role the psychoanalyst 
should adopt in practice. The following is a brief list of the scholars who have 
generated theories that align with the above passages: 1) has been advocated by H. 
Tristram Englehardt and Thomas Szasz; 2) by Paul Ricouer, Arnold Goldberg and 
Hans G. Gadamer; and 3) by Allen E. Bergin, Kerry Brace and Martin Lakin. 
8 Ibid., 23: 178. 
9 Ibid., 23: 181. 
10 Ibid., 23: 178. 
11 Ibid., 23: 175. 
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Following an explanation and critique of these views, I will suggest an 
alternative interpretation regarding how one can more plausibly interpret the guiding 
assumptions of the psychoanalyst based on Freud's views of reality. It is hoped that 
this final view will enlarge and recast prevalent ideas that the psychoanalyst is neutral, 
interactive, or uses personal values within the confines of psychoanalysis. 
View 1: The psychoanalyst as impartial/neutral 
Relatively few philosophers have maintained that the practice of 
psychoanalysis is an entirely value-neutral enterprise; nonetheless, the few that have 
done so have argued quite rigorously and persuasively for this approach. Notably, 
those who have defended this view are H. Tristam Englehardt in Psychotherapy as a 
Meta-Ethics12 and Thomas Szasz in The Ethics of Psychotherapy. 13 In brief, Englehardt 
conceives of the practice of psychoanalysis as a meta-ethic, aiming only at the value of 
autonomy. If clients adopt values at the end of therapy, it is not because the analyst 
imposes or suggests them to the client; but rather, clients freely choose to accept them. 
In principle, though, Englehardt believes that analysts are not in the business of 
advancing or suggesting values to clients. Thomas Szasz largely adopts this view, 
modifying the language slightly by referring to psychoanalysis as a meta-education. 
12 H. Tristram Englehardt. "Psychotherapy as Meta-Ethics," in Psychotherapy 
and Ethics, Rem B. Edwards, ed. (New York: Prometheus Books, 1982). 
13 Thomas Szasz, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (New York: Basic Books, 
1965). See also: Rangell, L. "Similarities and Differences between Psychoanalysis and 
Dynamic Psychotherapy," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, vol. 2 
(1954): 734-44. 
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To a greater degree than Englehardt, Szasz more fully develops the notion that therapy 
itself is a purely contractual endeavor, made and agreed upon by two autonomous 
individuals. 
In many of his writings (and as evidenced in the citations), Freud seemingly 
wants to align the entire discipline of psychoanalysis, as well as its methods, with the 
apparent neutrality of that of the natural sciences. Accordingly, the analyst would be 
viewed by analogy as a surgeon and the methods of free association and dream 
interpretation would be construed as neutrally employed. In other words, the role of 
the psychoanalyst would consist of the objective application of techniques. In this 
way, psychoanalysts could be conceived as neutral practitioners of an objective 
discipline or science. 
Several criticisms lend themselves to the Szasz/Englehardt interpretation. 
First, Although Freud speaks this way, it is questionable as to whether or not he truly 
advocates this view. Clearly, the passages in section 2 and 3 -- where Freud talks 
about the analyst's role as an educator, advisor, confessor, etc. -- seem to indicate that 
he was anything but certain about the possibility of an objective practice of 
psychoanalysis. Conflicting textual evidence alone warrants suspicion regarding the 
neutrality of the psychoanalyst. 
Second and more importantly, what these authors fail to address is that even if 
one were to align psychoanalysis with the natural sciences, it is difficult to conceive of 
an objective or "impartial" application of a technique in any discipline whatsoever. 
Even if most commentators agreed that Freud's psychoanalysis was absolutely like the 
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objective sciences, in light of the work of Thomas Kuhn, 14 objective science itself is 
replete with values. In other words, natural science is just one paradigm, or one way 
of choosing to portray the world amongst many. By default, those who choose to 
practice within one paradigm as opposed to another are themselves making a value-
laden decision. 15 
By way of combining the first and second points, one might note that the 
methods of psychoanalysis16 may, in and of themselves be considered "neutral," that is, 
by definition or in an abstract, conceptual form. However, the methods when 
practiced -- involving an individual's application of theory -- opens up the door to 
normativity in psychoanalysis. Contemporary philosophy of language supports this 
view. Recognition of the personal and unconscious aspects of language reveals that 
the methods of psychoanalysis have an inescapable value-laden dimension. 17 
Thirdly, and more specific to a refutation of the views of Szasz and Englehardt, 
both believe that psychoanalysts only encourage one value in the course of therapy, 
namely "autonomy." As a result, if the client adopts any other value at the end of 
14 Kuhn, Function of Dogma, 368-371. 
15 Support for this view also comes from within the psychoanalytic community 
For an example, see: Howard B. Levine. ''The Analyst's Participation in the Analytic 
Process," International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol. 75, (1994): 665-676. See in 
particular p. 667: whether or not a value-free psychoanalysis is possible or even 
desirable is widely debated in the psychoanalytic community. 
16 The reader should note that when I refer to the methods of psychoanalysis, I 
primarily refer to the methods of free association and dream interpretation. 
17 Ferdinand Saussure. Course in General Linguistics (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1959). See also: Jacques Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan. 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977). 
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therapy, they claim that the client alone bears responsibility for this decision. 
However, passages in the Freudian corpus directly undermine this view. Freud was 
aware that at the outset and during treatment, client's are not fully autonomous agents 
and consequently, are not fully responsible for their choices. At the very least, Freud 
himself would appear to acknowledge that clients are "susceptible" to an analyst's 
suggestion of values. For instance, one might consider the following passage in An 
Outline of Psychoanalysis: 
The method by which we strengthen the weakened ego 
(emphasis added) has as a starting point an extending of 
its self-knowledge. That is not, of course, the whole 
story but it is a first step. The loss of such knowledge 
signifies for the ego a surrender of power and 
influence;( emphasis added) it is the first tangible sign that 
it is being hemmed in and hampered by the demands of 
the id and the super-ego. Accordingly, the first part of the 
help we have to offer is intellectual work on our side and 
encouragement to the patient to collaborate in it. 18 
If autonomy is compromised to begin with, as Freud says it is, this is sufficient to 
raise a serious question as to whether or not the analysand is capable of discriminating 
effectively between the those interpretations that are truly his and those that are 
suggested by his analyst, both during and at the end of treatment. This point could 
even lead one to the paradoxical conclusion that the supposed "objective practice of 
psychoanalysis may be highly suggestive of values to the client in the course of 
treatment. 19 
18 Freud, SE 23: 177. 
19 Ernest Wallwork. Psychoanalysis and Ethics (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991), 210. 
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Finally, construing the role of the psychoanalyst as neutral ignores Freud's 
understanding of the inherent asymmetrical relationship between analyst and analysand. 
A cursory consideration of Freud's text, On Beginning the Treatment, is sufficient to 
say that he was well aware of this imbalance of power. In that text, Freud was careful 
to privilege psychoanalysts with a special fund of knowledge, certain professional 
norms etc. In short, he expounded upon the moral obligations that are required in the 
professional practice of psychoanalysis. 20 The norms listed in this text transcend an 
understanding of the therapeutic relationship as one agreed to by two, autonomous 
agents. In direct opposition to Englehardt's and Sz.asz's view, Freud seems to suggest 
that the psychoanalyst is, in a very real sense, a moral agent of some sort. 
In conclusion, and as I have tried to argue, both external to and internal to the 
Freudian corpus, the views expressed by Englehardt and Sz.asz may be rendered 
seriously questionable in light of the above considerations. If this is the case, then 
while the methods of psychoanalysis may be neutral, the practice of psychoanalysis is 
not. 
2° For an example, see Freud, SE 12: 134. There, Freud says that 
psychoanalysts may wish to sit out of the sight of the patient during analysis. Not 
only for practical purposes is this recommended (i.e. the fact that it is tiring to look at 
persons for eight hours a day and that it enables the client to free-~ociate and thus 
engage in the method of psychoanalysis); but also, this recommendation, I would 
argue has a moral dimension to it as well. He says: "I insist on this procedure, 
however, for its purpose and result are to prevent the transference from mingling with 
the patient's own imperceptibly, to isolate the transference and to allow it to come 
forward in due course sharply defined as resistance." Arguably, the moral dimension 
of this "practical" prescription is to enable the analyst to avoid imposing his own 
suggestions/interpretations on to the analysand. See also: SE 12: 139-141 for a similar 
example in which Freud encourages therapists to avoid early interpretation. 
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View 2: The psychoanalyst as engaged in a hermeneutic task 
Midway between these extremes one finds the literature by the 
hermeneuticians. Psychoanalytic truth, as argued by Ricouer and Gadamer, lies in the 
interpretative process or the movement of the dialogue within the analytic encounter 
between the analyst and analysand. 21 Such an account admits of a general description 
of the therapeutic endeavor as an encounter which is inherently subjective, or better 
stated inter-subjective, and dependent upon the two individuals involved in the 
dialectical exchange. 22 
There is one major assumption underlying the hermeneutic view of 
psychoanalysis, namely, the aim to obliterate the subject/object distinction within the 
therapeutic relationship. Because of this it follows that the therapeutic relationship is 
portrayed by an overarching "intersubjectivity" between the analyst and the analysand. 
As one can see, for either party to claim neutrality in terms of knowledge or values is 
a mute point. Goldberg succinctly explains the role of the psychoanalyst on this view: 
In contrast to Rubovitz-Seitz and Hirsch is the claim of 
Hans Georg Gadamer (1965), who states that a fusion of 
horizons between interpreter and interpreted, or between 
one person trying to understand another, necessarily and 
inevitably changes both. Thus, interpretation is not the 
21 H.G. Gadamer, "The Historicity of Understanding," in The Hermeneutics 
Reader, K. Mueller-Vollmer, ed., (New York; Continuum, 1989). See also: Paul 
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). For similar 
views advanced in the psychoanalytic community, see: O.H.D. Blomfield, "The 
Essentials of Psychoanalysis," Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 
vol. 27, (1993): 86-100. 
22 See A. Goldberg's, "Farewell to the Objective Analyst," International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, vol. 75, (February, 1994): 21-30. 
study of a static or fixed object, but a process of 
participation: the creation of a shared meaning. 23 
Given the aforementioned passages from the Freudian corpus, there does seem to be 
evidence that he saw the truth of analysis as a mutual product -- involving as it does 
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dual participation and interaction between the analyst and analysand in the sharing and 
creation of meanings. However, and in spite of this, two objections based on the 
Freudian corpus itself, seem seriously to undermine the strength of the hermeneutic 
view. They are: 1) the hermeneutic view seems to rest upon a confusion between the 
method and the role of the psychoanalyst in the therapeutic situation; and most 
importantly 2) I believe that if a psychoanalyst were to adopt the hermeneutic 
approach to treatment, he could not actually be consistent with the nature of the 
methods of psychoanalysis. 
With respect to the first issue, when Freud speaks about what the analyst learns 
in the clinical encounter, typically it is to indicate what he learns about the theory of 
psychoanalysis in general. 24 Hence, when Freud speaks in general about the 
importance of practicing psychoanalysis -- the importance of looking to and learning 
from the clinical case -- it is really not due to the fact that the actual interaction 
between analyst and analysand will together yield new data which are of significant 
interest to the analyst; but rather, the data coming from the analysand will reveal to the 
23 Ibid., 24. 
24 For an excellent example, see the opening pages of Freud's On Narcissism, 
SE 14: 73-75. There, one will find Freud addressing how individual clinical 
encounters aided in the development of his theory on narcissism. 
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analyst new truths or ideas about the theory upon which the technique of 
psychoanalysis rests. 25 
Even in its most suggestive form, when Freud does speak as if the truth of 
psychoanalysis is intersubjectively constituted, one must always remember that for him 
the relationship between analyst and analysand is asymmetrical. Hence the truth that is 
established in this sort of relationship is biased, for it is the analyst's knowledge that is 
privileged above and beyond all. I believe that this underlying vantage point or one-
sided perspective affects the actual degree to which a true bi-partisan notion of shared 
meaning can result. For example, in numerous texts Freud cautions the analyst not to 
impart knowledge (that he possesses) too quickly to the analysand who has yet to 
discover this knowledge on his own. 26 Such passages are key to discerning the 
different and more extensive knowledge that the analyst possesses in contrast to the 
analysand. Inter-subjective truths may ultimately constitute some of the knowledge 
that is achieved at the end or as the goal of analysis. However, knowledge as a 
mutual product is not the sole kind of knowledge to be considered in analysis. This 
25 One might consider any one of Freud's process notes of his clinical 
encounters in order see the force of this point. For example, consider his notes on the 
Rat Man, SE 10: 318. Typically, Freud will cite the specific facts of the case; but 
these tend to be immediately followed by another statement which indicates how this 
specific material corroborates or challenges established theory. Here is but one of 
many examples: "There was suppressed anger against his friend Springer, whose 
authority thus originates from this, and against another man who betrayed him and 
whom, in return, he had later helped at the cost of sacrifices. Thus we fmd ever-
increasing suppression of the instinct of anger, accompanied by a return of the 
erotogenic instinct for dirt." 
26 Ibid., SE 12: 134, 139-141. 
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being the case, what hermeneuticians fail to recognize is that it is possible through 
suggestive questions/interpretations that the prior knowledge of the analyst actually 
configures what is to be learned in analysis to a greater extent than what the 
analysand contributes. 
In a slightly different vein, what I think the hermeneuticians have a tendency to 
overlook, and frankly what Freud did not, is that characterizing the knowledge gained 
in analysis as a mutual product actually undermines the expertise of the psychoanalyst. 
Granted that to some degree, the analyst and analysand inevitably work together in the 
creation of meanings; however, the shared meaning which accrues in the end, will be 
radically different for each of the parties, both in degree and content. To fully realize 
this point, hermeneuticians need only consider what kind of knowledge would result if 
one considered treatment of a psychotic and a neurotic. 27 Presumably, the more severe 
the mental illness of the client, the less the client can meaningfu,lly contribute to and 
even be said to understand the "shared truth" derived from analysis. The two 
participants in the analytic situation are of an unequal status. 
View 3: The psychoanalyst as suggesting personal values 
In contrast to this extremist position, other scholars have maintained that the 
perspective of reality and the concomitant values assumed are of a highly personal 
27 See SE 14: 74. There, Freud reminds us that psychoanalysis is incapable of 
treating the paraphrenic because he has so "loosened his connections with external 
reality -- people and things." Because of this, Freud says: "In consequence of the 
latter change, they become inaccessible to the influence of psychoanalysis and cannot 
be cured by our efforts." 
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nature. Such a position has been advocated by Lakin, 28 Brace, 29 Bergin. 30 This view 
mitigates the possibility of an intradisciplinary agreement as to the view of reality 
employed by therapists and the values they rely upon. Overall, it implies that all 
patients are affected by the worldviews and normative notions of the individual 
therapist. Not surprisingly, such a thesis lends itself to these authors' superimposition 
of ethical justifications and/or a hierarchical ordering of the values that therapists 
should make use of within therapy. Typically, antiquated philosophical and religious 
ideologies have been appealed to for such an ordering of values. 
In many passages, Freud warns psychoanalysts to avoid making use of or 
advancing personal values in the analytic session. A technique recommended by 
which to overcome this tendency to rely on personal values was for the psychoanalyst 
to undergo his own analysis. If this could not entirely eliminate the transmission or 
suggestion of personal values, at the very least it could a) make the analyst self-aware 
of the values that he holds and by doing so, b) diminish the possibility or degree of 
28 Martin Lakin. Ethical Issues in the Psychotherapies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
29 Kerry Brace, "Nonrelativist Ethical Standards for Goal Setting in 
Psychotherapy," Ethics and Behavior, vol 2, no. 1, (1992): 15-38. 
30 Allen E. Bergin, "Proposed Values for Guiding and Evaluating Counseling 
and Psychotherapy," Counseling and Values, vol. 29, no.2, April, 1985: 99-116. See 
also: Allen E. Bergin, "Psychotherapy and Religious Values," in Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, vol. 48, (1980): 95-105; J.P. Jensen and A. E Bergin, 
"Mental Health Values of Professional Therapists: A National Interdisciplinary 
Survey," Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, vol. 19, (1988): 290-7; 
James Drane, "Ethics and Psychotherapy," in Ethics and Values in Psychotherapy: A 
Guidebook in Rem B. Edwards (New York: Free Press, 1982). 
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their transmission to the patient. 
Contemporary scholars typically have a mixed reaction to Freud's desire for 
objectivity on this point. Many claim that psychotherapists invariably rely on personal 
values, for better or for worse. Others, attempting to move beyond this view, 
encourage psychoanalysts to be consciously aware as to the selection of the kinds of 
values they advance to their patients. Attempts have been made to hierarchically order 
these values in terms of their importance and universality and to argue for their 
relevance in the clinical encounter. As mentioned earlier, these values often have as 
their justification arguments extrinsic to psychoanalysis itself (i.e. in major ethical or 
religious theory, etc.) 
In agreement with these individuals, and again aligning myself with Kuhn, it 
seems probable that some of the analyst's personal values are transmitted to the patient 
within therapy -- whether consciously or unconsciously. In some sense, then, efforts 
made by these commentators to acknowledge these values and provide a justification 
for them does seem laudable. However, my contention with such efforts is simply that 
personal values are not -- indeed, can not be -- the only values with which analysts 
must be concerned. As I will argue later in this chapter, not only are personal values 
a concern; but what should take precedence is those values which are implicit in the 
paradigm of psychoanalysis itself. 
Ironically, these author's attempts to identify values are in my view, both too 
limited and too broad. For example, Bergin claims that the value of "respect for 
persons" advanced in therapy is justified in light of Kant's moral philosophy. In order 
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to determine if indeed the principle of "respect for persons" is advocated in any form 
of therapy and in order to determine what its justification is, I would claim that one 
should rather look to the paradigm in which this principle may be said to play a role. 
In other words, Freud (while developing his account of psychoanalysis) might have 
advocated a respect for persons within the therapeutic situation, but the justification 
more properly may be said to follow from claims internal to the theory of 
psychoanalysis itself. In this respect, then, when commentators appeal to traditions 
external to the school of thought, they have a tendency unduly to broaden the range of 
justifying the presence of these values. On the other hand, by choosing to overlook 
justifications for values internal to the theory of which they are a part, these 
commentators run the risk of failing to identify other values operative in the practice 
of psychoanalysis. 
2) Transition 
Having seen what is problematic or incomplete about contemporary accounts of 
normative notions assumed by the psychoanalyst, in this section I wish to tum to a 
consideration of Freud's later, sociological works in order to see what the appropriate 
"starting point" for a consideration of values might be in psychoanalysis. First, we 
will tum our attention to unpacking the varied meanings of "reality" in the Freudian 
corpus. Categorizing his use of the term is foundational to understanding what kind 
of knowledge of reality is assumed as the starting point for the practice of 
psychoanalysis. Having established this, we will then consider Freud's broader 
34 
understanding of society as explained in his works, Civilization and Its Discontents and 
The Future of an Illusion. By doing this, I will attempt to glean out important 
"descriptive" aspects of how individuals function in society and why this is the case 
according to Freud. The descriptive project then will be shown to carry normative 
force in the sense that the external world embodies values that are reflective of an 
individual's instinctual nature. In attempting to fulfill our pleasure-seeking nature, 
society thwarts these natural desires and drives.31 If we assume that the therapist 
possesses knowledge of this kind of reality and this concomitant theory of human 
nature, then we can presume that this vision provides the backdrop against which the 
analysand is treated. Given this thesis and the enormity of the Freudian corpus, let me 
begin with a brief justification for the texts that I will use. 
3: Stipulation of texts 
Although often cited as speculative works on the origin of society, I have 
chosen to look at Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of an Illusion for 
several reasons: 1) they were written toward the end of Freud's life when his interests 
turned to more philosophical speculations and he was able to reflect, in a broader 
sense, on the contribution of his psychoanalytic theory to other disciplines, and 2) I 
think they illustrate quite nicely his hopes for the future. 
31 Much has been made about Freud's understanding of the term "instincts." In 
this chapter, I refer to instincts as basic human drives. For an excellent analysis of the 
role of instincts and morality, see Donald C. Abel. Freud on Instinct and Morality 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1989). 
35 
4: The many meanings of "reality 
Assessing Freud's distinctions of external and internal reality from a philosophical 
perspective is in some sense unjust. Freud never aimed to do philosophy per se; but 
rather, his psychoanalysis grew out of his observations of clinical cases. Nonetheless, 
throughout his theoretical works and possibly within his psychoanalytic practice, Freud 
relied upon decidedly philosophical concepts, notably his notions of external and 
internal reality. In order to determine how Freud understood these concepts, I suggest 
it is useful to look at them from the point of view of the history of philosophy that he 
inherited. Again, though not a philosopher himself, Freud was well aware of the 
western philosophical tradition. 32 
Ever since philosophy took the reflexive tum with Descartes, philosophers have 
been concerned with the existence of objective reality. While Descartes moved from a 
position of radical skepticism to having "proven" the existence of being, his knowledge 
of the existence of external reality was based on specious proofs for the existence of 
God. For it was only in his having shown that God exists and lacks a deceiving nature 
which enabled him to trust the clarity and distinctness of his perceptions -- one of 
which was that objective reality exists and has a certain definable nature. The 
Cartesian wave of optimism did not last long. Soon thereafter, David Hume seemed to 
have shown definitively that the nature of our mind is such that it can never know the 
32 For an excellent summary of how Freud was influenced by the western 
philosophical tradition, see: Lewis A. Kirshner, "Concepts of Reality and Psychic 
Reality in Psychoanalysis as Illustrated by the Disagreement Between Freud and 
Ferenczi," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, vol. 74, (1993): 219-230. 
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natural world, let alone demonstrate the existence, of external reality. It was left to 
Immanuel Kant to resolve the apparently contradictory positions of these two 
philosophers. This he accomplished by drawing the distinction between phenomenal 
and noumenal reality. 
Kant's own stance as to the nature of noumena was rather obscure: noumena 
are inherently unknowable, yet, persons must presume the existence of things-in-
themselves because phenomenal reality has to be caused by something from without. 
However, phenomenal reality, was ultimately the only thing that persons could be said 
to know. 
I took the liberty of this brief excursion into modem philosophy to point out the 
tradition that Freud inherited and with which he was apparently familiar. Although 
Freud sometimes slips into talking like a realist (in the sense that there is an objective 
reality that is knowable in itself), there are enough passages to suggest that Freud 
really aligned himself with the Kantian tradition. Consider for example the following 
passage in The Future of an Illusion. When extolling the virtues of science, Freud 
claims ... 
Finally an attempt has been made to discredit scientific 
endeavor in a radical way, on the ground that, being 
bound to the conditions of our own organization, it can 
yield nothing else than subjective results, whilst the real 
nature of things outside ourselves remains inaccessible. 
But this is to disregard several factors ... (namely), that the 
task of science is fully covered if we limit it to showing 
how the world must appear to us in consequence of the 
particular character of our organization .... and, the 
problem of the nature of the world without regard to our 
percipient mental apparatus is an empty abstraction, 
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devoid of practical interest. 33 
I suspect it is safe to say that given Freud's optimism for natural science, he may have 
been inconsistent with his language and sometimes fell into the trap of talking like a 
realist; yet, overall, as the above passage indicates, I think Freud truly believed in the 
Kantian resolution to the problem of human knowledge of reality. Noumena are 
inherently unknowable; all that persons can be said to know is a subjective experience 
of reality. 
Interestingly, there is yet another basis of comparison between Freud and Kant. 
Kant certainly wanted to avoid the conclusion that our mental life is radically 
subjective. Rather, given the structure of the human mind and the faculties for 
knowing, the data of phenomenal experience are necessarily structured accordingly. 
Kant's categories allow, then, for a high degree of similarity between human ways of 
knowing. Persons structure experience in regular ways, namely, by means of cause and 
effect, temporality, etc. 
I believe that Freud roughly had the same idea as Kant's in mind. In other 
words, though he did not advocate the same transcendental structures of the mind that 
Kant did, by positing a theory of human nature of basic and fundamental instinctual 
drives, stages of development, etc. Freud believed that phenomenal experience was not 
something radically subjective. By and large, for him, there is a horizon of experience 
that tends to get structured by individuals in certain concrete, predictable ways. 
In some sense, although there is good evidence as I have tried to show between 
33 Freud, SE 21: 55-6. 
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Kant's bifurcated sense of reality and Freud's adoption of this and their view that the 
mind somehow structures phenomenal reality, these points are rather peripheral to the 
thesis that I wish to develop in this chapter. The main point to note, though, and what 
will be helpful for this chapter is that in most cases where Freud refers to external 
reality it is best to interpret him as referring to phenomenally shared reality. As 
external reality tends to be used in his later works, namely in Civilization and Its 
Discontents and The Future of an Illusion, external reality refers to this intersubjective 
vision of the world or of society --- replete with its institutions, political forms, other 
persons, etc. It is this vision of a phenomenally shared reality that is charged with 
normativity in my view. This should not be surprising, given Freud's adherence to the 
Kantian tradition in which the knower is said to contribute to the object known. For 
Freud, and as I will argue in this chapter, because of our human nature, persons infuse 
their perception of reality with the twin values of pain and misery. 34 
At this point, someone might object and claim that in the above account I have 
confused Freud's notions of internal (psychic) reality and external reality 
(phenomenally shared understanding of reality). Some might claim that individual 
psychic reality (private reality) already implicitly contains a sense of "external reality." 
Such a criticism is not entirely unjust. Although there is debate about what Freud 
34 As a note to the reader, I chose to use the terms "pain and misery," because 
Freud himself often uses these words in Civilization and its Discontents. At ,times, he 
replaces them with the term "suffering." For the purposes of this chapter, I simply 
intend to show that our perception of the world is colored for Freud, with "negativity." 
This alone is what "pain is misery" is intended to refer to. 
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actually understood by psychic reality, 35 in general most scholars agree that there are 
two broad ways of construing this term. They are: 1) psychic reality as an individual's 
private subjective experiences; and 2) psychic reality as consisting of the unique 
aspects of our internal mental structures of the unconscious-preconscious-conscious 
system.36 
So as to avoid the above criticism and with an attempt to be clear and 
consistent with Freud's usages of the term, "reality," I believe that there are at least 
four different meanings he assigns to this term. They are: 1) objective reality (things 
in themselves); 2) phenomenally shared vision of reality or external reality as inter-
subjectively understood; 3) an individual's own inner psychic reality (private reality) 
inclusive of unconscious data that will become known in the course of the analysis; 
and 4) the general structures of the mind. 37 With these categorizations in place, let us 
now turn to the thesis of this chapter. 
5: The nature of phenomenally shared reality 
In some sense, if this section were simply intended to be a brief overview of the 
35 See for example: Modell, A., "A Confusion of Tongues or Whose Reality is 
It?" Psychoanalytic Quarterly, vol. 60, (1991): 227-44. 
36 For an excellent overview of Freud's notions of reality, see Robert Michels. 
"Introduction to Panel: Perspectives on the Nature of Psychic Reality," Fall Meeting of 
the American Psychoanalytic Association, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, vol. 33, no. 3, (1983): 515-19. 
37 Specific passages in the Freudian corpus which seem to support this 
categorization are: SE 21: 66-68 (for definitions 1, 2 and 4); SE 23: 76-8 (for 
definitions 1, 3 and 4); SE 23: 201 (for definitions 1, 2, and 4). 
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general patterns in which individuals relate to each other and/or their modes of actions 
within broader society, we would be retracing familiar ground. Yet, if there is one 
theme that will be my Archimedean point in this section, it is the recurrent references 
that Freud makes to our "life" or our vision of the environment (definition 2, above) as 
permeated with pain and misery. Perceiving reality in this way as charged with 
normativity, is caused by persons' inner psychic reality (definition 4, above). In other 
words, a person's phenomenal reality and actual structures of the mind are in a 
dialectical relationship. 38 Persons perceive external reality as imbued with pain and 
misery in virtue of, even in spite of, their natural and internal psychic structure. 
Interestingly, I believe that this thesis has an important implication for what the world 
is in-itself (definition 1). For Freud, social institutions that exist over and against 
individuals (i.e. private property) come to be as they are because of this operative 
dialectic. 
In order to develop this view and to show how it relates to the broader thesis of 
this chapter, two tasks need to be accomplished. First, it is important to "reconstruct," 
38 For examples which indicate what this dialectic might look like in other 
contexts, consider SE 6: 257-9: "In point of fact, I believe that a large part of the 
mythological view of the world, which extends a long way into most modem religions, 
is nothing but psychology projected into the external world. The obscure recognition 
(the endopsychic perception, as it were) of psychichal factors and relations is mirrored 
in the construction of a supernatural reality, which is destined to be changed back one 
more by science into the psychology of the unconscious." See also SE 14: 136: "For 
the pleasure ego, the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable which it 
has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated 
off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile. 
After this new arrangement, the two polarities coincide once more: the ego-subject 
coincides with pleasure, and the external world with unpleasure ... " 
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if you will, Freud's vision of this phenomenally shared reality or description of 
civilization so as to describe wherein this pain and suffering exist in society. This is a 
central task, because as we know, it is the knowledge of this "environment" itself 
which serves as the starting point for psychoanalysts. Having accomplished this, we 
can then move to the second part of this chapter, namely demonstrating how this 
vision of external reality may be said to enter into the therapeutic encounter because it 
is already assumed on the part of the therapist. Presumably, having been trained in the 
theory of psychoanalysis and adopting this vision of external reality as their starting 
point, psychoanalysts may subtly and legitimately, according to Freud, to be fostering 
these values in the course of treatment and as an implied goal of therapy. 
When turning to Freud's account of the environment in Civilization and Its 
Discontents, one might wonder how it is possible to "see normativity" in a very 
incomplete account of society. In spite of its incompleteness, one does receive a rather 
good impression of the general modes or patterns of civilization's operations, 
predictions of its future development and types of observable human behaviors. In 
what follows, we shall examine three different societal institutions that Freud describes 
rather thoroughly in order to explain his general "sense" of external reality. By 
exploring these institutions, one will come to see that for Freud, this reality is 
perceived by humans as replete with pain and misery. These latter values are 
inescapable elements of human reality. I believe this is caused by the dialectic that I 
referred to earlier: human nature has created reality to be this way and is, at some 
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point in time, destined to be frustrated within it. 39 In the end, what will emerge and 
be important within the confines of psychoanalysis is that life has the "feel" of a 
perpetual struggle due to the demands of our instinctual nature. A stoic resolve is 
encouraged for persons in order to effectively cope with life in their society. 
Early on in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud takes up the question: what 
is the purpose of human life? Clearly, he claims, religion falsely professes that it 
knows the purpose of life; yet, Freud retorts " ... the question of the purpose of human 
life has been raised countless times; it has never yet received a satisfactory answer and 
perhaps does not admit of one. "40 Nevertheless, he proceeds by raising an admittedly 
more modest but similar question: 
We will therefore turn to the less ambitious question 
of what men themselves show by their behavior to be 
the purpose and intention of their lives. What do they 
demand of life and wish (emphasis added) to achieve 
in it. The answer to this can hardly be in doubt. They 
strive (emphasis added) after happiness. 41 
In the following pages, Freud continues by assessing the unique paths or patterns of 
behavior that individuals choose in order to find happiness. Among the many different 
39 It is not necessary that I be specific in this analysis as to when, where, and 
how persons are said to "realize" or even "experience" this pain and misery. Rather, 
my thesis is restricted solely to the fact that invariably persons will "see" reality as 
imbued with negativity. However, the reader might like to know that in the 
forthcoming discussion of the intellectual and the artist, I do believe one can be 
somewhat specific about when those persons will truly "experience" reality in this 
way. 
40 Freud, SE 21: 75. 
41 Ibid., 21: 76. 
paths that individuals may wish to pursue are the following: 
The path of quietude, science, intoxication, yoga/the 
mystical life, controlling one's instincts, the intellectual, 
the artist (retreat into illusion), the hermit, establishing 
love as the center of one's life, contemplation of beauty.42 
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While Freud does not claim to have provided the reader with an exhaustive list 
of the paths to happiness, historically and at the time he was writing, Freud saw these 
ten paths to happiness as the most common routes that persons follow. While to 
some extent this claim rests upon empirical observation for Freud, the ultimate 
justification for persons' pursuit of happiness is derived from a previously inferred 
principle of the mind, notably the pleasure principle.43 Operating within each of our 
minds, Freud says: 
What decides the program of life is the pleasure principle. 
This principle dominates mental life from the start. There 
can be no doubt about its efficacy and yet its program is 
at loggerheads with the whole world, with the microcosm 
as much as with the macrocosm. There is no possibility 
at all of its being carried through... 44 
By identifying the ten paths to happiness and the inner, psychical principle that Freud 
claims lies behind this, through their conduct persons evidence a pursuit of happiness 
42 Ibid., 21: 78-83. 
43 For the purposes of this chapter, it is not imperative that I be very clear 
about what Freud means by happiness. Nor do I wish to engage in the debate as to 
whether or not Freud thought persons are naturally hedonistic or egoistic. For an 
excellent analysis and overview of scholarly interpretations on these issues, see 
Wallwork, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, Ch. 5: Overview of Psychological Egoism and 
Ch. 6: The Pleasure Principle and Psychological Hedonism. 
44 Freud, SE 21: 76. 
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as a main goal of life. 45 It is important for the reader to note that by acknowledging 
this point, one-half, so to speak, of the dialectic has been established. In other words, 
in virtue of the structure of our mind, all persons seek happiness in this world. And 
yet, Freud goes on to say ... 
It is no wonder if, under the pressure of these possibilities 
of suffering, men are accustomed to moderate their claims 
to happiness -- just as the pleasure principle itself, indeed 
under the influence of the external world, changed into 
the more modest reality principle -- if a man thinks 
himself happy merely to have escaped unhappiness or to 
have survived his suffering, and if in general the task of 
avoiding suffering pushes that of obtaining pleasure into 
the background.46 
Admittedly, this quotation strikes one as odd when compared to Freud's previous 
construal of the pursuit of happiness. In the previous quotation, one has the 
impression that happiness is to be understood as the obtaining of positive satisfactions 
and not merely, as is here·the case, the avoidance of suffering. The oddity of these 
two claims seems to hinge upon the respective roles and importance assigned to the 
pleasure and reality principles. On the one hand, it is the pleasure principle which has 
established (indeed, phylogenetically, historically and experientially) pleasure or 
happiness as the goal of our conduct in the external world; and yet, it is the reality 
principle, under the influence of the external world, which appears to limit or alters its 
fulfillment. 
45 By saying that happiness is a main goal of life, I do not mean to imply that 
this is the only goal of life for Freud. Other ends, may be sought as well. St?e 
Wallwork, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, Ch. 5 .. 
46 Freud, SE 21: 77. 
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The point may cause some concern to the reader. My point is that for Freud 
persons invariably come to see reality in terms of pain and misery. If, under the 
influence of the reality principle, persons are naturally accustomed to modify their 
pursuit of positive satisfactions, then my thesis would no longer hold. In a very real 
sense, then, my thesis can be maintained only if it is the case that the pleasure 
principle can be granted a foundational and more important role than the reality 
principle. 
Ernest Wallwork, in his book, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, offers a concise and 
useful way of categorizing the evolution and multiple meanings of Freud's pleasure 
principle. The categorizations offer a useful schema for resolving the above dilemma. 
When exploring the plausibility of viewing Freud's ethical theory as a version of 
psychological hedonism, he says: 
However, those who take this position seldom probe very 
deeply the multiple ways in which Freud uses the concept 
of the pleasure principle: first, as the regulatory principle 
of the primary process of the unconscious entire mental 
apparatus; second, as the regulatory principle of the 
primary process of the unconscious or id, where it is 
defined in part by contradistinction to the reality 
principle; and third, as the ultimate goal served by the 
reality principle's regulation of the of the ego's secondary 
processes. 47 
Ultimately, Wallwork identifies these distinctions in order to debunk the popular 
portrayal of Freud as advocating psychological hedonism. Rather, Wallwork argues 
that Freud does believe that persons can "find satisfaction in the pursuit of non-egoistic 
47 Wallwork, Psychoanalysis and Ethics, 108. 
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goals. "48 This thesis is made plausible by arguing that the reality principle usurps the 
role of the pleasure principle in the mature adult. In this way, individuals are said to 
endure immediate displeasure for some longer term pleasures. 
This brief digression of Wallwork's thesis will enable the reader to see more 
clearly my interpretation of the role of the pleasure and reality principle as explained 
in Civilization and Its Discontents. In this text, Freud is clear regarding the importance 
and foundational role accorded to the pleasure principle in determining our wishes or 
striving for pleasure. These brute "desires" are never tempered or defeated by the 
replacement of the reality principle. Instead, Freud is saying that persons are 
biologically determined always to wish for, strive after or simply want positive 
pleasures. Before turning to the passage in Civilization and Its Discontents which 
suggests this view, support for my interpretation also comes from Lewis K.irshner's 
analysis of this topic. He says: 
In fact, the concept of the reality principle has nothing to 
do with objective reality, but refers simply to the ego's 
capacity to determine whether a given mental content 
derives from inner fantasy or rather, from an external 
perception. Fantasy-making, Freud (1911) insisted, 
remains a function of thought kept free from reality 
testing and subordinated to the pleasure principle alone. 49 
As Kirshner suggests, the reality principle need not be construed as usurping the role 
of the pleasure principle. Even when the reality principle is in place, at least in 
fantasy, persons may still be said to desire positive satisfactions. Furthermore, there is 
48 Ibid., 109. 
49 Kirshner, Concepts of Reality, 223. 
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strong evidence that this is how Freud wants to construe the role of the pleasure 
principle in Civilization and Its Discontents. Comparing the role of the principles of 
the mind to the excavation of archaeological ruins, Freud there says: 
This brings us to the more general problem of 
preservation in the sphere of the mind. . . . in mental life 
nothing which has once been formed can perish -- that 
everything is somehow, preserved and that in suitable 
circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes back 
far enough} it can once more be brought to light... Now 
let us, by a flight of the imagination, suppose that Rome 
is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a 
similarly long and copious past -- an entity, that is to say, 
in which nothing that has once come into existence will 
have passed away and all the earlier phases of development 
continue to exist alongside the latest one... . . . The fact 
remains that only in the mind is such a preservation of 
all the earlier stages alongside of the final form possible, 
and that we are not in a position to represent it in pictorial 
terms. . . . We can only hold fast to the fact that is rather 
the rule than the exception for the past to be preserved in 
mental life. 50 
If one were to take this quote as one's starting point for interpretation, then, literally it 
is because of our phylogenetic or historical heritage that the pleasure principle is seen 
to persist alongside the reality principle. In addition, it is due to the fact that the 
pleasure principle is more primitive and hence, foundational in our nature that it's 
effects are not diminished and hence, still to some extent establish our search for 
pleasure and positive satisfactions. I do not think that it is an arbitrary point that a 
discussion of civilization (phenomenally shared reality) begins with this reminder that 
the pleasure principle is temporally, phylogenetically, that which importantly underlies 
5° Freud, SE 21: 69-72. 
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the reality principle. 
Additional evidence for the precedence that Freud grants to the pleasure 
principle, and by implication the fact that persons strive for positive satisfactions, can 
be found in his descriptions of the lackluster achievement of happiness in each of the 
ten character types. When Freud discusses the ten paths of happiness, irrespective of 
which of the above paths persons pursue, at some point, he believes they all will 
inevitably come to see their reality as imbued with pain and misery. Because of 
human nature, the various paths persons choose to find happiness will always result in 
their perception of reality as somehow mitigating the real satisfactions derived within 
this world. 
Consider for example, the interesting, even if extreme, example that the case of 
the hermit provides for us. By a complete removal of himself from the external world 
and relations with men, the hermit opens himself up to private delusion; in short, 
Freud claims that the hermit becomes a "madman."51 Ironically, one might think this 
to be the best possible path to happiness since it is a complete turning away from the 
two main sources of suffering, according to Freud. It is also important to note that in 
his description of the hermit, Freud says nothing about this person's psyche not being 
sufficiently regulated by the reality principle. Hence, even if we are to assume that 
the hermit is in touch with the reality principle, Freud goes on to say that in this way, 
the hermit becomes mad precisely because "reality is too strong for those who wish to 
51 Ibid., 21: 81. 
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advance private delusions of their own."52 Presumably, Freud is referring here to this 
phenomenally shared reality inclusive of our relations with others and the institutions 
found in society. Ironically, the hermit's attempt to reduce suffering and/or find 
satisfaction is destined to be met with suffering no matter which option he chooses: 
private delusion, or entering back into relations with others which is itself a cause of 
suffering. In either case, pain and misery permeate this life path. 
Even when Freud explores other more "admiral paths to happiness," such as the 
professional life of the artist or the intellectual, 53 the overall potential level of 
dissatisfaction as a consequence of this life-style choice is highlighted. This is so 
because the very attempt to defy sources of suffering by choosing this path to 
happiness carries with it the paradoxical consequence that persons have actually 
managed to open themselves up to more actual or potential sources of suffering. I 
would even venture to say that the potential sources of suffering carry with them a 
greater amount of potential harm than if these individuals had chosen not to pursue 
these paths to happiness. 
Evidence for the above claims comes from the following considerations: In the 
case of the intellectual, in choosing to pursue higher pleasures (pleasures of the mind), 
Freud claims that they actually run the risk of thereby loosening their "connection with 
reality," i.e. relations with others, with the world. Such a psychical retreat, although 
52 Ibid. 
53 Again, I think it is important point to note that these individuals also may 
have passed on to acceptance of the reality principle. 
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offering pleasures to the few who could obtain them, says Freud, actually carries with 
it the unpalatable consequence that intellectuals "create no impenetrable armor against 
the arrows of misfortune" and as such, this lifestyle "habitually fails when the source 
of suffering is a person's own body." In the end, when speaking of all the advances 
of science, Freud concludes that "man is not happy in his God-Like character."54 
In the case of the artist the situation is predominantly the same and even proceeds 
to a greater degree. Like the intellectual, the artist further loosens his connection with 
reality and enters into the realm of illusion. 55 Indeed, entering into illusion is the 
"intrinsic aim of art." The artist, like the intellectual, will come to see reality in terms 
of pain and misery when his/her physical nature suffers. 56 
At this point, it should be acknowledged that the only possible exception to these 
"paths of happiness" (which as I have tried to argue must inevitably lead to an 
acceptance of pain and misery), is the path of the scientist. It is the path that indeed 
Freud himself had chosen to follow. The scientist, according to Freud, "works with all 
for the good of all." In Civilization and Its Discontents there is scarcely a mention 
that this life-style could lead to pain and misery. Yet, even so, Freud says that 
54 Freud, SE 21: 91-2. 
55 For a brief discussion of the worldview of the artist, see Freud, SE 22: 160. 
56 It is safe to say that inevitably, the artist or the intellectual will come to see 
reality this way when one considers that as physical beings we are prone to illness and 
will all someday die. Even if an artist or intellectual is extraordinarily healthy and 
will have the good fortune of a swift death, surely the mere contemplation of possible 
physical ailments is sufficient for this kind of person to come to see reality as imbued 
with pain and misery. 
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science is a "powerful deflection" which causes us to make light of our misery.57 
In the end, Freud's paths to pleasure are a double-edged sword. In our search for 
the path to follow, and in our attempt to follow it for an attainable purpose, we are 
consistently led to the conclusion that. .. 
Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings us too 
many pains, disappointments and impossible tasks. In 
order to bear it, we can not dispense with palliative 
measures. We can not do without auxiliary constructions. 
We cannot do without powerful deflections, which cause 
us to make light of our suffering; substitutive satisfactions, 
which diminish it and intoxicating substances, which make 
us insensitive to it. 58 
Some scholars might wish to object to this argument and claim that an 
individual's substitutive satisfactions counteract the experience of pain and misery. 
However, one should remember that, for Freud, substitutive satisfactions only diminish 
an already, existent, pain and misery. As I have tried to demonstrate, by citing 
Freud's own remarks, in pursuing any one of these paths of life, even though they may 
afford substitutive satisfactions, are invariably accompanied by pain and misery. 
6: Summary and transition to private propertv 
In the above section, I have tried to argue that at least in one aspect of his 
account of society, namely, the overall aim to which all human activity is directed 
(happiness), persons are bound to be greeted with the inescapable elements of pain and 
misery. It is because of this fact that disappointment seems invariably to accompany 
57 Freud, SE 21: 92. 
58 Freud, SE 21: 75. 
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most observed paths to happiness. Like Phillip Reiff, I do believe that Freud, using 
the "normal environment" as his starting point for psychoanalysis, would strongly 
encourage persons to adopt a rather stoic stance toward life in this world. 59 
Someone might wish to object to my above interpretation by arguing that 
naturally my thesis would hold if one compares this world to some perfect, possible 
world In other words, some might say that I am naively assuming a kind of perfect 
world as a backdrop against which to judge Freud's theories. Given such a perfect 
world as an assumption, then of course it would follow that by comparison to this 
world, persons must come to see reality as imbued with pain and misery. They might 
add that even most hedonists would admit that persons will experience some kind of 
pain and misery in this world. 
Such an objection would have some merit. However, let me respond to this 
possible charge as follows. Individuals who would react to my thesis would have a 
stronger argument in refuting my thesis and even be more consistent if they talked 
about Freud himself as having appealed to a perfect criterion against which to judge 
human pursuits in this world. For Freud, this "perfect" criterion60 lies within our 
actual human nature. It is the pleasure principle. In other words, viewing reality as 
59 Phillip Reiff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, 3rd ed., (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 17: "Nevertheless, the connection is partly made, 
and from it issued that great body of pathographic writing in the drama and novel 
from which Freud professes to have learned far more than from academic psychology. 
His taste for Shakespeare -- whose characters and situations embody many of the 
precepts of the Stoic psychology -- is further evidence of an indirect but genuine 
affinity between psychoanalysis and the psychological theories of Stoicism." · 
60 I use "perfect" in the sense of "absolute." 
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imbued with pain and misery is inevitable because of the primacy that Freud himself 
grants to the pleasure principle in configuring what persons wish for, strive for, etc. 
Of course, because it is phylogenetically the oldest, the pleasure principle is actually 
the standard according to which Freud himself judges the successful attainment of 
one's pursuit of happiness. It is the pleasure principle that in primitive times, 
throughout history and today has set the agenda for individual behavior.61 
In sum, critics of my thesis would do better to attack Freud himself on this 
point. For, far from presupposing a perfect possible world against which to judge 
individual's perceptions of this world, Freud himself suggests that the criterion against 
which to make such judgements lies within human nature itself. In this way, the pain 
and misery of phenomenally shared reality would be judged to be so given our 
species-determined, constitutional nature and not something extrinsic to it. 
But a second and more devastating objection could be levelled at the thesis of 
this chapter. Perhaps some readers might be willing to accept that persons pursue 
positive satisfactions and yet, their pursuits are inevitably thwarted in reality. 
Nonetheless, we are left trying to reconcile this with the following claim: "Integration 
in a human community is necessary before the aim of happiness can be achieved." 
With this comment, Freud seems to be saying that "relations with men," previously 
characterized as a main source of suffering, are a prerequisite to the attainment of 
happiness. This, indeed, is a forceful objection and one that demands a response. 
In order to formulate an adequate response, I suggest that at this point we need 
61 Freud, SE 13: 64, 90. 
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to shift our perspective from that of the individual (or, individual psychic reality) to 
the perspective of "reality itself' (or the nature of civilization itself). In this way, we 
can begin to examine one important way in which persons actually do become 
"integrated in a human community." Fortunately, what was true in Freud's day holds 
true of our present society: namely, under capitalism, private property is a societal 
institution around which persons form communities. By shifting our perspective to 
Freud's account as to why private property is a social institution, I believe that my 
thesis will still hold; namely, society as it is structured, with this institution of private 
property, further frustrates one's pursuit of pleasure. But more than this, private 
property reflects back to the individual a principle which is operative in his/her nature, 
namely the aggressive instinct. Because persons are integrated into community in this 
way, this still affords for the general perception of reality as imbued with pain and 
misery. 
7: Private property 
To begin the development of this second point, and thereby more fully completing the 
dialectic referred to earlier, let me begin by suggesting that perhaps one reason why 
external reality comes to be perceived in negative terms has to do with the role of the 
aggressive instinct. I believe that Freud strongly insinuates in Civilization and Its 
Discontents that it is the aggressive instinct which supersedes the erotic impulse in the 
formation of communities. 
Although in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud does not develop at length 
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an account about relations with others (i.e. business relations, professional, etc.), there 
are enough passages to suggest that the further persons are removed from the family 
(i.e. acquaintances, strangers, etc.) and in the event that they are not functioning as our 
"sexual objects," other human beings function only as objects of our hostility or 
aggression. 62 Outside of these general descriptions, Freud does not say much more 
about human modes of relating. 
However, in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud puts forth a polemic against 
communism, and in opposition defends the institution of private property. Several 
questions leap to mind: Why? Why this seeming digression into a socio-political 
question? Did Freud merely see communism as a threat and if so why? 
As Freud himself notes in his later works, the inner tendency toward aggression 
was something that he reluctantly had to accept as part of his theory of instincts. With 
the continued manifestations of sadism, masochism and war-time trauma and neuroses 
in clinical encounters, Freud became aware of this inner tendency toward a depletion 
of energy -- a movement toward a state of non-being/non-existence.63 This instinct 
ultimately would culminate in his theory of the Nirvana Principle. Given the subject 
matter of Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud is naturally inclined to talk about the 
manifestations of this death instinct in the outer world. And, the manifestations of this 
62 Ibid., 21: 95-98. 
63 See Richard Wollheim. Sigmund Freud (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971), 205-213, for a further analysis of the death instinct. 
death instinct are aggressiveness and hostility. 64 Consider the following seemingly 
contradictory passages from Civilization and Its Discontents. When explaining the 
origin of his theory of the death instinct, Freud states: 
Starting from speculations on the beginning of life and 
from biological parallels, I drew the conclusion that, 
besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to 
join it into ever larger units, there must exist another, 
contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to 
bring them back to their primaeval, inorganic state. That 
is to say, as well as Eros there was an instinct of death. 
The phenomena of life (emphasis added) could be 
explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing 
action of these two instincts. 65 
The element of truth behind all this, which people are so 
ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures 
who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend 
themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, 
creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be 
reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, 
their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or 
sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to 
satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity 
for work without compensation, to use him sexually 
without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate 
him. Homo Homini Lupus. Who, in the face of all his 
experience of life and of history, (emphasis added) will 
have the courage to dispute this assertion ?66 
The communists believe that they have found the path to 
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64 It is important to note that there is some ambivalence as to how Freud talks 
about the death instinct in his later works. For example, see the editor's introduction 
in Freud, SE 6:6, where it is claimed that in The Ego and the Id, "the aggressive 
instinct was still something secondary, derived from the primary self-destructive death 
instinct." This is still true of the present work, even though here, the stress is upon 
the death instinct's manifestations outward. 
65 Freud, SE 21: 118-119. 
66 Ibid., 21: 111. 
deliverance from our evils. According to them, man is 
good and is well-disposed (emphasis added) to his 
neighbor; but the institution of private property has 
corrupted his nature... If private property were abolished, 
all wealth held in common, and everyone allowed to 
share in the enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would 
disappear among men. [Freud's response:] ... I am able 
to recognize that the psychological premisses on which 
the system is based are an untenable illusion (emphasis 
added).67 
As noted in the first section, when considering the phenomenon of life, Freud quite 
often paints it in terms of a struggle between Eros and Death. Given these two 
instincts, it would seems as if there are two viable ways in which persons naturally 
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may be led to integrate in human communities. Both would of course represent these 
natural drives. To be fair to Freud's theory, let us consider how our natural erotic and 
libidinal interests forge this integration in society. In Civilization and Its Discontents, 
Freud claims that the outward manifestations of the erotic instinct are: "the binding 
double individuals" in terms of love and marriage. Such individuals are said to be 
"libidinally satisfied in themselves."68 Yet, in such a pure form, Freud proceeds to say 
that "this desirable state of things does not, and never did, exist."69 Rather, at least in 
outer reality, it is civilization that forces the continued expression of the erotic instinct 
in a much modified way by means of aim-inhibited libido; precisely so as "to 
strengthen the communal bond by relations of friendship. "7° For the aims for which 
67 Ibid., 21: 112-113. 
68 Ibid., 21: 108. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 21: 109. 
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we truly strive, namely sexual gratification, society imposes "a restriction upon sexual 
life" that "is unavoidable."71 
In the canvas of reality as we find it, Freud tells us that the erotic instinct only 
exists in a modified way. How then, does this view get reconciled with his other 
claim that "love and necessity are the parents of civilization?"72 I would suggest that 
such a claim is to be construed as stated. What accounts for the origin of society is 
indeed the erotic instinct; however, society as it exists today (and as it has historically 
developed) allows for only this modified expression of the erotic instinct. I think this 
claim is especially important when compared and contrasted with Freud's 
developmental account of the aggressive instinct. He says: 
(Aggressiveness) ... reigned almost without limit in 
primitive times, when property was still very scanty, and 
it already shows itself in the nursery almost before 
property has given up its primal, anal form; it forms the 
basis of every relation of affection and love among 
people (emphasis added). 73 
The above quotation is interesting for two reasons: First, by claiming that "it forms," 
(present tense) I take Freud to be saying that still, in our present-day reality, the 
aggressive instinct is allowed full (and not modified) expression. But more interesting, 
one should note the foundational dependence that Freud seemingly grants to the 
aggressive instinct. For, it is this instinct which acts as the basis for the very 
expression of the (modified) erotic interests (friendship, affection, etc.) in society. It is 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 21: 101. 
73 Ibid., 21: 113. 
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precisely the aggressive instinct that is said to give life to the libidinal ties that now 
exist. In fact, as we shall see in the next section, it is religion, society's delusion, that 
fosters modified and inauthentic expressions of our instincts. 
Having worked through the first of the above series of quotations, it is now 
possible to understand fully the nature of the subsequent two cited passages. In the 
second and third citations, Freud is still speaking about reality as we find it; yet, in 
these passages, Freud sounds more like a philosopher than a psychologist advocating 
psychoanalytic theory. There is something very weighty about those passages, for 
Freud clearly seems to be making some general claims about human nature that are 
specifically not to be construed as a phase (among many) of individual development. 
Rather, he seems to be making claims as to what a human being's innermost essence 
is really like (even if the reality principle regulates the person's psyche). When all is 
said and done, not only is it apparent that my thesis holds, but even more boldly, in 
this passage Freud appears to be saying that persons essentially are aggressive and 
hostile creatures. Is it no wonder, then, that private property is the logical and 
necessary expression of this? 
What seems to be even more interesting about the second quotation is that typical 
behavioral expressions related to the erotic instinct (sex and affection), seem to be 
tied intimately to human beings' aggressive nature. For, one's neighbor tempts human 
beings and are seen ultimately as objects of sexual gratification. The third citation 
which contains Freud's critique of the communist position on human nature only 
serves to buttress this point. Theories of human nature which claim that "men by 
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nature are essentially good and well-disposed to their neighbors," seem to be as unreal 
as the claims of religion, according to Freud. Such theories overlook the fundamental 
presence and strength, indeed the "indestructible feature of human nature; namely 
aggression. 
In the end, and as I have tried to show, Freud's polemic against communism's 
notion of communal property contains within it far more than a mere critique of 
political ideology. Private property, as a social institution is a constant reminder of the 
ultimate hostility of persons. Indeed, perhaps "integration in a human community is a 
necessary prerequisite of happiness," however, the integration itself reinforces a 
perception of reality in terms of pain and misery. In the end, Freud's discussion of 
private property is not simply a necessary consequence of his theory of human nature, 
nor of an internal struggle between two opposing instincts; but rather, it is our 
culture's symbol of the pain and misery of which we must endure in this world. 
8: Considerations of religion 
A brief consideration of the role of religion seems to be necessary before 
concluding this chapter. Religion, in Freud's view, is an avenue which one could 
choose in order to escape the perception -- perhaps the feeling -- of viewing their 
environment in the way that I have portrayed it thus far. For Freud, religion is one of 
the main "institutions" which is present in almost every culture. It also is an aspect of 
culture that Freud deals with extensively in his later works. Most often, people focus 
on his critical comments towards religion. There certainly are an abundance ?f these 
and it is clear that it is one of Freud's great hopes that in the battle between the 
scientific weltanschauung and the religious, the former will be victorious. For this 
reason, this chapter would be incomplete without at least addressing the role that 
religion plays in society. 
Thus far, I have been painting outer reality as imbued with pain and misery. 
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Both of these features are inherent in society's institutions and this is so because of the 
psychological nature of human beings (i.e. the dominance of the pleasure principle, 
and the aggressive instinct). However, what I wish the reader to note in this section is 
Freud's view that religious believers are those who have not successfully passed 
through an important individual stage of development. In addition, even though 
religion may afford them an escape from perceiving reality as imbued with pain and 
misery, it is clearly stated that this is not the path for individuals, let alone for society 
at large, to pursue. 
Religious believers, for Freud, are those persons who still are truly fixated at 
a phase of infantile development, namely the Oedipal Complex.74 These individuals 
have not moved on to acceptance of the reality principle. Freud notes repeatedly, that 
a mere stage of development (and not an innate biological principle of inner psychic 
reality) namely, the Oedipal Complex has actually and perversely been manifested in 
civilization by means of religion. A vast majority of people subscribe to some kind of 
religious belief and look to a Godhead both for protection and ethical precepts. 
Religion offers a primitive kind of retreat from the pain and suffering inherent in 
civilization. However, according to Freud, religion offers a feeble path toward social 
74 Ibid., 21: 43. 
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progress and better individual prospects for the attainment of happiness. For Freud, all 
religion can afford is a further retreat into "group delusion and obsessional neurosis." 
Such a retreat is nothing less than an illusion. In a very real sense, religion is the 
false (primitive) promise of happiness that Freud actually wants us to avoid. 
One might very well wonder why Freud wants individuals so desperately to avoid 
the traps of religion. This is especially true when Freud himself claims that one may 
embrace religion as a narcotic and hence, as a deflection against negative perceptions 
of reality.75 This is especially curious when one considers that Freud truly seems to 
want persons to perceive reality in more positive terms. Optimistically, Freud says 
that this can only occur in "a distant, distant future, but probably not in an infinitely 
distant one. "76 
Whether or not, Freud himself completely understood how this perception of 
reality could be construed in more positive terms is open to speculation. At times, he 
strongly suggests that it is pursuing the path of science that affords most individuals 
their best hope. 77 Even so, there are other passages in which Freud expresses doubt 
that this path can afford a lessening of this vision of reality.78 However, Freud is 
75 Freud, SE 21: 49, 75. 
76 Freud, SE 21: 53. 
77 See Freud, SE 22: 158-182 and SE 21: 53 In order to be a follower of the 
scientific weltanschauung one must "listen to the soft voice of the intellect," and 
"adhering to reason and experience." 
78 Note Freud's honesty in SE 21: 53-54, where he repeatedly claims that the 
scientific weltanschauung might itself provide civilization with yet another illusion. 
However, it is clear that these are far preferable than those religion affords us. 
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uncompromising regarding the following issues: 1) society will not be happier by 
retreating into untamed expression of its developmental impulses, namely the Oedipal 
Complex; 2) "group agreement" is not the criterion by which to judge what is 
objectively real nor does it afford the most successful path to happiness; and 3) 
Religion only offers a seeming path to happiness, yet, like a narcotic, it really only 
opens up the door to more potential pain and misery in the end. 
Perhaps the sole conclusion to be drawn from the above considerations is that 
it is only by adopting a "stoic resignation" to this present life, that there will be even a 
glimmer of hope for founding a society which will allow for "a love of man and a 
decrease of suffering." 
Ironically and in conclusion, I think it is by means of Freud's thoroughgoing 
critique of religion that we actually discover a rather optimistic and pragmatic theorist. 
For Freud, life is certainly not forevermore destined to be perceived as consisting of 
pain and misery. There is hope that we can live in a world where there exists a "love 
of man and a decrease in suffering." However, this would require modifications in 
human nature that could, in time, be expressed outwardly in civilization. 
9: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to take seriously Freud's claim that a vision of 
the "normal environment" functions as the ultimate starting point for the practice of 
psychoanalysis. Having presented some evidence to demonstrate that Freud himself 
thought that the phenomenal view of reality is imbued with pain and misery, I hope to 
have recast and enlarged a proper foundation by which to consider the assumptions 
behind the practice of psychoanalysis. 
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While it would be more convincing to conclude this chapter by having 
demonstrated how Freud himself made use of this vision of reality in his clinical 
cases, it is unfortunate that his case studies shed minimal light in demonstrating the 
force of this claim. Rather, the majority of Freud's clinical cases read as the 
presentation of mere facts. Very little of his interpretation of the normal environment 
is afforded to the reader. One can only surmise what was actually conveyed to the 
analysand during and as a consequence of treatment by Freud himself. For these 
reasons, I can only conclude this chapter by offering some final suggestions to present 
commentators who purport to assess what the role of the psychoanalyst is or should 
be. 
First, I would urge scholars to abandon viewing the role of the psychoanalyst 
as "value-neutral." My aforementioned criticisms of this view suggest that viewing 
any form of therapy as lacking a normative dimension is but a mere pipe-dream. In 
this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that psychoanalysis itself presupposes a 
distinct and value-laden view of reality. Once one has considered the values implicit 
within the view of reality that psychoanalysis ultimately adopts, this should be 
sufficient to see that any non-normative practice of psychoanalysis simply can not be 
considered. 
Second, I would advocate that hermeneuticians begin to take seriously what the 
aged Freud had to say after his many years of treating a variety of patients. 
Hermeneuticans implicitly and subtly would have us believe that both the analysand 
and analyst are learning new "truths" about reality itself after treatment in therapy. 
Freud's final works demonstrate that rather than consistently learning new truths, the 
analyst is more persuasively led to the adoption of a unified and consistent vision of 
reality. 
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Finally, with respect to those who portray analysts as advocating values that are 
ultimately derived from systems extrinsic to the theory itself, I would simply ask: how 
is it possible to justify, let us say, a religious value in terms of psychoanalysis? Freud 
himself would most likely portray such a justification as stemming from a stunted 
nature -- a psychoanalyst trapped at an early stage of human development. 
It is hoped that this interpretation -- for it is only an interpretation -- may be of 
some constructive use to the contemporary discussion of Freud's ideas regarding the 
role of the analyst and how this may be said to impact, in a very real sense, the client 
who is treated. 
CHAPTER TWO 
HARRY STACK SULLIVAN'S INTERPERSONAL THEORY OF PSYCHIATRY 
Since his death in 1949, much has been made about both the person and the 
theories of American psychiatrist, Harry Stack Sullivan. Famed during his lifetime for 
his novel clinical work with male schizophrenics, today Sullivan is widely recognized 
as the founder of the Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Because Interpersonal 
Theory is presently a main theoretical orientation for practicing psychotherapists, 1 the 
contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan are a suitable and an important focus for this 
dissertation. 
Background 
Sullivan's Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (ITP) developed from his work as 
a clinician. Born in 1892 in New York, he managed to put himself through medical 
school. His interest in psychiatry emerged when he was assigned to work under the 
supervision of psychiatrist William Alanson White at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in 
1 Council for the National Register of Health Service Providers in Psychology, 
National Register, I-13, identifies six "primary" theoretical orientations that 
psychologists may use to identify their practice. These are: Behavioral, Cognitive/ 
Cognitive Behavioral, Existential/Humanistic, Interpersonal, Psychodynamic, Social 
Learning Systems. 
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Washington, D.C. During those years, White encouraged Sullivan's growing interest 
in psychiatry.2 After leaving St. Elizabeth's, Sullivan went to Sheppard and 
Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, Maryland where he began a ward for research in 
male schizophrenia. By the end of the decade, Sullivan began to formulate many of 
the ideas of his Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. 
In the 1930's, Sullivan moved to New York City and began a private practice. 
He continued to work with schizophrenics, but also became interested in treating 
obsessional neurotics. His desire to work in the clinical setting never waned and in 
1937, he became affiliated with the Chestnut Lodge Sanitarium in Rockville, 
Maryland. While there, he did much supervisory work and held informal 
conversations with colleagues and students -- much of which was to become the basis 
of later books published posthumously by colleagues and friends. Today, six texts in 
all constitute the Sullivan corpus. Interestingly, while Sullivan published many articles 
and later became the first editor of the journal, Psychiatry, he reluctantly authorized 
the publication of only one book during his lifetime, Conceptions of Modem 
Psychiatry. Apparently, he was never satisfied with the content nor the exposition of 
his work. 
Toward the end of his life, Sullivan became actively involved in issues of 
world mental health. He participated in conferences with social scientists and other 
2 Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1953), 177. Sullivan was later to acknowledge that White, Adolf 
Meyer and Freud were the three figures who most considerably influenced his 
thinking. 
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psychiatrists both in the United States and abroad. While in Paris in 1949, Sullivan 
died of a cerebral hemhorrage. 3 
Much of the secondary literature that one finds on ITP has been written by 
Sullivan's colleagues and friends. Their goal is to clarify the main tenets of ITP in 
"nontechnical and concise" language.4 Other literature on Sullivan recognizes the 
importance of his work, but tends to explain his theory as a mere extension and 
complement to Freud's psychoanalysis.5 Irrespective of their purpose, almost everyone 
who comments on Sullivan's thoughts tends to remark at some point on the difficulty 
of interpreting his theory. His many neologisms and awkward writing style makes any 
commentary on Sullivan a difficult endeavor.6 
In this chapter, we will consider the philosophical assumptions of ITP with the 
intent of uncovering the normative assumptions of this school of thought. Having 
worked through Sullivan's writings -- replete with his detailed accounts of the 
development of the self, his categories of mental illness, his long account of the 
psychiatric interview and goals of treatment -- it is my belief that the ethic of ITP has 
3 David Lawson. The Teaching of Values: From Ethical Idealism to Social 
Psychology: Adler, Dewey, Sullivan, Fromm (Montreal: McGill University, 1970), 59-
60. 
4 Patrick Mullahy, ed. The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, A Symposium 
on Interpersonal Theory in Psychiatry and Social Science (Washington, D.C.: Science 
House, 1967), 5. 
5 J.A.C. Brown. Freud and the Post-Freudians (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 
165. 
6 Mullahy, Contributions, 5. 
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many similarities to the moral theory of eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment 
philosopher, David Hume.7 By the end of this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that the 
main goal of Sullivan's ITP is for persons to behave as members of their "society" 
behave. Engaging in socially acceptable actions creates feelings of security within the 
individual who performs them. Nonetheless, it is one's inner character (Hume) or 
personality (Sullivan) that ultimately "determines"8 how persons will behave. Saying 
this in another way, mental health, for Sullivan, is empirically observed in external 
actions; however, these actions are causally tied to one's personality. The latter is only 
known through inference. 
The ethical theory in ITP has some interesting implications for understanding 
the role of the psychiatrist and how he treats "mentally unhealthy" persons. 
According to ITP, it is the psychiatrist who claims to have the ability to "affect" 
personality. Changes in personality necessarily imply changes in living. It is my 
contention that in ITP how the client lives his/her life is of paramount importance. 
7 The reader should note that by forging a parallel between Hume's moral 
theory and Sullivan's ITP, I am in no way undermining the thesis of this dissertation. 
In this chapter, I will not argue that Sullivan's ITP is or should be a moral sense 
theory. Rather, I invoke the moral theory of David Hume because it is useful in 
highlighting where the normative assumptions are (and what their content is) in 
Sullivan's ITP. 
8 The word "determinism" has multiple meanings. As used in this context, it is 
not intended to deny "free will." Most scholars agree that Hume is a soft-determinist; 
namely, that a person is "free" to form their character; but once established, actions 
are "caused" by character. There is good evidence, as I will show that Sullivan 
implicitly adheres to this view. For an exploration of this topic as it pertains. to 
Sullivan's ITP, see Patrick Mullahy. "Will, Choice & Ends," Psychiatry, vol. 12 
(1949):379-386. 
Because of this, it seems to me that Sullivan must concede that what is of central 
importance to the psychiatrist's expertise is his understanding of the social norms of 
culture/society. As a consequence of this view, a successful application of ITP 
depends minimally on the "medical" expertise of the psychiatrist. This chapter will 
conclude with some further thoughts on what this thesis means for understanding the 
role of the psychiatrist and the normative goals of treatment that ITP may be said to 
have for the client. 
In order to illustrate the above thesis, this chapter will assume the following 
structure: 
1) What is the interpersonal theory of psychiatry?: historical 
background 
2) Development of the self: basic needs 
3) Why the "need for security?": the role of experience in the 
development of the self 
4) Sullivan's conception of mental illness 
5) The role of the psychiatrist: the therapeutic encounter 
6) The goals of therapy 
1) What is the interpersonal theory of psychiatry?: historical background 
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the text that "represents the last 
complete statement which Sullivan made of his conceptions of psychiatry."9 In The 
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Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, consisting of a series of lectures that Sullivan gave 
at the Washington School of Psychiatry in 1946-7, he defines its practice as follows: 
One needs to consider psychiatry as an expanding science, 
9 Harry Stack Sullivan. The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, ed. Helen 
Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1953), 
vii. 
(emphasis added) concerned with the kinds of events or 
processes in which the psychiatrist participates while being 
an observant psychiatrist. The knowledge does not arise from 
a special, kind of data but from the characteristic or operatioris 
in which the psychiatrist participates (emphasis added). The 
actions or operations from which psychiatric information is 
derived are events in interpersonal fields (emphasis added) 
which include the psychiatrist. The events which contribute 
information for the development of psychiatry and psychiatric 
theory are events in which the psychiatrist participates as a 
psychiatrist, the ones which are scientifically important are 
those which are accompanied by conceptual schematizations or 
intelligent formulations which are communicable. These, in 
tum, are those actions or operations which are relatively precise 
and explicit -- with nothing significant left equivocal or ambiguous.10 
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In the spirit of Freud who preceded him, Sullivan conceives of psychiatry as a 
science. 11 Like Freud, Sullivan was trained in psychoanalysis and never fully 
abandoned his belief in traditional categories of mental illness. He also viewed the 
psychiatrist as possessing the requisite "expertise" to remedy these ailments. However, 
unlike Freud, the science which he refers to is more broadly and appropriately 
construed as a social science. I would argue that contrary to what some commentators 
seem to suggest, Sullivan never sharply distinguished between viewing psychiatry as 
10 Ibid., 13. The italicized words are intended to highlight what is both novel 
about Sullivan's ITP as well as to guide this present discussion in tracing the debt that 
his theory owes to previous scholars. 
11 There is a passage in which Sullivan appears to contradict this view and says 
that psychiatry may be conceived of as a therapeutic art. See Sullivan, Conceptioris of 
Modern Psychiatry, 173. However, given the context in which he is speaking about 
psychiatry, I do not think that undermines his view that psychiatry is ultimately to be 
conceived of as a science. In that passage, he expresses concern about how ~apidly 
the social order is changing in American society and as a result, so too the practice of 
the psychiatrist may have to change. It is in that context in which he equates 
psychiatry with being an art. 
72 
an "objective" science on the one hand, and a social science, on the other.12 On the 
contrary, what makes ITP a novel theory is that it makes psychiatry be a social 
science. 13 Sullivan is insistent that psychiatrists, just like social scientists, have the 
same object of study insofar as they "deal with living."14 Moreover, psychiatrists can 
only understand these problems if they understand how in general, persons in society 
behave. 
From a historical point of view, conceiving of psychiatry as a social science 
demonstrates Sullivan's theoretical alignment with the Chicago School of Sociology, in 
particular with the work of George Herbert Mead and W .I. Thomas.15 Sullivan, like 
Mead, believed that social psychology involves "an account of the development of the 
self on the basis of reflected appraisals from others and the learning of roles which 
one undertook to live or 'which live one."'16 If the subject of psychiatry is the ailing 
self and the self is formed by reflected appraisals of others, then in practice, psychiatry 
12 For an example, see: Mullahy, Contributions, 5. 
13 See Helen Perry Swick. Psychiatrist of America: The Life of Harry Stack 
Sullivan, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1982, 258, for an excellent 
sampling of Sullivan's own and friends' remarks on this claim. Sullivan is claimed to 
have said in 1930: "I think that it would be a very difficult proposition to show 
wherein psychiatry is more of a medical than a social science," and friend and 
colleague, Dorothy Blitsen says: "Harry Stack Sullivan was a social scientist whose 
specialty was psychiatry." 
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Perry, Psychiatrist of America, Chapter 29. It is important to remember that 
this school was significantly influenced by the pragmatism and instrumentali~m of 
John Dewey. 
16 Sullivan, Interpersonal Theory, 5. 
must be reflective of social reality. Edward Sapir, also a member of this school and 
long-time friend of Sullivan, illustrates this fusion of disciplines and subject matter 
when addressing both psychiatrists and cultural anthropologists. He says: 
We are not, therefore, to begin with a simple contrast between 
social patterns and individual behavior, whether normal or 
abnormal, but we are, rather, to ask what is the meaning of 
culture in terms of individual behavior and whether the 
individual can, in a sense be looked upon as the effective carrier 
of the culture of his group .... we then discover the field of 
social psychology which is not a whit more social than it is 
individual and which is, or should be, the mother science of 
both the cultural anthropologist and the psychiatrist. 17 
Just as the cultural anthropologist can not study his subject neutrally and 
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impersonally; so too, the psychiatrist must reject "the fatal fallacy" of viewing human 
relations as capable of being analyzed objectively. 18 The ITP psychiatrist must, by 
contrast, engage in "participant observation." While this is by no means an obvious 
concept, in simple terms, this means that the psychiatrist confines himself to an area of 
study, namely, the field of "human relations" between himself and the patient. Within 
this field of operations -- indeed, only in this reciprocal area of relations -- data are 
elicited for study. This concept will be treated at greater length in forthcoming 
sections of this chapter; however, what is important to note here is the novel subject 
matter of ITP's investigation. Focusing as it does on the participant observation of the 
psychiatrist, ITP takes an important move away from the supposed objectivity, 
17 Edward Sapir. Selected Writings of Edward Sapir in Language, Culture and 
Personality, ed. by David G. Mandelbaum, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1949), 513. 
18 Ibid., 576. 
impersonality and neutrality of psychoanalysis, so advocated by Freud. This 
theoretical commitment will be shown to have utmost importance as this chapter 
proceeds. 
2) Development of the self: basic needs 
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Having provided the reader with a general description of ITP and an 
explanation of its theoretical ties, let us begin with the most important philosophical 
assumption of Sullivan's theory, namely with an account of the development of the 
self. Sullivan himself claims that we can not begin to even understand psychiatry, let 
alone his version of it, " ... unless we know how everyone comes to be at chronologic 
adulthood. It is only in this way that we can then understand problems in living."19 
It is primarily this theme which Sullivan spent much time exploring in his earlier 
works, notably, Personal Psychopathology and Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry. 
For Sullivan, ITP must begin with an account of individual development, because it 
foretells what this version of psychiatry intends to accomplish both as a discipline and 
in practice. 
Sullivan begins his account of the self with an exploration of "needs/ 
motivational systems." Individuals are said to have "natural needs," such as hunger 
and thirst, that demand fulfillment because of physico-chemical nature. Sullivan 
repeatedly claims that "persons are animals who grow up solely for the purpose of 
19 Sullivan, Interpersonal Theory, 4. 
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living with other people in some sort of social organization."20 Additionally, 
developing infants demonstrate a basic need for tenderness. This need for tenderness 
or security21 functions as the defining characteristic of human beings. Even at this 
early stage of development, tenderness is so important, that its lack will inevitably 
cause "disorders in living" (or, as we will see in the next section, mental illness). In 
other words, humans only become "human," in Sullivan's eyes, by having their need 
for tenderness satisfied. As such, it is accorded foundational importance in his theory 
and has broad implications for the practice of ITP. The most important of these 
implications are identified below. 
First, for Sullivan the basic need for security can only be satisfied by and 
through another human being(s). During infancy, this is typically the mother. To 
have this need satisfied requires that one be in an "interpersonal field." Mullahy 
provides an excellent and comprehensive definition of this concept. He says: 
Sullivan thought that interpersonal situations imply 
something more than the presence of two people somewhere. 
The two people are involved with each other-- they are 
integrated. An interpersonal situation is brought into being 
by, held together by, and the course of their events or 
processes are to a certain extent determined by, something 
in the two people which is reciprocal, the manifestations of 
which coincide approximately in time.22 
20 Ibid., 5. 
21 Tenderness is the form of security demonstrated in infancy; security is the 
generic term that Sullivan uses to say how this basic need is satisfied throughout the 
course of one's life. 
22 Patrick Mullahy and Menachem Melinek. Interpersonal Psychiatry. (New 
York: Spectrum Publications, 1983), 199. 
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At some point, in the development of the infant, one learns to satisfy one's own bodily 
needs of hunger, thirst, etc.; however, tenderness is immune to being satisfied in 
isolation. The notion of an interpersonal field has a twofold importance: a) from the 
moment of birth, the infant's basic need for tenderness is satisfied by the mothering 
person and at this very moment, the socialization/humanization of the self begins and 
b) as the self matures, through the phases of the juvenile period and into adulthood, 
this basic need for tenderness persists. In the former phase, it is recognized in the 
need for "chums" and in the latter, it evolves into the need for intimacy and is 
satisfied with and through a significant other. 
Second, what is important to recognize in the above account is Sullivan's view 
that the satisfaction of the need for tenderness is somehow broader and more important 
than the satisfaction of bodily needs. Sullivan claims that if the need for tenderness is 
not satisfied, all other needs are thereby frustrated. 23 Presumably, he thinks this is the 
case because "anxiety," (defined as the lack of security) unlike our bodily needs, is not 
confined to a specific zone of interaction/body part that requires satisfaction;" but 
rather, it has "nothing specific about it."24 And again, because the satisfaction of the 
need for tenderness is facilitated by and through another or is frustrated by the feeling 
of anxiety that others cause us, Sullivan claims that these states are descriptive of the 
interpersonal situation. The symbiotic nature of this feeling of anxiety or the 
establishment of security is crucial to note at this point; for in a very real sense, it 
23 Sullivan, Interpersonal, 42, 95. 
24 Ibid., 42. 
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foreshadows the kind of therapeutic encounter that is encouraged in ITP. 25 
Finally, according to Sullivan, the securing of tenderness or its lack (anxiety) 
promotes a growing capacity of "recall" and "foresight" within the developing self. 
Clearly, the infant develops by learning to engage in those actions which promote 
tenderness and eliminate anxiety. It would not be completely off the mark to suggest 
that Sullivan's entire theory of the growth of the self is reduced to this basic point: the 
better one is at securing satisfactions from another and thereby eliminating anxiety, the 
more healthy or better adjusted in society she will be. 
At this point, I would like to forge the parallel that I stated in the introduction 
of this chapter, namely the similarity between Hume's moral sense theory and 
Sullivan's ITP. In both method and point, it seems to me that Sullivan modernizes 
Hume's conception of sympathy as developed in The Treatise of Human Nature. What 
Sullivan conceives of as the "need for tenderness," and traces back to infancy, Hume 
referred to as a "natural propensity" found in all individuals. While neither theorist 
would claim these are observable in themselves, both would agree that they can be 
inferred from their effects. Hence, both Sullivan and Hume adopt an empirical 
method to establish their views.26 The following quotes from Hume's, Treatise, 
25 What will later be shown (section 4) is that the therapist-client relationship is 
characterized precisely in these terms. Any interview situation for Sullivan is always 
characterized by "anxiety." Yet, both parties experience anxiety which is in search of 
security. See Sullivan, The Psychiatric Interview, 94. 
26 For an illustration of the empirical approach in Sullivan's work, see: Lawson, 
Teaching of Values, 60-1. 
illustrate this similarity. He says: 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in 
itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we 
have to sympathize with others, and to receive by 
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however 
different from, or even contrary to our own. This is not 
only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every 
opinion propos' d to them; but also in men of the greatest 
judgment and understanding ... 27 
When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first 
known only by its effects, and by those external signs in 
the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea 
of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, 
and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to 
become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, 
as any original affection. 28 
One last implication needs to be addressed before moving on to the next 
section, The self system, which will further develop this parallel between the 
foundational role that Hume grants to the account of sympathy and Sullivan's idea of 
one's basic "need" for tenderness. Since a "perfect sense of tenderness" or "a 
complete sense of anxiety" are never experienced, the self develops in such a way so 
as to adjust or bring about an equilibrium between these two states. This resulting 
balance will ultimately produce the "self-system" and this leads us to the next topic. 
3) Why the "need for security?" The role of experience in the development of the 
self-system and individual personality 
27 Hume, Treatise, II, xi, 316. 
28 Ibid., 317. 
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Having demonstrated that satisfying the need for security allows the self to 
grow and develop, one might still be wondering why Sullivan granted such a 
foundational role to this need in his theory. In order to respond adequately to this 
question, two issues need to be considered, namely: 1) What is the nature of human 
experience, according to Sullivan? Only by addressing this question can one come to 
an understanding of why and how "the self" develops at all. But, 2) answering this 
question will involve the more complicated task of discerning what the "self" really is 
according to Sullivan. Anyone who glances even superficially at the Sullivan corpus 
will discover that he makes use of a wide-array of terms to describe the self -- "self-
system," "self-dynamism," "persons," "personification," and "personalities." What I 
will argue, is that there is a sharp distinction between what Sullivan calls the self-
system ("an explanatory concept and a quasi-entity"29) and one's personality ("a 
hypothetical, a merely possible entity. "30) The importance that this has for the 
practice of therapy is that it is only "personalities" which are the proper focus of 
treatment. Only by affecting one's personality can the ITP psychiatrist hope to correct 
behavioral problems, otherwise called, "disorders in living" (mental unhealth/illness). 
Yet again, I will argue that in this respect Sullivan's ITP is decidedly Humean in its 
approach. For, according to Hume, one's character is also formed by and through 
society; and it is one's character that is causally connected to behavior. However, 
establishing this point will naturally lead us to the dissimilarities or, more 
29 Sullivan, Interpersonal, 167. 
30 Ibid. 
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appropriately, the novel aspects of Sullivan's theory in comparison to Hume. Sullivan, 
in contrast to Hume, will focus his discussion on "unhealthy" personalities and the role 
that the psychiatrist plays in remedying these. 
Few commentators writing on ITP have expressed how it is that Sullivan's 
conception of human experience acts as the ultimate justification for the existence of 
the self-system.31 In his Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, there is an interesting 
passage entitled, "The Necessary and Unfortunate Aspects of the Self System." 
Consider the following claim: 
The origin of the self-system can be said to rest on the 
irrational character of culture or, more specifically, society 
(emphasis added). Were it not for the fact that a great many 
prescribed ways of doing things have to be lived up to, in 
order that one shall maintain workable, profitable, satisfactory 
relations with his fellows; or were the prescriptions for the 
types of behavior in carrying on relations with one's fellows 
perfectly rational -- then, for all I know, there would not be 
involved in the course of becoming a person, anything like 
the self-system that we always encounter (emphasis added).32 
What is curious about the above paragraph is the way in which Sullivan seems to 
characterize society or cultures in general. Implicitly, the characteristics of group 
living are such that they involve an ineliminable "irrational" component. It is this idea 
that group living is somehow irrational, in its very nature, that acts as the ultimate 
justification for the self-system. The very act of living together, intrinsically and 
inevitably frustrates the possibility of completely satisfying the individual's need for 
31 Ibid., 165. "The self-system is thus an organization of educative experience 
called into being by the necessity to avoid or minimize incidents of anxiety." 
32 Ibid., 168. 
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security. So much is this the case that when Sullivan contemplates human 
development in a purportedly 'ideal" culture, he claims: "But even at that, I believe 
that a human being without a self-system is beyond imagination." Given his empirical 
approach, the irrationality of society is evidenced in a variety of ways: through 
societal prescriptions, social rules, norms, in the mere expectations others have of us. 
Yet, in spite of its irrationality, paradoxically, it is society itself that allows human 
beings to become quite literally human.33 
Having seen that it is society which acts as the ultimate justification for the 
growth and development of the self-system, let us now turn our attention to the second 
question: What is the "self" according to Sullivan? I wish to suggest that there are 
two intrinsic aspects of the self. First, there is a self-system that I believe represents 
the permanent core of the self. This aspect of the self can only be known by inference 
and is not the proper object of treatment in the therapeutic encounter. But, the kind of 
self-system one develops is causally related to the second aspect of the self, namely, 
personality. Personality, too is known by inference; but personality is linked by 
necessity to behavior. 
Sullivan postulates that the self-system develops by organizing experience in 
the following three ways. An outline of these kinds of experience is listed below so as 
to indicate what levels of experience the psychiatrist postulates in the development of 
the self-system. However, it is only the third kind of experience that is both evident 
33 IT psychotherapists are ironically, as it will be shown in the next section, 
practitioners and experts of this irrationality. 
and operative in the confines of therapy. 
- Prototaxic Experience: is the first kind of experience that 
the infant has; the infant experiences reality as an undifferentiated 
"cosmic" totality 
- Parataxic Experience: The wholeness of experience is 
broken into parts, but still not arranged in a logical fashion 
- Syntaxic Experience: when the child learns the consensually 
validated meaning of language. 34 
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A discussion of Sullivan's notion of experience would not be complete without at least 
mentioning the above three modes of experience. For these are the ways, known by 
inference, that all human beings develop a self-system. 
As the infant moves through these various levels of experience, the infant is 
said to learn; for "learning" by definition is nothing more than the "organization of 
experience." This learning is brought about by means of an "other," or the mothering 
one, and is accomplished according to the gradient of anxiety. 35 In this way, the self 
develops and learns to organize experience by means of what either diminishes anxiety 
and/or increases security.36 
Once the infant begins to organize experience at the syntaxic level, the self-
system is said to be firmly established and the transition from infancy to childhood 
34 Ibid., 28. 
35 Ibid., 153. 
36 While it is tempting to suspect that Sullivan is subtly advocating a kind of 
hedonistic ethic, I urge the reader not to adopt this view. One must remember that the 
self-system aims at an equilibrium between anxiety and tenderness; however, the 
feeling of security itself (construed of in terms of pleasure/happiness), is an.unrealistic 
goal. The presence of anxiety mitigates the possibility that one could achieve pure 
pleasure/happiness. And if anxiety is always present (and given the interpersonal 
nature of anxiety) -- this just basically says that human relations aren't that conducive 
to wholly satisfying the individual. 
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occurs. When the infant begins to be educated in a consensually validated way, 
specifically in terms of a language, acculturation is said to begin. The manipulation of 
signs and symbols in meaningful ways with others, for Sullivan, is the most overt 
empirical example of our uniquely "human" experience. These broad categories of 
experience also serve as markers for Sullivan's more specific analysis of general 
patterns of experience for the development of the self. 
While all self-systems grow and develop according to these kinds of 
experience, not all infants receive the same kinds of displays of affection. For this 
reason, the self-system develops along the lines of whether its primary expressions of 
tenderness were either malevolent or tender. Mullahy describes this as follows: 
The undergoing of tenderness, that is, the experience 
of beneficent activities of the mothering one, in tum 
promotes in the development in the infant and child an 
active interest in being tender as is manifested in playing 
with dolls, etc. But subsequent very unfortunate experience 
may compel the youngster to dissociate his tender impulses 
or to disintegrate them. 37 
What kind of expressions of tenderness the infant has been shown will determine to a 
large extent what kind of personality one is to develop. 38 For this reason, and as 
stated earlier, Sullivan calls "personality" a hypothetical (possible entity) which is 
formed against the permanent, but unobservable and untreatable "self system." He 
37 Mullahy, Contributions, 45. 
38 See, Sullivan, Conceptions, 21-22: "In other words, it (the self-system) is 
self-perpetuating, if you please, tends very strongly to maintain the direction and 
characteristics which it was given in infancy and childhood." And again, "Alld so the 
unhappy chlld who grows up without love will have a self-dynamism which shows 
great capacity for finding fault with others and, by the same token, with himself." 
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says: "Personality is the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations 
which characterizes a human life. 39 
Personalities begin to emerge when one begins to organize experience 
syntactically. Recalling what was said earlier, the self, according to Sullivan, is only 
constituted by and through relations with another (a mothering one). This 
development begins at the moment of birth, follows "a" history (whatever that might 
be) and forces within one "an organization of educative experience with the aim of 
reducing anxiety." Personalities arise against the backdrop of the self-system. 
Depending on one's developmental history, different personalities may or may not 
come to fruition. 
This distinction is important because it has implications for understanding what 
kind of knowledge the ITP psychiatrist requires in order to accomplish the goals of 
this kind of therapy. 40 First, the core of the self, the self-system, is impervious to 
therapeutic change. What alone can be affected within therapy is the patient's 
personality. For this reason, it is necessary that the psychiatrist have a good 
knowledge of the main "patterns" along which most persons in society develop. The 
39 Sullivan, Interpersonal Theory, 104, 110: also, the definition of pattern is 
"the envelope of relatively insignificant particular differences." 
40 I urge the reader to bear with me through this painstakingly long exposition 
of Sullivan's theory. However, this paragraph in particular will be of fundamental 
importance in Section 4. In that section, I will argue against the idea that the only 
goal of ITP is for the client to achieve insight into their patterns of development. 
Achieving insight might be a goal of this kind of therapy; but if so, it is always of 
secondary importance. The main goal of ITP is for the client to change maladaptive 
patterns in living. 
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bulk of Sullivan's theory is devoted to sketching out this comprehensive taxonomy, 
including descriptions of the phases of childhood, the juvenile era, preadolescence, 
early adolescence, etc.41 General knowledge of an individual's actions during these 
phases, coupled with the knowledge of how the self-system forms, indicates a general 
knowledge of the kinds of personalities that exist in society. 
As stated previously, the selfs attempt to strive for an equilibrium between 
security and anxiety is nothing more than growing in "knowledge in recall and 
foresight." It is important to recognize that Sullivan believes that individuals learn by 
doing what is "useful;" that is, by engaging in those behaviors which bring about 
security and avoiding those actions which cause anxiety. He says: 
When talking about the terms "useful" and "useless" 
I mean them in the sense of facilitating some activity 
which is vital in the business of satisfying needs or 
avoiding anxiety.42 
On this point, Sullivan's theory is decidedly Humean in feel. Useful behavior, 
for Hume, is nothing more than engaging in those actions which promote agreeable 
experiences in the self or others. But, in addition, and a parallel that has yet to be 
mentioned, is that in The Treatise of Human Nature Hume illustrates the link between 
character (personality, as Sullivan calls it) and actions. He says: 
There is a general course of nature in human actions, as 
well as in the operations of the sun and the climate. 
There are also characters peculiar to different nations and 
41 Sullivan, Interpersonal, see table of contents. 
42 Ibid., 119. 
particular persons, as well as common to mankind. The 
knowledge of these characters is founded on the 
observation of an uniformity in the actions, that flow 
from them; and this uniformity forms the very essence 
of necessity. 43 
The more one observes the regularity and patterns of human behavior, the better 
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inferences one can make regarding individual character. And since there is "a general 
course of nature in human actions," it would follow that there is a regularity of kinds 
of character. 
Yet, despite Hume's insistence that actions are patterned, he is aware that 
human beings engage in seemingly capricious or anomalous behaviors. Hume's 
remarks on this issue are of importance to ITP because it is the psychiatrist who must 
know what is regular and patterned about human nature in order to decipher and treat 
clients that act in anomalous ways. Consider the following passages from Hume's 
Treatise in which he addresses two possibilities for interpreting seemingly random 
actions: 
When any phenomena are constantly and invariably 
conjoin'd together, they acquire such a connexion in the 
imagination, that it passes from one to the other, without 
any doubt or hesitation. But below this there are many 
inferior degrees of evidence and probability, nor does one 
single contrariety of experiment entirely destroy all our 
reasoning. The mind ballances the contrary experiments 
and deducting the inferior from the superior, proceeds 
with that degree of assurance or evidence, which remains. 
Even when these contrary experiments are entirely equal, 
we remove not the notion of causes and necessity; but 
supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the 
operation of contrary and conceal' d causes, we conclude, 
43 Hume, Treatise, II, iii, 402-3. 
that the chance or indifference lies only in our judgement 
on account of our imperfect knowledge, not in the things 
themselves, which are in every case equally necessary, 
tho to appearance not equally constant or certain.44 
'Tis commonly allowed that mad-men have no liberty. 
But were we to judge by their actions, they have less 
regularity and constancy than the actions of wise-men, 
and consequently are farther remov'd from necessity. 
Our way of thinking in this particular is, therefore, 
absolutely inconsistent; but is a natural consequence of 
those confus'd and undefin'd terms, which we so 
commonly make use of in our reasonings, especially 
on the present subject. 45 
These two possible responses to anomalous actions conveniently afford us a 
subsequent structure for this chapter. I believe that these conclusions are helpful in 
clarifying some of the most important and interesting aspects of ITP. First, Hume 
acknowledges that if human behavior appears to be random, the explanation for this 
rests with the observer's "imperfect knowledge," of the agent (and possibly, his 
culture, station in life, etc.) but not with the agent himself. Since psychiatrist's know 
87 
patterns of behavior (and confront persons who behave in capricious ways), ITP must 
offer an explanation regarding the degree to which practitioners have or should have 
an adequate knowledge of character-types (replete with knowledge of the culture in 
which a person grew up, now works, etc. )46 Interestingly, in spite of Sullivan's 
comprehensive exposition of the patterns of human development, he, like Hume, has 
44 Ibid., 403-4. 
45 Ibid. 
46 See Part 4 of this chapter for a thorough investigation of this topic. 
the following comment to make on this point: 
In our civilization, no (emphasis mine) parental 
group actually reflects the essence of the social 
organization for which the young are being trained 
in living; and after childhood, when the family 
influence in acculturation and socialization begins 
to be attenuated and augmented by other influence, 
the discrete excerpts of the culture which each family 
has produced as its children come into collision with 
other discrete excerpts of the culture -- all of them more 
or less belonging to the same cultural system, but having 
very different accents and importances mixed up in them 
(emphasis mine).47 
The extent to which ITP psychiatrists adequately understand these "very different 
accents and importances" of various "cultures" of which his client is a member 
determines the extent to which treatment and the goals of ITP are successful or not. 
But the second conclusion to be drawn from Hume's passage is that an 
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observer's understanding of the actions of mentally disturbed individuals is "absolutely 
inconsistent," because it rests upon "confus'd ideas and undefin'd" terms. It is to this 
issue, namely, how --- and if--- ITP psychiatrist's understand mental illness that we 
will now turn our attention. 
4) Sullivan's conceptions of mental illness 
I will begin this section with an account of what characterizes the normal, 
"mentally healthy" or "mature" adult according to Sullivan. According to Sullivan, 
one can only understand this concept by studying what is empirically observable. For, 
47 Ibid., 169. 
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if experience is the origin of and justification for the self-system, and the self-system 
accounts for the formation of personality that ultimately "determines" behavior, then 
experience is necessarily the place by which to begin an account of what constitutes 
both "mental health" and "mental illness." In this section, I will argue that Sullivan's 
conceptions of "mental illness" are not reducible to fixed categories; but rather, 
"mental illness" is best understood broadly -- in terms of a continuum and as 
manifested in various kinds of behavior. This claim has an important implication, 
namely that all persons may, at various times in their lives, suffer from "disorders in 
living" or "mental illness." Because of this, and unlike Hume, Sullivan does not think 
that one's understanding of mental illness rests upon "confus'd ideas and undefin'd 
terms." Rather, one understands persons' behavior to the degree that they 
conform to how the majority of persons in society behave. Yet, Sullivan's conceptions 
of mental illness raise the interesting and important question as to whether or not it is 
possible for the psychiatrist to possess truly adequate knowledge of manifest 
"disorders in living." 
Establishing the above claims will highlight interesting aspects of ITP; namely, 
Sullivan's extraordinarily optimistic view of the persons' ability and natural striving 
toward mental health. Ironically, Sullivan's optimism about individuals does not 
translate to societies at large. Rather, he is wary of the health of societies. It is as 
this point where the psychiatrist may be said to have a responsibility to play the role 
of the social critic and shift his focus from the individual to the state of societies in 
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general.48 
For Sullivan, the end of the juvenile phase signifies the beginnings of maturity. 
At this point, sufficient socialization has occurred in the development of the self that 
something akin to a relatively stable personality is established. While it is difficult to 
identify exactly when a person reaches full maturity, evidence of this threshhold is 
observed when: 
One is oriented in living to the extent to which 
one has formulated, or can easily be led to 
formulate (or has insight into), data of the 
following types: the integrating tendencies 
(needs) which customarily characterize one's 
interpersonal relations; the circumstances 
appropriate to their satisfaction and relatively 
anxiety-free discharge; and the more or less 
remote goals for the approximation of which 
one will forego intercurrent opportunities for 
satisfaction or the enhancement of one's 
prestige. The degree to which one is adequately 
oriented in living is, I believe, a very much 
better way of indicating what we often have in 
mind when we speak about how "well-integrated" 
a person is, or what his "character" is in the 
sense of good, bad or indifferent. 49 
I believe that the basic idea Sullivan wants to establish is that a "mature" individual is 
a "directional" being -- one who has a sense of his basic needs, a knowledge of what 
situations have fulfilled these in the past and an ability to bring this knowledge to bear 
on future actions. All of this establishes the self as "well-integrated." Irrespective of 
48 For an extraordinary example of how the IT psychiatrist might be useful to 
the work of cultural anthropologists, see Sapir, Selected Writings, 515. 
49 Ibid, 243-4. 
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the various personalities that individuals possess in the world, I think these are the 
basic features that one must display in order to be deemed "mature."50 
But what is curious is that Sullivan seems to acknowledge how a psychiatrist's 
investigations of "mature" persons are severely restricted. Consider the following 
claim: 
... the actual fact is that an understanding of 
maturity eludes us as psychiatrists who are students 
of interpersonal relations, for the people who manifest 
the most maturity are least accessible for study; 
and the progress of our patients toward maturity 
invariably removes them from our observation before 
they have reached it. Thus, a psychiatrist, as a 
psychiatrist, doesn't have much actual data. But 
one can guess a few things. I would guess that 
each of the outstanding achievements of the 
developmental eras that I have discussed will be 
outstandingly manifest in the mature personality. 
The last of these great developments is the need 
for intimacy .... (emphasis added, mine)51 
The italicized qualification, as a psychiatrist, speaks volumes; for Sullivan is implying 
that a psychiatrist may have personal experiences with mature adults but not clinical 
50 It is important to note that the concept of "maturity" is independent of 
normative notions such as "goodness" or "badness." In other words, given the 
definition of maturity, it is logically possible for a person to be a "directional being" 
and yet, have an evil character. But, Sullivan seems to think that this could only 
happen in one of two ways: a) as noted in previous sections, the mother may have 
shown the infant affection in "malevolent ways." See Sullivan, Interpersonal, 214-
215. This would produce a damaged self-system. But such individuals would find 
their way into therapy, for their actions would not be socially approved. b) Entire 
cultures, (i.e. Nazi Germany) may have evil social rules, and hence, a well-integrated 
person, in Sullivan's view, might do evil deeds if they are justified by the society. In 
this respect, one can see how important it will be for the psychiatrist at times to 
assume the role of the social critic. · 
51 Ibid., 310. 
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experience. In their personal life, most everyone has encounters with mature adults. 
However the "cultures"52 in which individuals associate are limited; and also, when 
encountering mature adults in the sphere of private life, they tend not to be viewed as 
"objects of study." In addition, Sullivan intimates that while "educated guesses" may 
be useful for the psychiatrist to have a sense of what constitutes maturity in general, 
as this concept actually functions in the very real therapeutic encounter, he might not 
have adequate knowledge of how his clients evidence their maturity in their particular 
"cultures." 
At this point, those who are familiar with Sullivan's work might object and 
claim that I have unfairly depicted his account of mental illness by basing it solely on 
empirical observation of human behavior. Some might say that Sullivan's training as a 
medical doctor and in psychoanalysis mitigates any concern that a psychiatrist might 
possess inadequate knowledge of human behavior. After all, what is important is the 
knowledge of mental illness itself as a medical diagnosis. Certainly, one must not 
overlook how Freudian thought and medical expertise buttress ITP. 
Admittedly, there is a clear sense in which Sullivan seemingly incorporates 
52 What I mean by this is only that in our personal lives, our involvement in 
and knowledge of "cultures" is limited. For example, a person may be an American 
and hence may be viewed as part of American society; but if they have lived in the 
Midwest their entire life, they may not be familiar with "mature individuals" from the 
South, the East Coast, etc. Sullivan is quite right in eluding to the fact that the 
psychiatrist, as a psychiatrist and as a person, has a limited knowledge of all of the 
manifest "cultures" /manifestations of maturity that individuals may display. 
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Freudian53 categories of mental illness. In addition, there is evidence that Sullivan 
even attempted to expand upon the classic, objective understanding of mental illness 
for he introduces his own array of terminology, ranging from mental deficiency, 
mental disorders, mental deviancy, etc. More than just an "immature character" or a 
disorder in living, Sullivan seems to want to construe mental illness in classical and 
medical terminology.54 
To such a counter-argument, I would suggest that if one pays very close 
attention to Sullivan's terminology, one will see a decided move toward "objective" 
descriptions of mental illness and towards describing mental illness solely in empirical, 
socially observable terms. As stated at the outset of this section, there is an 
abundance of terminology: in part, this is due to the various stages in which his texts 
were written and in part I think it is because Sullivan did not want to disown the 
Freudian legacy nor deny the scientificity and specialness of the medical 
establishment. 
We might begin exploring my claim by examining his account of "mental 
illness" as offered in Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry. An entire section is devoted 
to what Sullivan calls, "developmental syndromes." In this chapter, ten syndromes are 
defined and classified into two general types. Sullivan subdivides these into two 
53 Also, Kraeplin's objective-descriptive formulations of diagnoses are important 
in Sullivan's theory. 
54 See Harry Stack Sullivan, Personal Psychopathology, with an introduction 
by Helen Swick Perry, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972), Ch. 10, 308-
326; See also, Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry. 
groups. The first group of syndromes is described below: 
... these first five of our syndromes are of 
early origin in the development of personality. 
They all come from the time of predominantly 
autistic verbal behavior. They are deviations 
of growth that are not chiefly a result of 
verbal communication between parent and child, 
teacher and pupil. They occur before the 
mediate acculturation of the juvenile era ... 55 
The second category of syndromes, by contrast, occur "after this spread of 
acculturation takes on a greater complexity ... "56 The point to note from his list of 
syndromes is that the first five bear a remarkable resemblance to those traditionally 
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construed along psychoanalytic lines. With respect to two of these syndromes, namely 
the psychopathic personality disorder and the self-absorbed person, Sullivan even 
acknowledges the indebtedness of this classification to Kraeplin and Freud's 
psychoanalysis, respectively.57 Sullivan calls these first five syndromes, "diagnoses of 
personality" in contradistinction to the second five, empirically described, "disorders of 
personality." 
In his later book, The Psychiatric Interview, Sullivan abandons talk of "mental 
illness" in terms of syndromes. The new classifications that he introduces, namely 
mental deviancy, mental deficiency and mental disorder, seem to accomplish the same 
goal. When discussing the more extreme "mental disorders," Sullivan says the 
following: 
55 Sullivan, Conceptions, 82-3. 
56 Ibid., 83. 
57 Ibid., 78 (fn). 
I come finally to a group of mental disorders which 
are probably of most intense interest to the 
psychiatrist who is concerned with the theory and 
practice of psychotherapy. The older nosology in this 
field is undergoing dissolution, and one may hope that 
something much better will arise out of the disappearance 
of ancient errors. I think, however, that the following 
rubrics still represent important distinctions: 
1) those who suffer anxiety attacks; 2) the hysterical, 
3) the obsessional, etc. (emphasis added, mine)58 
Through these examples, I hope to have demonstrated that Sullivan's appeal to 
objective, medical classifications for his descriptions of mental illness in no way 
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serves as a "corrective" to the psychiatrist's imperfect knowledge of "the mature adult." 
While it is true that Sullivan inherited a rich classificatory history and probably did 
not want to undermine the authority of psychiatry as a "science," this in no way 
destroys the idea that his real method for understanding mental illness rests with 
empirical observation. This shows his true understanding of psychiatry as a social 
science. So much is this the case, that when describing mental unhealth, Sullivan 
says: 
It is, I believe, perfectly correct to say with 
Bridgman ... "I act in two modes ... my public mode 
and in the private mode (in which) I feel my 
inviolable isolation from my fellows ... " 
Psychiatry studies, as I see it, activity in 
the public mode and also that part of activity 
in the private mode which is not in any sense 
inviolably isolated. Let me say that insofar 
as you are interested in your unique individuality, 
in contradistinction to the interpersonal activities 
which you or someone else can observe, to that extent 
58 Harry Stack Sullivan, The Psychiatric Interview, ed. by Helen Swick Perry 
and Mary Ladd Gawel. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1954), 190. 
you are interested in the really private mode in 
which you live -- in which I have no interest 
whatsoever. The fact is that for any scientific 
inquiry, in the sense that psychiatry should be, 
we cannot be concerned with that which is inviolably 
private.59 
Here it is clear that only what is empirically observable -- and not what is repressed, 
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suppressed, sublimated, in the unconscious, etc. -- is of interest to the ITP psychiatrist. 
Leaving the above account aside, I want to tum my attention to a more 
substantive account of Sullivan's notions of mental health. Because Sullivan largely 
understands mental illness in terms of mental health, the optimism that he has 
regarding the individual drive toward "health" is apparent in his very approach. Yet, 
in spite of his optimism, Sullivan remains rather skeptical regarding the nature of 
societies in general. Let us begin with a consideration of the manifold definitions that 
Sullivan uses to characterize his understanding of mental health: 
Mental health is interpersonal adjustive success. 60 
... still the experience of the school may head the self-
dynamism in another direction which will make for much 
greater opportunity for contented living, for mental 
health.61 
Healthy development of personality is inversely 
proportionate to the amount, to the number of tendencies 
which have come to exist in dissociation. Put in another 
way, if there is nothing dissociated, then whether one 
be a genius. or an imbecile, it is quite certain that he 
will be mentally healthy. 
59 Sullivan, Interpersonal, 19. 
60 Sullivan, Conceptions, 91. 
61 Ibid., 40. 
If on the other hand, a person be very talented but be 
required by his experience, by the significant people who bear 
on him at various stages in his development, to dissociate from 
his awareness a considerable number of powerful and durable 
motivational systems, then that person will be markedly disposed 
to mental disorder. He will be maladjusted in some of the situations 
through which his life must develop, and that maladjustment will 
come about quite certainly, the partition being between those 
activities of which he is aware versus those which he does with 
no awareness. 62 
Otherwise, I shall have little or no valid basis for 
observing the interpersonal processes and formulating 
an impression of the complexities in them which constitute 
his maladjustment or mental disorder.63 
There is nothing unique about any mental disorder 
except its pattern and perhaps the emphasis laid on 
various of its manifestations. Thus, we all show 
everything that any mental patient shows, except for 
the pattern, accents and so on ... 64 
... patterns of mental disorder and related personality 
types (involve) recurrent eccentricities in interpersonal 
relations ... 65 
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I do not wish to make this an unduly complex account. I believe that in light 
of the various definitions we find above, the best way to conceive of "mental illness" 
according to Sullivan is in terms of a failure of mental health. Clearly, as in the case 
with his "diagnoses of personality" -- because they occur earlier in life -- some failures 
in mental health may be severe while others, such as the "disorders of personality," 
62 Ibid., 47 
63 Ibid.' 93. 
64 Sullivan, Psychiatric Interview, 173. 
65 Ibid., 185. 
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may be milder in form. The point is, though, that for Sullivan there are gradations of 
"mental health." 
Why did Sullivan conceive of mental illness in this way? Is there a 
justification in his theory for viewing mental illness in terms of mental health? I 
believe this is due to his most famous and foundational assumption, commonly called 
the One Genus Postulate. He says: 
We shall assume that everyone is simply much more 
human than otherwise, and that anomalous interpersonal 
situations, insofar as they do not arise from difference 
in language or custom, are a function of differences in 
relative maturity of the persons concerned. In other 
words, the differences between any two instances of 
human personality -- from the lowest grade imbecile 
to the highest grade genius -- are much less striking 
than the differences between the least-gifted human 
being and a member of the nearest other biological 
genus.66 
If psychiatrists keep their focus on what is common to all human beings, rather than 
on what makes some different from others, mental health and mental unhealth will be 
seen as nothing more than variations on one theme: humanity. 
This being so, one might wonder, "In Sullivan's opinion, who are the persons 
who should seek psychiatric help?" Clearly, occasional, isolated instances of one 
acting against the norm would not warrant treatment by a psychiatrist. 67 However, 
66 Sullivan, Interpersonal, 32-33. 
67 This point is, again, very similar to a claim that Hume's makes in the 
Treatise, III, i, 403. When judging moral actions, Hume tells us not to be concerned 
with the occasional, random action. He says: "The mind ballances the contrary 
experiments, and deducing the inferior from the superior, proceeds with that degree of 
assurance or evidence which remains." 
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recurrent eccentricities in behavior might justify psychotherapeutic treatment. In the 
end, though, this could conceivably happen to anyone, at any time. As Sullivan says: 
The interviewer has to remember that there 
is enough in the culture to justify his 
client having some trouble in living ... Every 
one of us has some trouble in living -- it 
is ordained by our social order itself that 
none of us can find and maintain a way of life 
with perfect contentment, proper self-respect, 
and so on. . . . In the psychiatric interview, the 
patient believes that he is going to learn 
something useful about the way he lives.68 
What Sullivan is really attacking in this paragraph is the notion that culture which is 
responsible in large measure for what determines successful interpersonal relations has 
not developed (and probably never will) to the point where everyone could possess 
perfect mental health. One must recall what was noted earlier, that culture is 
inherently irrational. As such, culture itself mitigates the possibility that persons 
could ever achieve perfect mental health when described as perfect contentment, 
perfect self-esteem etc. This leads to a final remark. 
Perhaps the definitions themselves patently suggest this, but one must always 
bear in mind that for Sullivan, whether one is talking about mental health/illness or the 
like, the diagnosis is made against the backdrop of culture. If cultures are changeable 
(and they are for Sullivan), then so too are these categories of "mental health" or the 
"patterns of interpersonal adjustive success." Because of this, the burden that 
societies bear for establishing "correct patterns of acculturation" is great. For this 
68 Sullivan, Psychiatric Interview, 17. 
reason, Sullivan says: 
Psychoneuroses and psychoses result when a 
society is "twisted" from the purely average 
in the statistical sense. 69 
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In the end, the continuum of mental health is variable against the backdrop of culture. 
This strongly demonstrates that persons are, to a large extent, not responsible for the 
failures in mental health. It also suggests that the role of the psychiatrist should be 
more far-reaching than aiding "particular" patients. In short, the psychiatrist may be 
seen to have the role of the social critic of and for society at large. The point though, 
after a consideration of all of this, is that patterns of mental health/illness are subject 
to change, in both time and place. 
5) The role of the psychiatrist: the therapeutic encounter 
Having explained Sullivan's theory of the self and the nature of mental illness, 
we are now in a position to see how these concepts are used in the therapeutic 
encounter and by means of the psychiatrist. Again, although Sullivan's theory is 
decidedly Humean in its normative agenda, I believe it is precisely when discussing 
the peculiar role that the psychiatrist plays, that his account leaves much to be desired 
-- not simply at a theoretical level, but most importantly as it affects the clients who 
are treated in ITP. 
We've seen in the previous section, that (any) person who exhibits a failure in 
mental health and/or who is experiencing a difficulty in their interpersonal relations is 
69 Ibid., 6. 
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a possible patient for therapy. Upon entering into therapy, from an interpersonal point 
of view, Sullivan would claim that what is established is a "field." Much has been 
written about the concept of "field theory," for it is not at all easily understandable. 
The concept itself originated in disciplines other than ITP.70 Sullivan, apparently, 
uprooted this concept and found it useful for ITP. He says: 
The field of psychiatry is the study of interpersonal 
relations and this is a perfectly valid area for the 
application of the scientific method. The psychiatrist's 
principal instrument of observations is his self -- his 
personality, him as a person. The processes and the 
changes in processes that make up the data which can be 
subjected to scientific study occur, not in the subject 
person nor in the observer, but in the situation which 
is created between the observer and his subject (emphasis 
added, mine).71 
In brief, field theory shows that the only relevant data in the therapeutic encounter is 
the interpersonal situation that exists between the psychiatrist and the client; or in 
other words, the "processes" that transpire between two persons. For Sullivan, it is 
virtually by definition of the nature of the psychiatric interview which demands this 
approach and thereby denies psychoanalysis' ideal of a therapist as studying the client 
in a neutral and impartial manner.72 Sullivan says: 
An interview is a situation of primarily vocal communication 
7° For an excellent discussion of the history and the confusion surrounding the 
concept of field theory, see Mullahy and Melinek, Interpersonal Psychiatry, 197-199. 
As this concept operates particularly in Sullivan's ITP, see Mullahy, Contributions, 
especially the chapter by Gardner and McCarthy entitled: "Sullivan and Field Theory." 
71 Ibid., 3 and Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, 5. 
72 See Mullahy, Contributions, 162. 
in a two-group, more or less voluntarily integrated, on a 
progressively unfolding expert-client basis for the purpose 
of elucidating characteristic patterns of living of the subject 
73 person ... 
Given this cursory overview of "field theory," I suggest that what should 
102 
concern us is the question: if Sullivan wishes to characterize the therapeutic encounter 
as a "field of study"74 that consists of the "processes" that transpire between two 
persons, how does the therapeutic encounter actually look in practice? Exploring this 
question will lead us to an investigation of the respective roles of the client and the IT 
therapist and the nature of what occurs between these "two persons." 
One must remember that the field itself must be empirically observable. As 
such, it is constituted by "syntaxic experience" (signs, symbols, language). In 
Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, Sullivan claims that we might picture the field as 
follows: 
The situation is not any old thing, it is you and 
someone else integrated in a particular fashion 
which can be converted in the alembic of speech into 
a statement that 'A is striving toward so and so from 
B.' As soon as I say this, you realize that B is a 
very highly significant element in the situation ... 
The situation is ... the valid object of study, or 
rather, that which we can observe; namely the action 
which indicates the situation and the character of 
its integration. 75 
73 Ibid., 4. 
74 In Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, Sullivan calls field theory, "the proper 
psychiatric methodology," 5. 
75 Ibid., 5. 
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The above paragraph gives us better imagery of what the therapeutic situation might 
look like: two persons striving towards an "integration" by their use of shared signs 
and symbols. However, given this description that "action" between two participants 
constitutes the data to be studied, one might very well wonder if the ITP psychiatrist 
is somehow always studying himself in this process. And if so, how? Or conversely, 
one might question if the client's communications affect the practice -- the person -- of 
the psychiatrist? 
The resounding answer to these questions would appear to be yes; although, as 
we will see, in numerous passages Sullivan appears to say no. Let me begin by 
saying that the use of the term "interpersonal" in this context is rather misleading. 
Given some passages in his texts, it might have been wiser for Sullivan to admit that 
some personal aspects of the psychiatrist enter into the therapeutic encounter. 
Admittedly, that claim sounds quite strange. However, consider how Sullivan defines 
the content of the interpersonal situation: 
The setting up of the psychiatric field as 
a study of interpersonal relations is certainly 
necessary if psychiatry is to be scientific; 
furthermore, by this simple expedient of so 
defining psychiatry, we weed out from 'serious' 
psychiatric problems a great number of 'pseudo-
problems' -- which, since they are pseudo-problems, 
are not susceptible of solution, attempts at their 
solution being, in fact, only ways of passing a 
lifetime pleasantly. Let me repeat that psychiatry 
as a science cannot be concerned with what is 
immutably private; it must be concerned only with 
the human living which is in, or can be converted 
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into, the public mode.76 
On the one hand, Sullivan is boldly making a normative claim about what aspects of 
the person he is and is not interested in possessing knowledge of within the confines 
of therapy. Moreover, Sullivan is also making claims with respect to what 
legitimately counts as a psychiatric problem (what is definable and/or treatable) and 
what is not. In general, one should note that what holds true for the client is also 
implied for the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, as well, should not allow his private 
mode of being to enter into therapy. 
Consistent with the above view, in The Psychiatric Interview, Sullivan is most 
emphatic in claiming that however "interpersonal" the therapeutic encounter may be, 
the psychiatrist does not act as a "person," so to speak. He says: 
From the beginning to the end, to the best of his 
ability, the psychiatrist tries to avoid being 
involved as a person -- even as a dear and wonderful 
person -- and keeps to the business of being an 
expert. (emphasis added, mine)77 
There is little chance that the interviewee will 
interpret correctly for the interviewer is not 
engaged in being anything like a well-rounded 
person whose durable characteristics would be 
pertinent to the interview. He is engaged in 
being an expert at determining what the durable 
characteristics of the interview are.78 
Despite the reactionary move of ITP against the neutrality of Freud's psychoanalysis, 
76 Sullivan, Interpersonal, 19. 
77 Sullivan, Psychiatric Interview, 34. 
78 Ibid.' 97. 
Sullivan is not advocating that therapists be empathic. Quite often, in order to 
describe the role of the therapist, Sullivan uses the seemingly oxymoronic phrase, 
"participant observer." Clearly, though, the psychiatrist does not participate as a 
person; but rather, only as an expert. This causes one to wonder, where in this 
interpersonal field does the psychiatrist's expertise consist? Sullivan explains ... 
The psychiatrist is supposed to be at least somewhat 
familiar with practically everything that people do 
one with another and to know more than his client 
does about the interpersonal relations in any field 
of interest that may be discussed. The psychiatrist 
catches on to more; he is more informed about what 
goes on in his relations with others than are even 
really talented, but not expertly trained people . 
... since the psychiatrist is an expert in interpersonal 
relations, it is not at all strange that the patient 
comes to the physician expecting him to handle things 
so that the patient's purposes will be served; namely, 
that his assets and liabilities in living will be 
correctly appraised, and that his difficulties will be 
tracked down to meaningful and remediable elements in 
his past.79 
As has been argued in the previous section, within ITP (for the establishing of the 
diagnosis), a psychiatrist's expertise is not to be equated with medical expertise. It 
had there sufficiently been established that it was empirical observation with a view 
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toward "culture" that truly allowed for successful diagnosis. Let us take it as a given 
that most rational persons, including psychiatrists, know a great deal about the 
particular "culture(s)" in which they live. Let us use a thought experiment to see how 
an ITP might treat a client whose "culture" varies considerably from his/her own. 
79 Ibid., 27-8. 
Consider the following simple example: 
32 yr. old woman of Haitian descent. Moved to 
Florida at the age of twelve. Recently moved to 
Washington D.C. to work at a Catholic High-School 
teaching history. Married to an American man. 
Consulting an ITP for despair in marriage. 
Imagining if this woman were to consult Sullivan himself for treatment, with the 
exception of being part of the American culture and now only part of "east coast 
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society," I wish to suggest that Sullivan would have little understanding of the other 
very important cultures of which she is a part, for example, the immigrant Haitian 
culture of which she is a member. Now some might object and say that Sullivan 
could have read about this other culture. Two easy responses are available on this 
point: 1) This may be true; but even in this respect, Sullivan has no justification to 
claim that the psychiatrist knows more than his client about the interpersonal relations 
among Haitians and/or immigrant Haitians interacting with east coast society. 2) 
Invariably, clients in all of their particularity will show up who are part of cultures of 
which the psychiatrist will have no knowledge whatsoever. In short, psychiatrists can 
not be expected to know something about all interpersonal patterns unless they become 
cultural anthropologists (and even they would not purport to know something about all 
cultures). But this actually leads to the most important point. 
Cultural anthropologists purport to study the patterns of society. As has been 
said, psychiatrists treat individuals against the backdrop of society/culture. Because 
they treat the individual, nuances, individual meanings, idiosyncrasies of the individual 
are significant in a way in which they are not significant to a cultural anthrop0logist. 
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For example, one might imagine if the Haitian woman practiced voodoo. This may be 
significant in a way that it is not to a cultural anthropologist; and yet, it is precisely 
this fact which is of importance in individual psychiatric treatment. I would venture 
to say that an up-state New York psychiatrist would indeed know very little, perhaps 
nothing, about this practice. What I am trying to establish here is that a psychiatrist's 
knowledge of general patterns of behavior may be relatively unimportant in therapy 
whereas knowledge of the details of an individual's life may be of essential 
importance. 80 
As a counterexample, someone might wish to argue that what is important for 
the ITP psychiatrist to know is the important phases of the client's developmental 
history. Indeed, Sullivan himself says this at the end of the above quote. Presumably, 
if clients gained insight into the past as it affects their present, clients would learn 
something useful for future actions. 
In response to this objection, I would say that one must remember that the self-
system of any individual is impervious to therapeutic change (see Section 1). It is 
only the personality (more or less developed at the end of the juvenile era) which 
might admit of therapeutic change. In the best circumstances, a client's personality 
will change; however, the psychiatrist knows this to be the case by empirically 
80 Sullivan, Psychiatric Interview, 82. At times, Sullivan acknowledges the 
importance of a psychiatrist's knowledge of the details of the person, but only to say 
that knowledge of the details may indicate a pattern. Sullivan fails to acknowledge 
how details of a person's life in and of themselves may be important and also. while 
the details of a persons life may admit of a pattern, psychiatrist's may have little or 
altogether lack knowledge of some patterns. 
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observing a client's behavior. In other words, claims that one's personality has 
"changed" are known only by inference. So too, a psychiatrist's understanding of 
earlier phases of development rests upon "inference." The upshot that this has for our 
present discussion is that the less one is acquainted with the cultures of which another 
individual is a part, the less reliable will the psychiatrist's inferences be. One can only 
imagine the reliability of the inferences Sullivan himself might make about the 
developmental history of the Haitian woman. This point directly relates to the next. 
Given the very different cultures to which the Haitian woman presently belongs 
(and in the past belonged), the psychiatrist would indeed have very little fellow-
feeling, or as Hume would say, feelings of sympathy toward her. For Hume, the 
degree to which a person "sees their like" is the degree to which we have fellow-
feeling. He says: 
Now, 'tis obvious, that nature has preserv'd a great 
resemblance among all human creatures, and that we 
never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, 
in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in 
ourselves .... (emphasis added). Accordingly we find, that 
where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there 
is any peculiar similarity (emphasis added) in our manners, 
or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. 
The stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, 
the more easily does the imagination make the transition, 
and convey the related idea the vivacity of conception, with 
which we always form the idea of our own person (emphasis 
added). 81 
Hume's remark invites two very important challenges to Sullivan's conception 
of the role of the ITP psychiatrist. For, at the end of the quote, Hume claims that 
81 Hume, Treatise, II, xi, 318. 
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one's feelings of sympathy always occur with respect to the idea that one has of their 
own person. As we have shown, Sullivan, oddly claims that the person of the ITP 
psychiatrist -- even though dear and wonderful -- should not enter into the therapeutic 
endeavor. Yet, as we will soon see, there are enough passages in which Sullivan 
contradicts himself on this point. But secondly, one might counter and claim that 
"fellow-feeling"/sympathy, as Hume calls it, although characteristic of human relations, 
does not characterize the therapeutic encounter in ITP. As I will argue, Sullivan 
argues that the main assumption of any interpersonal field is characterized by "anxiety 
in search of security." In other words, Sullivan is in complete agreement with Hume 
and claims it is security that needs to be established in order to generate the cure/goal 
of ITP. I will address both of these concepts below. 
The first issue has to do with the fact that the psychiatrist's personal 
characteristics impact the therapeutic encounter because ultimately, he makes use of 
his "personal" knowledge of living as the criteria against which the patient is judged. 
I make this point, because I do not think that it is arbitrary that numerous passages in 
The Psychiatric Interview read as follows: 
One of the reasons for the psychiatrist's initial 
hesitancy in revealing by means of a summary how 
at sea he feels in the interview situation is that 
the sort of things that he summarizes is determined 
by his own experience and his own grasp on living. 82 
If it turns out that nothing about the patient fits 
with any of the interviewer's past experience, he 
will really have a grand and difficult task in being 
82 Sullivan, Psychiatric, 82. 
useful to this patient. 83 
{With reference to a case study} And when I have all 
this information -- and note that I am proceeding in what 
has gradually been ingrained in me as a system of values 
that seems natural to Americans -- I become curious, 
sometimes to the patient's amazement, as to what sort of 
person his father was ... 84 
{When talking about the initial stages of the interview .. } . 
At least, I try to give the client something of my 
impression of why he is there. 85 
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What I am attempting to drive home by citing these remarks, is that there seems to be 
a willingness on Sullivan's part to claim that the psychiatrist brings his own -- albeit 
limited -- knowledge of experience to bear on the therapeutic encounter. More than 
just knowing or being an expert in the rough taxonomy of the developmental stages of 
the self, here, it seems as if Sullivan is claiming that the "personal aspects" are quite 
necessary within the confmes of therapy. But more importantly, the extent to which 
persons sympathize with the other is the extent to which therapy will be useful or will 
have accomplished its goal. So important is this to the success of ITP that I believe, 
in a rather lucid and honest moment, Sullivan claims the following: 
An identical distortion of living common to doctor 
and patient makes this type of inquiry (psychiatric 
inquiry), at best, difficult. Neither is able to see 
the troublesome patterns ... , both become more firmly 
deceived about life.86 
83 Ibid., 73. 
84 Ibid., 70. 
85 Ibid.' 60-1. 
86 Sullivan, Interpersonal, 377. 
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It is curious to note the choice of words in the above passage, for Sullivan clearly 
states that a possible outcome of ITP is not merely "failure" of treatment; but more 
radically, a deeper entrenchment of deception about life. 
The second reason why personal characteristics are necessary in the ITP field 
is because for Sullivan, the actual service of the therapeutic encounter is to be a 
preliminary foray into the new patterns of behavior concerning future interpersonal 
relations. He says: 
.. .it may become possible to observe 
better the factors that actually resist any tendency 
to extend the integrations of our subject-persons, 
so that they would include representative of other 
groups relatively alien to them -- a Pilot Test of 
which is the integration with oneself... 87 
If the therapeutic encounter(s) serve as testing situations of better adjusted behaviors 
on the part of the client, then in some sense, the psychiatrist has to use himself (his 
own experience of interpersonal patterns) as some kind of criterion of mental health. 
At the very least, the psychiatrist will be assuming some kind of personality that 
comes replete with details (based on the personal experience of the psychiatrist). 
Perhaps an example will better illustrate this point: One could imagine a patient who 
enters therapy who has a problem with his boss. Imagine that this patient works in the 
computer industry. Now, the psychiatrist's actual knowledge of corporate structure 
may be limited or it may be vast. The point to note is that in his assumed role as his 
patient's boss, invariably he has to bring his own knowledge (or lack thereof) to bear 
87 Sullivan, Interpersonal, 377. 
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in his performance. The extent to which a client experiences success in the confines 
of therapy, acts as a predictor as to whether or not the success will continue to occur 
outside of therapy. In this regard, the degree to which the psychiatrist effectively (or 
not) performs his role directly bears upon the success in living that the client will 
experience (the restoration of mental health). 
Finally, let me suggest that the personal characteristics of the psychiatrist enter 
into the therapeutic encounter in the most important and necessary way by means of 
his anxiety -- anxiety, of course, which is in search of security (or, sympathy as Hume 
would say). There is this sense that anxiety is somehow first and foremost our 
natural state of being-with-others,88 and that individuals constantly strive to overcome 
it by the "establishment" of security. I believe it is fair to say that in this respect the 
therapeutic encounter imitates the manner in which the self develops. Sullivan often 
states that the client presents to the psychiatrist precisely with a need to remedy his 
trouble in living and at times, to ameliorate anxiety. Anxiety is said to have the 
following very important role within the therapeutic encounter: 
Anxiety as that which makes communication possible in 
the therapeutic encounter: When there is no anxiety, a true 
interview situation does not exist. 89 
Although anxiety is always underlying any interview situation, anxiety is always in 
88 At times, it seems as if Sullivan believes that any human encounter provokes 
anxiety. When characterizing humans stages of development, at one point he states: 
"Well this is how lovely life was and then I realized there were people... " It appears 
as if anxiety is a presupposition of any interpersonal encounter. 
89 Sullivan, Psychiatric Interview, 102. 
search of security. Some kind of connection based upon fellow-feeling becomes the 
goal of ITP therapy. 
6) Goals of therapy 
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Speckled throughout the subsequent sections have been hints as to what 
constitutes the goals of ITP for the client. We might begin with overtly 
acknowledging what is not a desired goal; namely pleasure. Indeed, insight desired 
for only its own sake is also not encouraged. Insight may be a mediant, though not an 
end-goal, of ITP. In other words, since Sullivan's notions of mental "unhealth/illness" 
are based on a continuum conception, then ITP is honest in claiming that if clients 
leave with having learned "something" that is conducive to living in their respective 
cultures, then it has been worthwhile. 90 
The emphasis in the above paragraph, I would, argue should be on "living," 
rather than on one's having "learned" something. Again, Sullivan, like Hume, is an 
empiricist. One knows that one has succeeded in therapy to the extent to which one's 
actions better conform to the expectations of his/her relevant cultures. A psychiatrist, 
indeed, anyone, can only make inferences as to whether or not personality or character 
has been modified. However, the true test of success in this form of therapy is 
judged by what is observable. As such, Sullivan is quite right to express only hope --
and not certainty -- that the "pilot test" will be of some use to his client's future 
behavior. To encourage psychiatrists to make ITP as successful as possible for their 
90 For example see Sullivan, Psychiatric Interview, 42. 
clients, Sullivan says: 
I suggest that a psychiatrist find out something about 
a person before he makes or implies expansive promises 
about what he will do, or what ought to be done, and 
particularly before he begins to do something which may 
or may not have any earthly constructive influence on the 
patient .... The psychiatrist should try to orient himself as 
to certain basic probabilities according to the developmental 
scheme of things.91 
What is important for the reader to recognize is Sullivan's honesty both about what 
psychiatry can do and what the psychiatrist (and the client) may know about the 
"cure" that results at the end of treatment. Like Hume who claimed that human 
knowledge about matters of experience rests upon probability alone; so too, does 
Sullivan claim that whether or not the client will manifest more useful patterns of 
living (and hence, achieve a meaningful cure of therapy) is, ultimately, a matter of 
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faith. I call this a "matter of faith" because for Sullivan, what the client has learned in 
therapy will only be meaningful when one acts accordingly. Thus, depending upon 
how well the client "performs" in the pilot test acts as a kind of predictor about how 
well they will perform their activities in the real world. The better the performance in 
therapy, the more assured both the psychiatrist and client may feel about the client 
performing these activities in the real world. In this respect, both will be more 
assured that ITP therapy was useful -- successful -- for the client. 
With respect to the content of these actions; Sullivan in no way explores what 
these might be; for an individual's behavior must correspond to the culture(s) of which 
91 Ibid., 77. 
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he/she is a part. This is an extremely important point to acknowledge because not 
only does it indicate that Sullivan is an empiricist with respect to moral issues; but 
also, that he is a relativist of some sort. This stands in marked contrast to what one 
author has to say about Sullivan's "ethical theory:" 
For Sullivan, the "good" is generally identified with 
the state of human maturity, already described in the 
"fully human estate," and characterized as dignity, self-
respect, competence and freedom. 92 
Lawson is quite right in saying that dignity, self-respect, etc. are values that appear in 
adolescence, or what is commonly considered to be the last phase of personality 
development. Yet, drawing the further normative notion from this by saying that 
Sullivan's description of maturity functions as some "abstract" rationalistic notion of 
what all persons should aspire to -- the good, or the good life -- is a faulty 
interpretation. In particular, with respect to competence and freedom, these are all but 
absolute or well-theorized notions in ITP. In themselves, they may be pleasant to 
have; but they are not intrinsically necessary for the establishment of mental health. 
The same could be said for the concepts of dignity and self-respect. Some might wish 
to say that a sense of dignity and self-respect are essential to acting in useful ways, or 
are somehow necessary for acting well with others. There is some evidence that 
Sullivan does seem to think this is the case; but remember, the beauty of ITP both 
broadly and minimally is that people are ultimately judged by how they live. Dignity 
and self-respect, then, are only evidenced through actions. 
92 Lawson, Teaching of Values, 63. 
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In conclusion, it is hoped that the reader will see that there can no~ be, in 
principle, any one set of ethical maxims that are suggested to all clients during and as 
a goal of treatment in ITP. Values that are suggested to the client in the course of 
treatment will and do vary according to the values that are esteemed within a client's 
given culture(s). As I have attempted to demonstrate, Sullivan himself seemed to be 
aware, though did not consistently express, that the success of treatment largely 
depends upon the psychiatrist's familiarity with the client's past and present patterns of 
behavior. 
Nonetheless, there are consistent normative notions that the psychiatrist must 
adhere to if he purports to practice ITP. These, as I have argued, are strikingly similar 
to those professed by David Hume. In the end, it could safely be said that what is 
important to inculcate for the client both within treatment and as the goal of therapy is 
for him to experience feelings of security and approval from others. Psychiatrists are 
experts in this field to the extent that they can do the work, in part, of the cultural 
anthropologist. In this respect then, the ITP psychiatrist is indeed a relativist with 
respect to values. However, it is also important acknowledge that an ITP psychiatrist 
may be required to be a social critic when it is deemed that particular cultures do not 
advocate security. 
By way of illustration, biographer Helen Swick Perry says that in his later 
years, Sullivan suffering from ill health and yet living in the aftermath of Hiroshima, 
had to make the difficult decision to take care of his own health or advance 
scholarship in the human sciences towards issues of social responsibility. She writes: 
His own comment on his decision was typical of 
Sullivan: "It appears that I'm about to make even 
more of a fool of myself than usual, but, by God, 
I'm going to try it!" From that moment on, Harry 
Stack Sullivan paid no more attention to his heart 
or to his medical advisors.93 
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So great were Sullivan's worries about social cohesion in the wake of Hiroshima that 
until the day he died he was involved in issues of social activism. He urged other 
psychiatrists to engage, as he did, in interdisciplinary mental health congresses in order 
to explore "improper child training."94 Knowledge thus gained could enlighten the 
public about ill-founded cultural practices for the sake of encouraging better mental 
health, and more importantly social progress. In this respect, then, Sullivan was an 
absolutist; for, as society moved toward seeming chaos, Sullivan fought for greater 
bonds of sympathy. As the founder of ITP, Sullivan founded a theory which 
legitimated future psychiatrists to play the role of the social critic, social activist, 
moral psychologist and cultural anthropologist. To the extent that ITP psychiatrists can 
play these roles is the extent to which they serve their clients and society at large. 
93 Helen Swick Perry, Psychiatrist of America, 404. 
94 Ibid., 407. 
CHAPTER THREE 
ANALYSIS OF VIKTOR FRANKL'S LOGOTHERAPY 
In The Will to Meaning, Viktor Frankl claims that "no psychotherapy is 
immune to values; there are only psychotherapies which are blind to them." 1 More 
than any other paradigm of psychotherapy analyzed in this dissertation thus far, Frankl 
not only seeks to expose but even flaunts the philosophical and normative assumptions 
that underlie logotherapy. Less than a century since Freud claimed "scientific" status 
for psychoanalysis Frankl argues, by contrast, that it is the spiritual dimension of the 
person which lies at the heart of mental wholeness or health. 
The task of this chapter is to examine the normative force that a logotherapy's 
philosophical assumptions acquire in the clinical context as they: a) function in 
establishing the client's diagnosis, b) define the role of the therapist and the techniques 
of treatment and most importantly, c) determine the goal( s) of therapy. Identifying 
these assumptions would seem to be a relatively straightforward task considering how 
much attention Frankl gives to these concepts in his writing. Chapters abound entitled: 
1 Viktor E. Frankl. The Will to Meaning: Foundations and Applications of 
Logotherapy, expanded ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), xi. 
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"Dynamics and Values of Therapy," "The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy," 
etc. 2 Paradoxically, despite Frankl' s discussions of these underlying assumptions, very 
often a true grasp of their meaning remains elusive.3 For this reason, part of this 
analysis will consist of a reconsideration of Frankl's justifications for logotherapy, his 
view of the human person and what he calls, the "objective realm of values." 
It is my contention that when one examines the philosophical assumptions of 
this paradigm on their own terms and for the consequences that they might entail, the 
internal consistency of logotherapy as a discipline begins to erode. I will demonstrate 
that the theoretical incoherence of logotherapy has two important implications for its 
practice: 
1) the nature of the expertise of logotherapists is unclear 
2) any number of goals could potentially result for the client 
at the end of treatment. 
2Viktor E. Frankl. Psychotherapy and Existentialism, Selected Papers on 
Logotherapy (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), 4. 
3 I suspect this is the case for two reasons: 1) So as to differentiate 
logotherapy from other psychological schools of thought, Frankl often appeals to 
rich philosophical traditions to establish his theory. For example, he claims that 
logotherapy borrows many of its concepts from existentialism and phenomenology. 
The richness and breadth of these two traditions and the various persons who have 
advanced them suggest that terms, such as "being" and "reality" admit of various 
meanings. For this reason, the philosopher reading Frankl' s texts will look for 
precision regarding the meaning he gives to these terms. 2) Because traditional 
philosophical assumptions are uprooted from their context and being employed 
for a different end -- the establishment of logotherapy -- these concepts acquire 
subtle shifts of meaning. For these two reasons, then, I call them "elusive." 
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In a variety of senses, I will argue that relativism lurks beneath logotherapy. Rather 
than having established "the meaning of being human therapy" and attempting to 
remedy clients' ailments by means of its methods, Frankl can only honestly be said to 
have put forth an interpretation of a meaning of being human. As this last claim is 
itself interpreted by individual practitioners of logotherapy, in its very real and human 
context, any number of possible values may be achieved by the person who seeks this 
kind of treatment. 
Admittedly, the above paragraph reads as a very complex thesis statement. To 
aid the reader to see the force that my interpretation has and to see it unfold from the 
variety of perspectives under which logotherapy can be viewed, 4 the main themes of 
this chapter are outlined below: 
1) Historical background and purpose of logotherapy: 
a) Why did this form of therapy arise and for what end(s)? 
b) Is logotherapy merely a "supplement" to psychotherapy? 
2) Logotherapy's view of the person 
a) Frankl's dimensional ontology 
b) Preliminary consideration of mental illness 
c) The tragic triad of human existence: pain, death and guilt 
3) "Logos" (meaning): The objective realm of experience 
4) How do we know the objective realm of experience: the role of 
intuitive conscience 
5) Bridge: What has been accomplished? 
6) The therapeutic encounter: 
a) Treatment of the clinical neurotic 
4 What I mean by this last phrase is simply that the clinical encounter involves 
at least two different points of view - that of the client and the therapist. When one 
adds temporal considerations to this, i.e. the client's view at the beginning, during and 
at the end of therapy, one can see how logotherapy could be viewed from a variety of 
perspectives. Of course, and as I have been suggesting, underlying these perspectives 
is the theory itself (the philosophical assumptions) that the logotherapist purportedly 
adopts. 
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b) Treatment of the existential neurotic 
7) Conclusion 
1) Historical background and purpose of logotherapy: 
1 a) Why did this form of therapy arise and for what ends? 
In his first chapter of The Will to Meaning, Frankl acknowledges the historical 
indebtedness of logotherapy to other forms of psychotherapy. 5 Accordingly, 
logotherapy draws from Freud's psychoanalysis and even the philosophical writings of 
Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler and Martin Buber. Yet, because logotherapy merits its 
own name and interprets the concept of mental health in a unique manner, Frankl is 
eager to point out the differences between his version of therapy and those of his 
predecessors. 
In order to situate his version of therapy in the scheme of existing paradigms, 
Frankl claims that logotherapy can be viewed as a branch of existential or onto-
analysis.6 Like Ludwig Binswanger, Frankl agrees that psychotherapy should be 
concerned with the human person's "being;" however, unlike Binswanger, Frankl 
maintains that "being" requires the corollary of "meaning." It is because existential 
analysts overlooked this second and necessary correlate of human existence that Frankl 
saw the need to further develop this school of thought by means of logotherapy. 
5 Ibid., 3-12. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
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Both theoretically and practically, the addition of the concept of meaning is 
essential because the self, for Frankl, simply can not be understood without some 
reference to an "other." As opposed to the philosophy of Sartre and Binswanger's 
(incomplete) existential analysis, Frankl maintains that the self can neither be what it is 
nor become what it should be when considered against the background of nothingness. 
An other/meaning(s) is required for human being-in-the-world.7 
The theoretical rationale for this view rests, in part, on a more complete 
conception of the nature of the person. In Frankl's view, previous schools of 
psychotherapy overlooked the importance of logos precisely because they took for 
granted the intrinsic spiritual core of the human person. Viewing the human person as 
a combination of body and psyche forced the unpalatable conclusion that the human 
person is solely a mechanism and driven by instincts. Although both psychoanalysis 
and interpersonal forms of therapy have addressed these aspects of the human person, 
their inadequacy lies in not recognizing that it is the spiritual (logos-seeking) aspect of 
the human person which "constitutes oneness and wholeness in man. "8 Logotherapy 
7 As we shall see in subsequent sections, the therapeutic setting itself must 
imitate this self/other relationship. It is the logotherapist who facilitates the clients' 
being to come in contact with meaning(s). As Frankl states in The Will to Meaning, 
11-12: " .. .if self-understanding is to be reached, it has to be mediated by encounter. In 
other words, Freud's statement, where id is, ego should be, could be enlarged; Where 
id is ego should be; but the ego can only become an ego through a Thou." 
8 Viktor E. Frankl. The Unconscious God: Psychotherapy and Theo/o~ (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 28. 
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addresses the spiritual dimension of the person and by implication, logotherapists 
attempt to bring their clients into contact with "meaning." 
In this section, I have attempted to summarize one motivation that led to the 
formation of logotherapy. 9 When viewed in its historical context, it can be seen as an 
intellectual development of existing psychotherapeutic paradigms. For this reason, 
Frankl frequently speaks of logotherapy as "supplementary" to traditional 
psychotherapy. 10 Yet, even a cursory glance at the underlying rationale for 
logotherapy -- involving as it does a more complete conception of the nature of the 
person and a discussion of meanings -- makes one wonder if it is more appropriate to 
say that logotherapy constitutes a "revisionary" or "radically new" form of 
psychotherapy. Determining whether or not logotherapy is intended to be only a 
supplement to psychotherapy, or perhaps something more, is extremely important. It 
will enable one to have a clear sense of what it is that logotherapy intends to do, both 
theoretically and practically for the client who seeks this kind of treatment. Attempting 
to answer this question directly leads us to the next question of this chapter. 
9 It would be an oversight not to acknowledge the personal motivation that led 
to Frankl's logotherapy. See Frankl, Doctor and Soul, x. There, he says that his 
experience in the concentration camps served as a "testing ground for the main tenet 
of logotherapy." Much of the theory had been developed prior to his entering the 
concentration camps; however, the work was taken from him by the S.S. The thought 
of reconstructing the book served as an orientation toward a meaning which had 
survival value for him while in the camps. 
10 Ibid., xii, 17, 270. 
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1 b) Is logotherapy merely a supplement to psychotherapy? 
An architectural metaphor may be helpful to illustrate the nature and the 
importance of the above distinction. One might compare "traditional psychotherapy" 
to a classically constructed building. If, as Frankl often claims, logotherapy is a 
"supplement and not a substitute for psychotherapy," one might imagine that 
logotherapy adds necessary structural supports to the already existent building. Even 
with the supports, the overall appearance of the building remains the same. However, 
if one construes logotherapy as revisionary, one might imagine in light of the metaphor 
that it adds new and different supports to the building. If the support system were 
"radically new," such as an inner steel frame might be for a classically constructed 
building, it would necessarily follow that the overall appearance of the building would 
be different. One might imagine that a classically constructed building with an interior 
frame structure would no longer even bear a resemblance to what it once was; but 
rather, it might look like a modem-day skyscraper. The same would be true if one 
were to view logotherapy as providing foundations of a "radically new" kind for 
psychotherapy. Traditional psychotherapy would no longer look as it does. It would, 
by necessity "become" something different. 
Repeatedly in his writings and as noted before, Frankl maintains that logotherapy is 
supplementary to psychotherapy and because of this, is not applicable to all 
traditionally conceived mental illnesses. Logotherapy, properly speaking, only 
addresses the spiritual core of the human person and does not purport to treat the 
body and psyche. Because of this, Frankl sometimes speaks as if logotherapy is only 
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applicable to those who suffer from uniquely spiritual illnesses (i.e. the existential 
vacuum, collective neurosis). If we are to interpret Frankl literally on this point, a 
practical problem emerges for the potential client of logotherapy: If the human 
person, metaphysically speaking, consists of a body, mind and spirit, is it possible that 
one see a psychiatrist for medical management, a psychotherapist for interpreting one's 
psyche and a logotherapist for concerns of the spirit/meaning? Are three different 
"professionals" needed? Viewing logotherapy as a "supplement and not a substitute" 
for psychotherapy would seem to delimit its appropriate sphere of intervention to only 
and exclusively matters of the spirit. Practically, this would mean that clients might 
need treatment from other professionals. 
In other passages, Frankl rejects the above consequence. 11 By doing so, it appears 
as if Frankl intends logotherapy to be more than a mere "supplement" for 
psychotherapy. For example, some chapters of Frankl' s books are devoted to 
demonstrating how classic (psychoanalytic) mental illness, i.e. obsessional neurosis, 
anxiety neurosis, sexual frustration can be "cured" by means of logotherapy's 
techniques. 12 In addition, his characterization of logotherapy as a medical ministry 
11 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 151-2. "I am reminded of the American doctor 
who once turned up in my clinic and asked me, 'Now, doctor, are you a 
psychoanalyst?' Whereupon I replied, 'Not exactly a psychoanalyst; let's say a 
psychotherapist.' He then asked me, 'What school do you stand for?' I answered, 'It 
is my own theory. It is logotherapy.'" 
12 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 176-209. 
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highlights the therapeutic effects that logotherapy may have on the body. 13 More than 
a supplement, logotherapy purports to do the following: 
The applications of logotherapy discussed in this 
book are also threefold: First of all, logotherapy is 
applicable as a treatment of noogenic neurosis; 
second, logotherapy is a treatment of psychogenic 
neuroses, i.e. neuroses in the conventional sense of 
the word; and third, logotherapy is a treatment of 
somatogenic neuroses, or for that matter, 
somatogenic diseases in general. As we see, all the 
dimension of a human being are reflected in this 
sequence of subject matters. 14 
Indeed, as Frankl himself argues in this passage, "all the dimensions" of the human 
being can be addressed by logotherapy's applications. Far from treating a mere one-
third of our total human nature, the above citations show that logotherapy aims to do 
much more. In my view, these two incompatible accounts of the purpose of 
logotherapy rest upon Frankl' s ambiguous account of the nature of the human person. 
As noted before, Frankl is eager to point out the philosophical foundations of 
logotherapy; however, and as we will see in the next section, his discussion of the 
nature of the person admits of two very different interpretations. In sum, depending 
on what view of the person the logotherapist ultimately adopts determines if 
13 Ibid., 281. "Medical ministry belongs in the work of every physician. The 
surgeon should have recourse to it as much and as often as the neurologist or 
psychiatrist. It is only that the goal of medical ministry is different and goes deeper 
than that of the surgeon ..... Where actual surgery comes to an end, the work of 
medical ministry begins. For something must follow after the surgeon has laid aside 
his scalpel, or where surgical work is ruled out -- as, for example, the inoperable 
case." 
14 Frankl, Will to Meaning, viii. 
logotherapy is only a "supplement to psychotherapy" or is, in fact, "revisionary in 
nature. 15 
2) Logotherapy's view of the human person 
2a) Frankl's dimensional ontology 
Frankl' s account of the self was modified over the years. Yet, unlike Freud, it 
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could be argued that Frankl merely used different language to describe the self and did 
not substantively change his theory. In other words, Frankl's view of the self remains 
essentially the same. It is also, as I will argue, a consistently vague theory. For, 
whether one considers Frankl's earlier or later work, both accounts admit of at least 
two interpretations of the nature of the person. In what follows, I will describe these 
two competing conceptions of the self and demonstrate how each implicitly supports 
different aims of logotherapy as a discipline -- as either supplementary to 
psychotherapy or as a revisionary form of therapy. Curiously, it will also be shown 
that Frankl himself seems to favor one conception of the human person as opposed to 
the other and, therefore, most likely does construe logotherapy as a "revisionary 
version of psychotherapy." Consequences that this interpretation has for other aspects 
of his therapy will be noted (i.e. descriptions of mental illness, motivational account, 
causal account, etc.). 
15 It goes without saying that if logotherapy theoretically admits of two 
different interpretations regarding the nature of the person, then which view a 
logotherapist adopts for practice is a matter of individual choice. In this way, 
arbitrariness is imbued in the nature of the "expertise" that logotherapists claim to 
possess. This individual choice might imply different goals for the clients treated by 
this form of therapy. 
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Frankl' s 194 7 text, The Unconscious God, is one of his first attempts at 
characterizing the nature of the human person and the need for logotherapy. Even in 
this early work, the primacy that Frankl accords to the spiritual dimension of the 
person is apparent. However, in this book, Frankl' s account seems constrained by the 
language of depth psychology. Like Freud, Frankl employs the notions of the 
unconscious and conscious. Only unlike Freud, in this account he claims that "the 
spiritual basis of human existence is ultimately unconscious."16 Rather than merely 
being the locus of instincts, the belief that the human person is fundamentally a 
conscious and responsible agent is rooted at this primordial level of being. 
Presumably, Frankl expands the notion of the unconscious in this way so as to align 
logotherapy (in terms of technique) with psychoanalysis. Just as Freud believed that 
unconscious material needed to be made conscious; so too, Frankl claims that in 
logotherapy one is consciously made aware of their basic human nature: of being a 
free, responsible and spiritual being. 
In his later work, Frankl abandons talk of the spiritual unconscious which is at the 
root of the self. I suspect he did this for two, somewhat related reasons: 1) It seems 
plausible to suggest that Frankl realized the limitations of the language of depth 
psychology to characterize the nature of the spiritual self. Even in his early work, 
Frankl seems to struggle with talk of a spiritual unconscious which is essentially free 
and responsible. This leads him to make obscure claims such as "spiritual 
phenomenon may be unconscious or conscious. "17 2) Inspired by the work of Nicolai 
16 Frankl, Unconscious God, 31. 
129 
Hartmann and Max Scheler, Frankl realized that the language of "dimensional 
ontology" better characterized his view of the person. 18 Even with this improvement, 
however, two competing interpretations can be derived from this account. 
In later work, Frankl adopts a concentric circle approach for analyzing human 
nature. The core of the self is the spiritual center which is the locus of two, 
irreducible ontological features: consciousness and responsibility. 19 Encircling our 
spiritual core (and in this order) are the psyche and the body. To speak of the self as 
having "aspects" -- consisting of strata or layers as Hartmann or Scheler claim, -- does 
"justice," Frankl says "to the ontological differences of the human person."20 It is this 
view of the person which implicitly supports the view that logotherapy is a supplement 
and not a substitute for psychotherapy. 
Nonetheless, despite these ontological differences, Frankl is adamant that the self 
be viewed as a unity. Indeed, he criticizes Scheler's and Hartmann's account for 
failing to emphasize the "unity that man is, a unity in spite of multiplicity."21 Concern 
for presenting a holistic view of human nature is apparent even in his treatment of the 
self in The Unconscious God In that text, Frankl critiques Freud's psychic atomism; 
namely that the human being is conceived of in terms of distinct parts: the id, the ego 
17 Ibid. 
18 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 22. 
19 Frankl does seem to want to justify these assumptions. For an example, see 
Doctor and Soul, fn. 5-6. 
2° Frankl, Will to Meaning, 22. 
21 Ibid. 
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and the super-ego. Frankl's dissatisfaction with Freud's characterization of the self is 
that it implied that the task of psychoanalysis was to reconstruct the whole person out 
of mere fragments. 22 
It is hoped that the reader can now see why logotherapy may have two very 
different aims. Depending if one gives precedence to the three, ontologically different 
aspects of the self, one may construe logotherapy as a supplement to psychotherapy. 
While this interpretation is warranted based on his description of the self, Frankl 
probably realized that too much emphasis on these ontological differences would 
expose logotherapy to the same kind of criticism to which psychoanalysis falls prey. 
If, on the other hand, one views the self as an integrated unity -- as Frankl seems to 
advocate -- then logotherapy is indeed a revisionary form of psychotherapy and even 
more, a medical ministry. If Frankl's view of the person is "revisionary" in this sense, 
one can expect that his descriptions of what constitutes mental illness will be different 
as well. 
Giving precedence to the self as a unified whole has some interesting consequences 
for logotherapy, now viewed as a revisionary form of psychotherapy. Two of these 
implications are alluded to in the following passage: 
Of necessity the unity of man -- a unity in spite of the 
multiplicity of body and mind -- cannot be found in the 
biological or psychological but must be sought in that 
noological dimension out of which man is projected in 
the first place. 23 
22 Frankl, Unconscious God, 21. 
23 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 25. 
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If the unity of the person rests upon the noological (spiritual) core of the self, by 
necessity the three dimensions of the person are hierarchically arranged. As a result, it 
will be shown that for Frankl it is the spiritual core of the human person which 
functions as the foundational and most important aspect of our existence. If this is the 
case, then one might expect Frankl to provide the reader with a causal account of how 
it is that the spirit "impacts" the other two dimensions of the self. In sum, some kind 
of causal story that explains the connections between these three strata is needed. 
Finally, if it is consciousness and responsibility that capture the essential nature of the 
human person, one might wonder what importance Frankl might grant to a client's 
desires in the confines of therapy. 
In the next section, we will turn to an examination of Frankl' s notions of mental 
illness. If the above is a correct characterization of the person, then perhaps a 
preliminary understanding of the nature of mental illness can be reached. Such an 
investigation may carry with it the possibility that normative assumptions attached to 
these definitions can be glimpsed. 
2b) Preliminary consideration of mental illness 
Understanding logotherapy as a revisionary psychotherapy due to its metaphysically 
enriched description of the person suggests that traditional conceptions of mental 
illness will be altered.24 As mentioned in an earlier section of this paper, Frankl's 
24 By the phrase, "traditional conceptions of mental illness and norm3:lcy," I 
am simply referring to those schools of thought which characterize mental illness 
solely in terms of a psychological data, i.e. Freud's psychoanalysis and H.S. Sullivan's 
interpersonal theory of psychiatry. 
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logotherapy does purport to treat schizophrenia, obsessional neurosis, anxiety neurosis, 
etc.25 However, one must bear in mind that the meaning assigned to these terms is 
markedly different; that is to say, they are literally "re-viewed" through the lens of 
logotherapy's understanding of what it means to be a person. In this section, we will 
engage in a preliminary consideration of how Frankl conceives of mental illness. 26 
Since the biological and psychological aspects of the self are said to constitute 
human facticity, one might wonder how various psychological states (i.e. feelings of 
frustration, erratic ideas, racing thoughts) and/or behavior (i.e. compulsive hand-
washing, avoidant activities) affect his definitions of mental illness. When seen from 
the spiritual dimension of the person, as logotherapy asks us to view these data, neither 
psychological nor behavioral data contribute to these conceptions in any meaningful 
way.27 Quite simply, they are said to constitute a human person's "destiny." What 
remains central to the concept of "normalcy" is that one's spiritual core -- the core of 
conscience and responsibility -- is unscathed by destiny. Provided that one makes a 
25 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 176-206. 
26 I call this a "preliminary consideration" of mental illness and normalcy 
because we are considering these notions on their own terms. One must remember 
that for Frankl, the self can not be wholly understood in isolation; rather, an "other," is 
required. We have yet to consider the nature of the corollary of being. As such, this 
section is only to be considered as a preliminary investigation of mental illness. 
27 See Section 6a of this chapter for a further explanation as to why only the 
spiritual dimension of the person contributes to a meaningful understanding of mental 
illness. 
28 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 75. 
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choice or takes a stand toward these data, a person's essence will not be impacted by 
such facticity. This theme is expressed in numerous ways in The Doctor and the Soul: 
The mind is contingent upon instincts and existence is 
contingent upon substance. This destiny can be transcended. 28 
Destiny must always be a stimulus to conscious, responsible 
action.29 
Biological destiny is the material which must be shaped by 
the free, human spirit.30 
Man's psychological fate, meaning by this, those psychic factors 
which stand in the way of spiritual freedom. The ego can decide, 
freely; the ego can have control over the instincts.31 
On this reading, I think one can assume that "mental illness" may still be said to 
exist, although one may be said to be spiritually normal. Invoking the view of the 
person as ontologically stratified would allow for this interpretation, though it would 
seem to entail some extremely undesirable implications. 32 Because of this, I would 
maintain that Frankl reconstrues traditional conceptions of mental illness by means of 
29 Ibid.' 79. 
30 Ibid., 83. 
31 Ibid., 85. 
32 One could certainly imagine a case where someone believes he should 
commit suicide. It would appear as if logotherapists would have to concede that this 
person is spiritually healthy provided they have taken a conscious and responsible 
'stand' toward their destiny. Yet, Frankl himself denies this implication. In The Will 
to Meaning, 61, he says: "I am personally glad to take the blame for having been 
directive along the lines of a life-affirming Weltanschauung whenever I have had to 
treat the suicidal patient." 
134 
his integrated understanding of the nature of the person. In large part this is 
accomplished by a broader understanding of the nature of the symptom. When one 
understands what constitutes a "symptom" in logotherapy, one will have to concede 
that logotherapy radically reconstrues the nature of "mental illness." 
When discussing the nature of the symptom in The Doctor and the Soul, Frankl 
draws parallels between the expression of the symptom and the human person's three 
ontological dimensions. He says the following: 
The symptom is never merely a consequence of some somatic 
factor and the expressions of some psychic factor, but it is also 
a mode of existence -- and this last element is the crucial one 
(i.e. somatic factors in the concentration camp included lack of 
sleep, hunger; psychological expressions included inferiority 
feelings, depression, etc.) But ultimately, symptoms express a 
spiritual attitude. For in every case, man retains the freedom 
and the possibility of deciding for or against the influence of his 
surroundings. 33 
I believe that the language Frankl uses in the above passage to characterize the 
symptom supports my view that Frankl does indeed re-construe traditionally conceived 
notions of mental illness and normalcy. Characterizing the most "crucial" aspect of 
the symptom as being a "mode of existence" and that "ultimately, it is a spiritual 
attitude," can not help but forge new understandings. What emerges, though, from 
this consideration is a paradox: If it is the case that symptoms can be expressed at the 
spiritual level and manifest themselves at this conscious, free dimension, one wonders 
how "in every case, man retains the freedom and the possibility for or deciding 
against" anything whatsoever. In other words, the spiritual dimension of the person is 
33 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 97. 
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the very aspect of the person which is capable of free, conscious and responsible 
choices; yet, it is this very dimension of the self which also can fall prey to 
"symptoms." This paradox could be resolved if Frankl would speak of the spiritual 
dimension as somehow stratified; yet, this possibility is not addressed. Rather, Frankl 
seems to want to stress the unity and wholeness of each of the three aspects of being. 
While this paradox has been shown to exist in other paradigms of psychotherapy, it is 
my contention that it will pose particularly acute problems in existential versions of 
psychotherapy. 34 
I believe that a logotherapist has three possible stands to take with respect to this 
paradox: 1) either the spiritual dimension of the person is completely immutable in the 
face of mental, even spiritual illness; 2) the spiritual dimension suffers at some level 
and is immutable at some level;35 3) the spiritual dimension of the self suffers 
completely -- conscience and responsibility are incapacitated. There is evidence that 
Frankl adopts all three of these positions. 36 Since the above example can be 
interpreted as illustrating either the first or second position, I will focus on the 
theoretical evidence for the third possible interpretation of the paradox. 
34 See Section 6a of this chapter for a further explanation. 
35 Ibid., 195, "Obsessional neurosis is not a psychosis; the sick person's attitude 
is still relatively free." 
36 From my point of view, Frankl's implicit adoption of all three stands without 
clearly justifying them to the reader and more importantly to the logotherapist 
necessarily ushers a certain arbitrariness into this discipline. I remind the reader that 
analysis of the paradox lends support to my thesis: namely, that logotherapy involves 
"incoherent" metaphysical assumptions and as a result ushers relativism into its 
practice. 
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At times, Frankl speaks of uniquely "spiritual illnesses" or "spiritual suffering." 
There is evidence which suggests that this suffering can be experienced in either one 
of two ways: either persons are incapable of actualizing their freedom and 
responsibility; or, persons have a distorted view of their basic human nature. 37 In the 
former case, Frankl claims that these cases of spiritual suffering represent the "greatest 
human accomplishment." For, it is at these points that one most fully realizes their 
essential nature; namely, to be a free and responsible being. In the latter case, Frankl 
does not call this distortion an '"'accomplishment," but neither does he call it "a mental 
disease; let alone a disease of the spirit. "38 Rather, cognitive distortion of one's basic 
nature constitutes a "particular philosophical position" or a "particular world-view. "39 
Our preliminary excursion into the nature of mental illness has resulted in 
revisionary conceptions of its nature. One might even suggest that in logotherapy, the 
term, mental illness, is somehow obsolete. To summarize what has been 
accomplished, logotherapy "allows" for the following forms of "abnormalcy:" 
1) Traditionally construed "mental illnesses" (understood as 
psychical states or physical expressions) constitute part of 
human "destiny," 
2) When viewed from the spiritual dimension, traditional "mental 
illnesses," may be accompanied by "spiritual symptoms," 
37 See Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 191. Frankl claims that the obsessional neurotic 
"seeks absolute certainty in cognition and decision. He strives for hundred-
percentness." As we will see in a later section, Frankl believes that human 
cognition is fallible and limited. Therefore, the obsessional neurotic misconstrues 
human nature. 
38 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 195. 
39 Ibid. 
3) Uniquely spiritual illnesses may be interpreted as accomplishments 
or distorted philosophical worldviews. 
Underlying these multiple descriptions lies an ambiguous conception of the spiritual 
dimension of the self. 40 
2c) The tragic triad of human existence: pain. death and guilt 
Thus far, attention has been granted to only one philosophical assumption 
underlying logotherapy, namely the nature of the self. By discussing the theoretical 
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inconsistencies operative in this one, foundational concept it is hoped that the reader 
may already begin to glimpse how this could impact the practice of logotherapy. At 
this point, however, the normative force that this concept assumes in the course of 
therapy has yet to be addressed. This section functions as a bridge by which the 
reader can begin to see the normative project flourish. At the end, the reader will see 
how Frankl's description of the person's existential state, consisting of death, pain and 
guilt takes on a prescriptive force and suggests of its own accord a "particular 
philosophical worldview. "41 
40 In the previous sections, it was shown that logotherapists are warranted in 
adopting two views of the self. In this section, we have shown that whether or not 
logotherapists buy into one or the other, they still have an insufficient metaphysical 
foundation of the spiritual dimension of the self which supports the various diagnoses 
of mental illness, spiritual illness, etc. More will be said on this when the technique 
of the logotherapist is discussed. 
41 The unique position that this section occupies can be explained in a slightly 
different way. In the preceding section, I had suggested that Frankl employs Sartre's 
existential concept of "facticity," and would agree that it is a person's biological and 
psychological dimension which constitute destiny. Given the uniqueness of persons, 
one might assume that each individual experiences their destiny in a highly subjective 
way. When discussing individual clients, Frankl himself often speaks this way. 
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In addition, analysis of the tragic triad of our existence bridges together an isolated 
analysis of the self (subject) to that of the objective realm of values (the other). On 
the one hand, it characterizes essential features of the person's existence, and therefore, 
relates to the experience of the self. On the other hand, these features form the 
backdrop against which human beings act, adopt values, relate to others, etc. At the 
end of this section, the path will be paved for a discussion of other philosophical 
assumptions in logotherapy, in particular a discussion of "the objective realm of 
values." A proper understanding of the descriptions of death, pain and guilt, greatly 
colors the worldview that logotherapy advocates; for it is against the universal and 
subjective background whereby all persons exercise free, conscious and responsible 
action. 
Frankl claims that the tragic triad of existence characterizes our "human 
predicament," but more importantly it motivates us to act and to reach out to the 
objective realm of values.42 The three aspects which form the "tragic triaq of our 
existence" correlate to each of the ontological dimensions of the self. In some sense, 
these features can be interpreted as limiting factors of existence. For example, at the 
somatic level one simply must acknowledge the natural limitation of death. While 
physical immortality might be a pleasant notion to entertain, all persons have to 
However, for all of the uniqueness of our thoughts and situations, Frankl does find 
certain features to be characteristic of all human destiny. Using Sartrian language, one 
might call this a general, universalizeable "facticity." 
42 Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 15 "man's human condition 
consists of pain, death and guilt." 
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contend with the inevitability of their own death. Given this, it is quite conceivable 
how death may act as a motivator to action in the present. Recognition that our lives 
are limited provides one with a sense of urgency to act in the present moment. While 
it is rather clear how one's finitude functions as both a limiting factor and a motivator 
to action, one might very well wonder how this might be explained with respect to 
pain and guilt. The majority of this section will be concerned with how Frankl 
understands the concepts of pain and guilt. 
Corresponding to the psychological strata of the self is the facticity of pain; 
corresponding to the spiritual layer is guilt. Unfortunately, Frankl posits these notions 
and yet says very little about their exact nature -- when they are experienced, how, in 
what contexts and with reference to what objects.43 In addition, the proper method by 
which to examine these so called "realities of our human predicament" is not 
discussed. Perhaps the method by which these concepts may be investigated is the 
phenomenological method that Frankl adopts from Scheler. Frankl says: 
We need only tum to the way the man in the street actually 
experiences meanings and values and translate this into 
scientific language. 44 
With this method, let us begin with the concept of pain. I believe it is patently 
obvious that Frankl is not referring to momentary, fleeting, somatic sensations of pain. 
In this context, since pain is said to be part of our human condition, it must somehow 
43 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 73. "The tragic triad consists of pain, death and 
guilt. There is no human being who may say that he has not failed, that he does not 
suffer and that he will not die." 
44 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 69. 
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constitutes a rather permanent aspect of psychological nature. In the abstract and as 
functioning at the psychological level, one may seek to describe pain as hardship or 
suffering. But even with this description, pain seems to require an "object." In other 
words, what is the hardship or suffering about? 
There are various ways that Frankl could answer this question. Hardship could be 
experienced in the face of life in general, in response to other human beings, etc. 
Frankl himself might be seen to advocate this view given his experiences in the 
concentration camps and his lengthy analyses of human suffering. 45 Yet, these "outer 
objects" do not seem to be the proper foundation for a general sense of pain. Life, 
after all, is not commonly a concentration camp and suffering tends not to define the 
entirety of our existence. What I am suggesting is that if and only if outer experience 
could function as the permanent object of our psychological sense of pain, then 
perhaps it is outer objects which force us to have this tragic existence. 
However, I think it is a more plausible way to view pain as constitutive of our 
psychological nature. In many of his books, Frankl criticizes Freud's notion of the 
pleasure principle. Two arguments are used: 1) If we wish to claim, as Freud does, 
that human beings. are so constituted as to only pursue pleasure, then we reduce human 
beings to the level of animals and claim that they are only driven by their instincts, 
and 2) pleasure can never be aimed at directly for it always eludes the individual. 46 
45 See Viktor E. Frankl. Man's Search/or Meaning: An Introduction to 
Logotherapy, new and revised ed., trans. by Ilse Lasch with preface by Gordon W. 
Allport, (New York: Pocket Books, 1963), 3-149. 
46 Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 63-64. 
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Pleasure for Frankl, can only be the by-product of completing a task or actualizing a 
meaning.47 
I believe that Frankl' s real motivation for claiming that pain is part of our 
psychological tragic existence serves as his ultimate refutation of Freud's psychological 
hedonism. Unlike Freud, Frankl does not need to claim that human beings are 
motivated or have a drive toward pleasure; but, by positing pain as part of our facticity 
he mitigates the idea that there is some one, reductionistic goal that all people seek. It 
also gives precedence to the will as decider of values, rather than to our instinctual 
nature. Unfortunately, it leaves Frankl with a decided problem with respect to the 
goals of logotherapy. For how can one truly feel a sense of happiness or pleasure if a 
sense of pain is always constitutive of a person's psychological make-up? What sense 
of joy can possibly result? 
If trying to understand the concept of pain were a thorny enough issue, then 
understanding the concept of guilt becomes even more complex. First, common sense 
observation does not seem to indicate that all people are cognizant of a state of guilt. 
Once again one wonders what is the proper object of guilt. 
For any religious believer, guilt tends to imply a sense of inadequacy, shame or 
failure with reference to God. In virtue of the fact that Frankl sometimes refers to 
logotherapy as a "medical ministry" and perhaps because he is Jewish, one might 
suggest that Frankl superimposed his own sense of guilt onto his psychological 
47 Sometimes Frankl equates pleasure with happiness. The reader should be 
aware that Frankl's exact understanding of the nature of pleasure is not central to my 
argument. For that reason, the reader can construe the meaning of this term as he/she 
wishes, at least in this section. 
understanding of the human person. Textual evidence seems to support this view. 
Just as Frankl adopts a hierarchical notion of the person, so too does he see this as 
operating in the disciplines. In The Unconscious God, he says: 
Higher dimensions are subsumed by lower ones; Thus 
biology is overarched by psychology, psychology by noology 
and noology by theology. 48 
Could it not be the case then, that at the spiritual dimension of being, the human 
person feels guilt because of his/her fundamental imperfection, failures to God or to 
prescribed religious action? 
There are two reasons as to why this can not be the correct interpretation: 1) 
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Despite his religious alignment, Frankl would never claim that the objective realm of 
meanings and values are to be equated with religious prescriptions. Religious persons 
may interpret the values in light of their beliefs; yet, they exist for all persons.49 2) 
Frankl contends that while logotherapy may serve as a medical ministry and may 
orient the person to ultimate meaning, namely God, this is by no means its primary 
task. It is only a supplementary one if so desired. 
Returning to the question at hand: What then is the proper object of guilt? 
Clearly, guilt can not follow upon our choices. For according to Frankl, when humans 
are confronted with the objective realm of values, to every situation/question that life 
poses there is only "one true/right meaning to each situation. "50 Now, if individuals 
48 Frankl, Unconscious God, 13. 
49 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, xv. 
5° Frankl, Will to Meaning, 60-1. 
143 
are choosing the "right" meaning, as Frankl says they must, then clearly guilt does not 
follow from such a choice. 
The only possible answer to this question is that it is the fallibility of conscience 
itself which is the source of our guilt. The following summarizes the main features of 
conscience: 
Conscience - is fallible, a human phenomenon, intuitive, creative, 
its job is to discover values - and the development of conscience 
is the main goal of education. 51 
If what I suspect is right, then human beings are in a perpetual state of guilt because 
they realize their imperfection. Sometimes they make the right choices, and 
conscience is to be the guide of these; sometimes they make the wrong choices and 
conscience is the guide for these. Guilt remains in either case, for the human 
condition is such that we lack complete certainty regarding the correctness of our 
choices. 52 When we embark on a discussion of the goals of therapy -- how one 
knows when the goals are reached and how one feels when they are reached -- we will 
see how this precise issue will present Frankl' s logotherapy with a major problem. 
It might be useful, at this point, to summarize what has been accomplished in this 
section. One must recall the dual role that the tragic triad of existence is intended to 
serve in logotherapy: 1) They are limiting factors of the three ontological strata of the 
51 Ibid., 63. 
52 Admittedly, there is a paradox involved in these two paragraphs. How is it 
the case that one must always choose the "true" or the "right" meaning in a situation 
and yet not fully be cognizant (or have a feeling of assurance) that they chose the 
"true" or "right" meaning? This will be explored in subsequent sections. -
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human person and 2) They operate as specific motivators to action. In order to clarify 
their role as limiting factors, it was necessary to explore the very meaning of pain and 
guilt.53 It was concluded that since Frankl maintains that pain is a permanent, 
universal element of the human condition, it would have to be understood "negatively;" 
that is to say, "pleasure" is not the main goal that persons seek. As for guilt, it was 
demonstrated that this state pertains to the fallibility of one's own conscience. Let me 
suggest that it is a small, logical leap to claim that these philosophical features acquire 
a normative force. Indeed, all persons must contend with death, pain and the fallibility 
of their own conscience and all human action occurs against the backdrop of these 
"realities." The worldview which logotherapy advocates begins to "feel" like an 
enlightened Stoic reality. 54 
With respect to the triad's role as a motivator to action, I find Frankl's account 
rather bizarre. As noted earlier, perhaps death provides the human person with a sense 
of "urgency" to act in the present moment. But, it is unclear how a constant privation 
of pleasure and the unavoidable fallibility of conscience would provide the necessary 
motivations for one to act. In fact, one could effectively argue that the opposite is true 
-- the tragic triad may motivate one not to act all. For why would one engage in 
activity if there is a constant, psychological sense of "pain?" And what would be the 
53 It was noted that it was obvious to see how death would be a limiting factor. 
54 Although not specifically addressed in this section, the "realities" of pain, 
death and guilt truly acquire their normative force in the actual practice of 
logotherapy. Presumably, a client who is not aware of the tragic triad of his/her 
existence will have to "acknowledge" it when treated by a logotherapist. This, of 
course, presupposes that a logotherapist is practicing his craft consistent with the 
theory. 
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purpose of action if in the end error is all that is achievable? Frankl's description of 
the tragic triad is theoretically untenable as a motivational account. In the realm of 
practice, one must be concerned with how the client who seeks logotherapy is really 
motivated in their search for meaning. 
3) "Logos" (meaning): The objective realm of experience 
Throughout this paper, I have baldly been referring to "an objective realm of 
values" to which the self is related and by which it is constituted. Having analyzed the 
nature of the self, it is now time to tum to the second half of the equation of the real. 55 
Three questions will be considered in this section. They are: a) What is the nature of 
"logos?" b) How real is "logos?" 3) What are Frankl's proofs for positing "logos?" 
By the end of this analysis, I will have shown that there is good reason to understand 
logos as being something far less objective than Frankl intends it to be. At best, 
Frankl' s logos can only honestly be called an inter-subjectively constituted realm of 
facts and values; at worst, evidence warrants an interpretation of logos as a subjective 
concept. The theoretical untenability of logos will necessarily lead to practical 
difficulties for logotherapy. 
Throughout this analysis, one must recall one of the reasons which led Frankl to 
establish logotherapy; namely, it was intended to be a corrective for already existent, 
55 It would be preferable to confine this analysis to a purely descriptive account 
of the nature of this realm of reality; however, such an exposition will invariably 
involve the related question of how it is that one knows the nature of these values. 
Because of this, analysis of the "objective realm of values" may often bring us back to 
the knowing and acting subject, the self. The reader should be forewarned of the 
possibility that there is bound to be some overlap in the treatment of these 
metaphysical descriptions and related epistemological issues. 
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but inadequate versions of existential analysis/ontoanalysis. While existential analysis 
was seen to be partially correct in its focus upon the human person as an acting and 
existent subject, it failed to concern itself with "essence," "logos" or "meaning" -- or 
that to which the acting subject was related. It is the very presence of "logos" that 
allowed for existential analysis to be more than mere "analysis" of a subject and to 
function as a viable form of "therapy" for persons. 57 Both the novelty and central 
importance that Frankl gives to logos in his theory requires us to consider the nature 
of the logos and the concomitant issue of its objective/"real" status. 
Quite frequently, Frankl simply translates "logos" as "meaning." Construing logos 
in terms of meaning, at some level, seems to be oxymoronic; for meaning ordinarily is 
interpreted as something wholly subjective rather than objective. In The Will to 
Meaning, Frankl asserts that "meaning is what is meant, be it by a person who asks me 
a question or by a situation which too implies a question and calls for an answer.58 In 
some sense, the definition itself foreshadows the claim that I want to establish in this 
section, namely, that the "objective realm of experience" is really permeated with 
subjectivity at some level. At first glance, one is tempted to interpret "meanings" as 
belonging to the subjective rather than an "objective" realm. The phrase, "what is 
meant," seems to hinge upon an individual's interpretation. If there is anything 
"objective" in that phrase it may be such things as "persons, questions or situations" 
which actually exist and confront individuals. Indeed, in numerous other passages 
57 Ibid. 
58 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 61. 
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where Frankl speaks of an "objective realm of experience," what seems to be objective 
are facts/entities, but certainly not meanings. One is led to believe that perhaps it is 
the facts, properly speaking, that solely constitute an objective realm of experience. 59 
The following passage seems to suggest this interpretation: 
Perhaps the law by which man's responsibilities are 
revealed only in concrete tasks is more general than we 
imagine. Objective values become concrete duties, are cast 
in the form of the demands of each day and in personal tasks. 
The values lying back of these tasks can only be reached for 
only through the tasks. 60 
59 Personal vignettes also seem to suggest this view. For example, in Mans 
Search/or Meaning, 58-9, Frankl tells of a personal dilemma that confronted him 
during World War II. Faced with the choices of remaining with his parents in Vienna 
or emigrating to the United States, Frankl describes how he made that decision. He 
says: "While I was pondering what my true responsibility was, I felt that this was that 
type of situation in which you wish for what is usually called a hint from Heaven. 
Then I went home and when I did so, I noticed a piece of marble stone lying on a 
table. I inquired of my father how it came to be there, and he said: "Oh, Victor, I 
picked it up this morning at the site where the synagogue stood." (It had been burned 
down by National Socialists.) "And why did you take it with you?" I asked him. 
"Because it is a part of the two tables containing the Ten Commandments." And he 
showed me, on the marble stone, a Hebrew letter engraved and gilded. "And I can tell 
you even more," he continued, "if you are interested; this Hebrew letter serves as the 
abbreviation of only one of the Ten Commandments." Eagerly I asked him, "Which 
one?" And his answer was: "Honor father and mother and you will dwell in the land." 
On the spot I decided to stay in the country, together with my parents, and let the visa 
lapse." 
I believe that this story offers way to see how logos may be construed as 
"objective." In Frankl's view, it was the fragment of the Torah which was the very 
carrier of "values." By way of concluding the account, Frankl denies that this story 
could be interpreted as a projective test and says: " ... the only thing which is 
subjective is the perspective through which we approach reality, and this 
subjectiveness does not in the least detract from the objectiveness of reality itself' 
(emphasis added, mine). 
60 Frankl, Doctor and the Soul, 41-2. 
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While it is tempting to create a sharp divide between facts and meanings with the 
hope of getting clear as to what exactly is objective and subjective, facts/objects are 
inextricably intertwined with meaning. So, the logos that was earlier referred to does 
not by itself constitute some outer objective realm of experience; but rather, 
meaning(s) exist in conjunction with a multitude of facts/events. Together, these 
constitute the objective realm and confront the individual. At this point, our 
conception of the objective realm of experience can even be broadened to include 
facts, meanings and values; for values are only " ... meaning universals which 
crystallize the typical situations a society or even humanity has to face. "61 
Inadvertently, we have achieved a full description of what constitutes the objective 
realm of experience: facts/events/situation, meanings and values. Now we will turn to 
a consideration of the phenomenological proofs that Frankl offers for this view. 62 
61 Ibid., 56. 
62 I imagine that one could claim that Frankl's negation of Sartre's relativism 
and subjectivism serves as a kind of proof for the objective realm of values. For 
Sartre, persons confront their existential situation (facticity). Through action, persons 
create both their individual essence, and a model for how all human persons should 
be. Frankl finds this view untenable, so much so, that he claims it reminds him of the 
Fakir trick (see Will to Meaning, 60). However, Frankl rejects Sartre's view by 
insisting that "what man so badly needs in order to preserve mental health and 
wholeness is that the objectiveness of the objective pole be preserve" (Will, 61). As 
one can see, Frankl's argument is really no argument at all. Rather, he just uses 
different starting points or assumptions than does Sartre. In short, Frankl does not 
directly provide the reader with proof that Sartre's view is wrong, but only that it fails 
to lead an individual to mental health/wholeness. While disproving Sartre's 
existentialism may be peripheral to the grounding of logotherapy, demonstrating that 
the objective realm of values exists is not. It is the existence of this realm that allows 
persons to have mental health and also, which allows logotherapists to cure the 
spiritual sufferer. 
There are at least four lines of reasoning Frankl uses in order to legitimate this 
objective realm of experience. They are: 
Unless self-understanding is crippled by pre-conceived patterns 
of interpretation, not to say indoctrination, he refers to meaning 
as something to find rather than something to give. And a 
phenomenological analysis which attempts to describe such an 
experience in an unbiased and empirical way will show us that, 
indeed, meanings are found rather than given. 63 
The particularity of all perspective, the fragmentary nature of 
all images of the world, after all presupposes the objectivity of 
the world. 64 
The ultimate -- or, if you will, the first -- question of radical 
skepticism is about the meaning of existence. But to ask the 
meaning of existence is meaningless in that existence precedes 
meaning. For the existence of meaning is assumed when we 
question the meaning of existence. 65 
Value is transcendent to the act which intends it. It transcends 
the value-cognitive act which is directed toward it, analogous to 
the object of an act of cognition, which likewise is situated 
outside of this (in the narrower sense of the word cognitive) act. 
Phenomenology has shown that the transcendent quality of the 
object in the intentional act is always already present in its 
content. If I see a lit lamp, the fact that it is there is already 
given along with my perception of it, even if I close my eyes or 
turn my back to it. In the perception of an object as something 
real is already contained the implication that I recognize its 
reality independently of its perception by myself or anyone else. 
The same is true of the objects of value perception. As soon as 
I have comprehended a value, I have comprehended implicitly 
63 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 61. 
64 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 16. 
65 Ibid., 196. 
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that this value exists in itself, independent therefore of whether 
or not I accept it. 66 
I have quoted the above passages at length, not with the intent of assessing the 
validity of these proofs, but rather, to assess how real (or what kind of reality) the 
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objective realm of values has according to Frankl. Frankl forthrightly states that the 
proof for this realm is derived from the phenomenological tradition. For this reason, a 
brief excursion into the phenomenological tradition may well be justified. 
It is a basic strategy of all who call themselves "phenomenologists" to begin with 
the brute fact of experience and the knowing subject. In addition, phenomenology 
aims to discover meanings/essences of experience. But essences are equally 
constituted by "acts of consciousness" and by what experience presents us with. To 
some, such as myself, a phenomenological theory of meanings seems to order upon a 
version of idealism. By implication, this understanding of phenomenology would 
render it impotent with respect to claims about mind-independent reality. However, 
one should bear in mind that the proof for the logos of Frankl' s logotherapy draws 
much more from the work of Max Scheler than that of Husserl. Scheler, in greater 
degree than Husserl, would say that the place where meanings are discovered lies with 
the object and not with the knowing/perceiving subject. Or, "meaning is given to 
consciousness with the sense data and essences are carried by objects. "67 By way of 
summary: 1) all phenomenologists begin with experience, 2) to know what experience 
66 Ibid.' 40-1. 
67 Eugene Kelly, Max Scheler, Twayne's World Leaders Series, vol. 55, 
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977), 32. 
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is assumes both a "something (meaning or an object)" and a knower (subject),68 but 3) 
unlike Husserl, Scheler and Frankl are far more insistent about the permanence/reality 
of essences that "impinge" upon the mind of the knower. In the end, the question will 
be can the nature of this realm be substantiated according to their own criteria1'9 
In some sense, the very fact that Frankl establishes his claims for an objective 
realm of values within the phenomenological tradition mitigates interpreting his theory 
as a version of objective realism.70 More honestly but less frequently, Frankl seems 
to admit that the objective realm of values is only "phenomenologically real" and 
consists of only "trans-subjective meanings/values." If this is the case, as it seems to 
be, one could simply end this account by claiming that Frankl was inconsistent with 
his language. Rather than referring to an "objective" realm of values, he should have 
68 Ibid. 
69 It should be noted before moving on that the potential error of interpreting 
"existence" as subjective and essence as "objective" has been tempered. Even though 
Frankl all-too often makes use of the term "objective" which might imply that persons 
can have knowledge of reality-in-itself, phenomenological proofs mitigate this 
interpretation. All experience is always experience relative to the observer. For this 
reason, Frankl occasionally refers to logos more correctly as "trans-subjective" reality. 
This phrasing better explains the meaning behind passages such as: "We must remain 
aware of the fact that as long as absolute truth is not accessible to us (and it will never 
be), relative truths have to function as mutual correctives. Approaching the one truth 
from various sides, sometimes even in opposite directions, we can not attain it, but we 
may at least encircle it" (Doctor and Soul, xiii). Given this view of reality, one might 
say that Frankl is really a relativist in a foundational sense. It appears as if Frankl is 
solely describing "phenomenological reality" as opposed to "objective reality." For an 
explanation of "phenomenological reality," see Manfred Frings, Max Scheler, 2nd ed., 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996), 20. 
70 By using the term, "objective realist," I have in mind traditional 
metaphysicians such as Plato or Descartes who believed that there is a reality 
which exists independently of the conceiver. 
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consistently referred to it as a trans-subjective realm of experience. This section could, 
then, conceivably end here. 
However, let me suggest that even if we charitably overlook Frankl's inconsistent 
use of language, the above quotations still leave us with questions of the following: 
With respect to the first citation, one may very well wonder how empirical and 
unbiased Frankl' s assessment is of the realm of experience. 71 Granted that there is a 
trans-subjective realm of experience consisting of meanings/values and facts taken 
together, is it possible to claim that there is more (and we can know more of it) than 
that? Considering this question will serve as a further explanation of the "reality" of 
the "trans-subjective" realm of values as well as function as a natural bridge to the 
next section on epistemological considerations. In other words, barring the question of 
existence, is it the case that a hierarchy of values can truly be discerned from a trans-
subjective realm of values? 
Frankl, following in the footsteps of Scheler, maintains that within the realm of 
experience there exists a hierarchy of values. Values, for both Scheler and Frankl are 
of one of two kinds: eternal or situational. The criteria for this distinction could be 
described in various ways. Eternal values are somehow "more binding," more 
universal" more enduring and often called "higher" on the scale of values when 
71 Again, the reader must bear in mind that this question is not only 
theoretically significant, but also, it is of great practical importance. As noted at the 
outset of this section, logotherapy was introduced as a corrective to inadequate 
versions of existential analysis. It was due to the introduction of "logos" that allowed 
existential analysis to truly become a viable form of "therapy" rather than mere 
"analysis." 
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compared with situational values. While Scheler proceeds to identify four kinds of 
values from this fundamental distinction,72 Frankl's hierarchy consists of three, 
different values. The following quote identifies his schema and reminds us, curiously, 
of the "empirical" method that yielded this "unbiased" data.73 He says: 
The logotherapist is neither a moralist nor an intellectual. His 
work is based on empirical, i.e. phenomenological analyses, and 
a phenomenological analysis of the simple man in the street's 
experience of the valuing process shows that one can find 
meaning in life by creating a work or doing a deed or by 
experiencing goodness, truth and beauty, by experiencing nature 
and culture; or, last but not least, by encountering another unique 
being in the very uniqueness of this human being -- in other 
words, by loving him. 74 
If one prefers in this context to speak of values, he may discern 
three chief groups of values. I have classified them in terms of 
creative, experiential and attitudinal values. This sequence 
reflects the three principal ways in which man can find meaning 
in life. The first is what he gives to the world in terms of his 
creations; the second is what he takes from the world in terms of 
encounters and experiences; and the third is the stand he takes to 
his predicament in case he must face a fate which he cannot 
change.75 
72 W. Stark, ed., introduction to The Nature of Sympathy, by Max Scheler, 
trans. by Peter Heath, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1973), xvi. The values 
are: a) holiness, b) spiritual/cultural values, c) vital values and d) pleasure values. 
73 I do not believe it is an arbitrary point that the three categories of values 
naturally correspond to Frankl's dimensional view of the self. The fact that attitudinal 
values are the deepest and most important kind of values that can be achieved seems 
to underscore the correctness of my interpretation that the spiritual core of the self is 
the foundational and most important aspect of the self. 
74 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 69. 
15 Ibid., 69-70. For a further description of creative, experiential, 
and attitudinal values, see Frankl's Doctor and Soul, 43-4. 
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There are two important conclusions that result from considering a phenomenological 
analysis and categorization of values. First, both Scheler and Frankl must admit that 
to claim that values are "trans-subjective" opens their theories up to the charge of 
relativism at some level. Secondly, and moreso than Scheler's categorization, Frankl's 
definitions refer obviously and implicitly to human subjectivity. In virtue of the fact 
that creative and attitudinal values find their origin within the individual and are 
specifically values of individuals (as opposed to groups of individuals), the logos of 
logotherapy seems to be far more radically subjective than trans-subjective. 
So as to side-step the charge of relativism, both Frankl and Scheler appeal to the 
defense of perspectivism. 
He compares the eternal and immutable values to a mountain 
range which towers high above the valleys in which we humans 
live. To every age and to every people they reveal, according to 
their respective points of view, a different aspect of themselves: 
each one is true, and yet each one is unacceptable to all the 
others. We must not speak of a relativism of values then, but 
rather of a perspectivism (314) - an altogether different 
proposition. 76 
... the only thing which is subjective is the perspective through 
which we approach reality, and this subjectiveness does not in 
the least detract from the objectiveness of reality itself. I 
improvised an explanation of this phenomenon for the students in 
my seminar at Harvard. "Just look through the windows of this 
lecture hall at Harvard Chapel. Each of you sees the chapel in a 
different way, from a different perspective, depending on the 
location of your seat. If anyone claimed that he sees the chapel 
exactly as his neighbor does, I would have to say that one of 
them must be hallucinating. But does the difference of views in 
76 Stark, introduction in Nature of Sympathy, xvii. 
the least detract from the objectivity and reality of the chapel? 
Certainly it does not. 77 
It seems highly dubious to me to suggest, as Kelly does, that perspectivism is 
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somehow an altogether different proposition from relativism. But even if somehow it 
is, it appears as if Scheler' s hierarchy of values is more amenable to this interpretation. 
On Frankl' s categorization, only the experiential values of truth, beauty and goodness 
are of the kind that may be "seen" through a particular perspective. Creative and 
attitudinal values, by contrast and by definition, are of the sort that are rooted in 
human subjectivity. An additional concern of "perspectivism" is that the criterion by 
which trans-subjective values are found is, as has been noted, by consulting how the 
ordinary man in the street behaves. Perhaps even the limited category of experiential 
values, then, have subjectivity as at their root, being nothing more than consensually 
agreed upon values. 
Summarizing what has been accomplished in this section, it has been shown that in 
logotherapy, the objective realm of experience consists of an inextricable combination 
of facts and values. Nonetheless, the "objectivity" of this realm really is only "trans-
subjectively" or phenomenologically real. Definitions of the supposed hierarchy of 
values reduces itself to two categories of values which really have their basis in human 
subjectivity. The only category of values which somehow retains its "trans-
subjectivity" are experiential values. Even so, this category of values does not escape 
the charge of being relative by appealing to perspectivism as a defense. This is 
77 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 59-60. 
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especially true when one considers the criteria by which values are "discovered," 
namely by consulting how the man in the street behaves. If the objective logos is 
permeated with subjectivity and therefore is relative at some level, why, one wonders, 
is Frankl insistent that the logos is objective? 
The philosophical answer might be that it simply serves as a corrective to a 
misguided philosophical theory, namely Sartre's. Perhaps the real reason why Frankl 
does this is to argue that life is not absurd; or, one might say, even if one thinks life is 
absurd meanings still exist in spite of such a perception. But more importantly, Frankl 
does want to make room for morality. Our contemporary society which is 
characterized by a loss of meaning and in which many people find themselves in an 
existential vacuum signals the possibility of further corruption -- corruption that we 
bore witness to in Nazi Germany. An objective realm of values allows for a standard 
by which the likes of Hitler could be judged and be deemed a failed human being. 
4) How we know the objective realm of experience: the role of intuitive conscience 
In this section, I will focus on the nature of intuitive conscience or the means by 
which an individual can be said to know the objective realm of values. By necessity, 
my analysis of intuitive conscience will be confined to three issues: a) How is it 
possible that one discovers the one/true meaning in a situation if conscience by 
definition is fallible? b) What motivates "intuitive conscience" to discover trans-
subjective values? c) A problem with the causal story and motivational story. 
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A basic description of the role of intuitive conscience is required if one is to 
understand how it is that an individual discovers the trans-subjective realm of values. 
Again, this issue has both theoretical and practical importance; for if the logotherapist 
is neither to be construed as a moralist nor as an intellectual, then by default, it will be 
the client's own conscience that allows her to know the trans-subjective realm of 
values and to achieve "meaning." Frankl is unusually specific when it comes to 
describing the central features of intuitive conscience. Nonetheless, I will show that 
there is an obvious discrepancy in the description and the role of conscience itself. 
Since this is a theoretically difficult issue, it is likely to raise concerns about the 
logotherapist' s theoretical understanding of this concept and practical applications of it. 
In The Will to Meaning, Frankl offers the following definition of conscience. He 
says: "conscience could be defined as the intuitive capacity of man to find out the 
unique meaning of a situation." In addition, conscience is creative insofar as it has the 
"power to discover unique meanings that contradict accepted values;" it is "human 
phenomenon and because of this it is fallible; "78 Two consequences follow from the 
78 Consider the following descriptions of conscience put forth by Frankl, in The 
Will to Meaning: "Apart from being intuitive, conscience is creative. Time and again, 
an individual's conscience commands him to do something which contradicts what is 
preached by the society to which the individual belongs," 63. "Conscience also has the 
power to discover unique meanings that contradict accepted values," 63. "Because we· 
live in an existential vacuum, or a place where values are on the wane, education can 
not afford to proceed along the lines of tradition, but must elicit the ability to make 
independent and authentic decisions ... a lively and vivid conscience is what resists the 
effects of conformism and totalitarianism," 64-5. "True conscience has nothing to do 
with what I would term 'Superegotistic pseudomorality.' Nor can it be dismissed as a 
conditioning process. Conscience is a definitely human phenomenon. But we must add 
that it is also "just" a human phenomenon. It is subject to ~the human conditiOn in that 
it is stamped by the finiteness of man. For he is not only guided by conscience in his 
search for meaning, he is sometimes misled by it as well. Unless he is a perfectionist, 
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definitions.79 First, I would suggest that the very fact that conscience is "creative" 
subtly adds credence to my previous interpretation of the trans-subjective realm of 
values as radically subjective and/or simultaneously further erodes the reliability of 
"looking at the common man in the street's behavior" as a criteria for making 
decisions. Although Frankl wants to claim that the "creative" capacity of conscience is 
to discover unique meanings, if our criteria for discovery is empirical (and sometimes 
this empirical evidence may be misguided or in need of correction), then an 
individual's conscience is given precedence as the criterion for decision-making. Thus, 
at least in logotherapy, while empirical evidence is sometimes referred to as the guide 
for discovering phenomenologically real values, it is human conscience which acts as 
the ultimate arbiter in decision-making. 
A second, but even more significant problem is readily apparent in Frankl' s 
description of conscience. Conscience is a human phenomenon and as such, it is a 
fallible guide. But, in spite of this permanent possibility of fallibility, 8° Frankl insists 
that in each situation, there is always one right and one true meaning to be found. 
Frankl himself seems to be well aware of the oddity of these two claims; but 
nonetheless, he defends them as follows: 
he will also accept this fallibility of conscience," 65. "But if man is not to contradict 
his own humanness, he has to obey his conscience unconditionally, even though he is 
aware of the possibility of error," 66. 
79 Frankl, 63. 
80 One must recall what was said in the analysis of the tragic triad of human 
existence. The fallibility of conscience is said to be part of human facticity. 
On one of my lecture tours through the United States my 
audience was requested to print questions in block letters for me 
to answer and hand them over to a neurologist who passed them 
over to a theologian who passed them on to me. The theologian 
suggested that I skip one, for as he said, it was "sheer nonsense. 
Someone wishes to know," he said, "how you define six hundred 
in your theory of existence." When I read the question I saw a 
different meaning. "How do you define GOD in your theory of 
existence?" Printed in block letters, "GOD" and "600" were hard 
to differentiate. Well, was not this an unintentional projective 
test? After all, the theologian read "600," and the neurologist 
read "GOD." But only one way to read the question was the 
right one. Only one way to read the question was the way in 
which it was meant by him who had asked it. (emphasis added 
mine) 81 
To be sure, man is free to answer the questions he is asked by 
life. But this freedom must not be confounded with 
arbitrariness. It must be interpreted in terms of responsibleness. 
Man is responsible for giving the right answer to a question, for 
finding the true meaning of a situation. And meaning is 
something to be found rather than to be given, discovered rather 
than invented. Crumbaugh and Maholick point out rather that 
finding meaning in a situation has something to do with a Gestalt 
perception. This assumption is supported by the Gestaltist 
Wertheimer' s statement: "The situation, seven plus seven 
equals ... is a system with a lacuna, a gap. It is possible to fill 
the gap in various ways. The one completion -- fourteen --
corresponds to the situation, fits the gap, is what is structurally 
demanded in this system, with its place, in the function of the 
whole. It does justice to the situation. Other completions such 
as fifteen, do not fit. They are not the right ones. We have here 
the concepts of the demands of the situation; the 'requiredness.' 
"Requirements of such order are objective qualities. "82 
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I quote these passages at length in order to demonstrate how Frankl defends this idea 
that there is only one true or right answer to be given in a situation, in spite of the 
81 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 61-62. 
82 Ibid. 
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fallible nature of conscience. In the first quote, while Frankl admits that at least two 
interpretations are possible, the "right" meaning is precisely "that which is intended by 
him who asked the question." This proviso is interesting for at least in that situation, 
one has a way of determining the correctness of the interpretation. Assuming that the 
individual had a specific intent in asking the question and not wanting to be deceptive, 
one need only ask the person in order to discover the "truth" or "rightness" of his 
meaning of the question. However, when one considers the plethora of situations, 
facts, events, persons, meanings, objects, etc. that constitute the "objective realm of 
experience," it is certainly not as obvious what the criteria might be for checking the 
truth or correctness of our interpretation. It is even difficult to imagine what the 
criteria might look like in order to carry out this investigation. 
Fortunately, Frankl's second, mathematical example offers us a hint. The number, 
"fourteen," we are told, is the right response precisely because it fits the situation and 
does justice to the equation. However, I would contend that the number fits the 
situation because the rules of addition determine what number must necessarily fill the 
gap. By analogy, and in the realm of experience, one must say that there are 
"experiential rules" which determine how persons ought to behave in certain situations. 
But, whereas it seems plausible to suggest that these experiential rules are only "social 
rules" (and therefore, human creations and inter-subjectively constituted), Frankl 
misleadingly identifies them as "requirements" which are "objective qualities." 
A bit later, these requirements are compared to "social rules" and are explained as 
follows: 
Today, we live in an age of crumbling and vanishing traditions. 
Thus, instead of new values being created by finding unique 
meanings, the reverse happens. Universal values are on the 
wane... However, even if all universal values disappeared, life 
would remain meaningful since the unique meanings remain 
untouched by the loss of traditions. 83 
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Care has been taken with terminology in this section because there are at least two 
different places and two kinds of criteria that one may use in order to discover the true 
or right answer to a situation. On the one hand, one may use common-sense 
observation and consult traditions. In this way, one will necessarily find the true and 
right meaning of a situation. On the other hand, if the rules can not be discerned 
(either because there is no clear social rule, or by the discovery that the rule is 
somehow wrong), then conscience must act in its creative capacity and discover the 
true/right answer. The following issues are neither explained nor acknowledged by 
Frankl: when one should consult what proper object and/or with what concomitant 
epistemological criteria; the intelligence that a person must have in order to enact these 
mechanisms; the inherent inter-subjective origins of the basis of "traditions." With 
such variability, one wonders how an individual (let alone a logotherapist who purports 
to have expertise in this area and help people find these answers) is really capable of 
discovering the true/right meaning of a situation. 84 
83 Ibid., 64. 
84 These issues will be shown to be especially disconcerting when it comes to 
the practical application of logotherapy. For, acknowledging that "spiritual illnesses" 
can and do occur, how is it the case that a client can mobilize his "conscience" in 
order to effectively assess existent traditions, let alone to discover unique meanings? 
In addition, is it the case that the logotherapist (again, by the theory itself advocating 
these two, disparate ways of knowing) can neither be a "moralist" nor an "intellectual" 
in his practice? This footnote can only scratch the surface of this topic. A further 
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Perhaps, the answer to the above dilemma lies with the "intuitive" nature of 
conscience. A rough and ready definition of "intuitionism" is that persons have a 
direct and immediate grasp of some reality.85 Frankl often equates one's intuitive 
ability with having the capacity to "sniff out values." Our concern in this section will 
be to assess whether intuitive conscience finds its basis in the emotive or cognitive 
realms for Frankl. In short, leaving aside the very real question of whether or not 
intuition constitutes a valid criteria for knowledge, I want to consider the motivational 
account lying behind Frankl' s understanding of conscience. Is it feeling that motivates 
an individual toward meaning; or rather, is it consciousness itself? 
Understanding what motivates an individual toward meaning is crucial for both the 
theory and practice of logotherapy. For, if the intuitive aspect of conscience is 
grounded at the emotive level, this would seem to imply that it is the psychological 
aspect of the self which motivates action. If the three layers of the self are 
analysis will follow in subsequent sections. 
85 As an anticipatory point, it seems likely that many persons consult 
psychotherapists because they lack, or think they lack, a direct grasp of reality. Frankl 
says as much in The Doctor and the Soul: "the neurotic lacks an instinctive sureness," 
14. Given this, is it not the case that the logotherapist acts in the capacity as either an 
intellectual or moralist when reinstilling an instinctive sense of sureness for the 
neurotic? 
In other passages in Doctor and Soul, Frankl says that the logotherapist's role is 
to evaluate the appropriateness of the neurotic's worldview. He says: "Suppose the 
patient's world-view should turn out to be a valid one. In that case we would be 
committing a serious error in opposing it, for we must never leap to the conclusion 
that a neurotic's world-view is necessarily wrong simply because it is neurotic. 
However, it may happen that the patient is wrong in his world-view. In that case, 
correcting it calls for non-psychotherapeutic methods. .. .. We must still refute it [the 
worldview] .. . Our evaluation of ideas does not depend on the psychic origin of those 
ideas (emphasis added, mine), 14-15. 
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ontologically distinct, how is it the case that emotions "cause" free decision? I think 
this is important because Frankl is insistent that persons are always capable of talcing a 
stand toward their psychological distress. Yet, if it is the case that emotions are what 
motivates and causes free action, and if persons suffer at the psychological level, how 
is free (conscious and responsible) action possible in logotherapy? What would 
motivate or cause a psychological sufferer to take a stand at all? 
There is some evidence that Frankl understands the "intuitive" part of conscience 
as rooted in emotion. In The Unconscious God, Frankl characterizes the "intuitive" 
nature of conscience as follows: An intuitive conscience is one that is "prelogical," 
"irrational," and "it is based in the emotional and intuitive. "86 He also claims that the 
intuitive conscience is rooted in "love." Love is a complex emotion and might be said 
to have both a psychological and cognitive component. Could persons have a 
conscious awareness of love that acts as a motivator and cause of action? Gould 
thinks that this is where Frankl draws from Scheler and bases intuition on the feeling 
of love. 
However, there is some ambiguity as to whether or not love is the proper motivator 
to action. This ambiguity occurs in several places in Man's Search/or Meaning. To 
begin with, Frankl recounts the story of how he endured his suffering in the 
concentration camps by contemplating his wife. He says: 
A thought transfixed me: For the first time in my life, I saw the 
truth as it is set into song by so many poets, proclaimed as the 
final wisdom by so many thinkers. The truth that love is the 
86 Frankl, Unconscious God, 37. 
ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire. Then I 
grasped the meaning of the greatest secret that human poetry and 
human thought and belief have to impart: The salvation of man 
is through love and in love. 81 
In this respect, conscience is like love-- the reason for this 
comparison is that both have to do with something that is 
absolutely unique. 88 
Even if a man has never loved or never been loved, he may 
still realize values. 89 
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So, perhaps love is not the basis of the intuitive conscience which moves us toward the 
objective realm of values. It can not be a psychological force such as an instinct or a 
desire - this would imply that the person is driven. 90 Sometimes, Frankl speaks as if 
the pull from the objective realm of values pushes the individual toward them (fmd 
quotes) -- but this still leaves us with the problem of individual engagement. What 
after all, would make an individual want to realize an eternal value in a certain 
situation? This type of justification really poses a problem for us when one recalls 
from the previous section that it is only experiential values, and not creative or 
attitudinal values, that can provide this "pull." 
Whether or not Frankl definitively asserts that love, feelings, etc. is the basis for 
the intuitive part of conscience and is far from clear. However, let me suggest, that if 
this were to be the case, then the theoretical and practical problem exists concerning 
87 Frankl, Man's Search, 58-59. 
88 Ibid., 34. 
89 Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 75. 
90 William Blair Gould. Viktor Frankl: Life with Meaning, (California: 
Brooks/Cole Publishers, 1993), 90. 
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what motivates individuals toward meaning. Conversely, if love, feelings, emotions, 
etc. are not the basis for intuitive conscience, the only possible explanations for why 
individuals are motivated to act is either an abstract sense of duty rooted in conscience 
and/or the objective realm of values itself. If either of the latter are intended to 
explain human motivation, then, from a practical point of view, it would be very 
difficult to see why individuals seek logotherapeutic help. Why, after all would a 
logotherapist even be consulted if conscience can discover the objective realm of 
values and this realm of values alone provides sufficient motivation for an individual 
drive toward meaning? 
Let us now turn to a consideration of how these competing motivational accounts 
may impact logotherapeutic practice. To begin with, almost all of Frankl' s case 
studies suggest that people enter therapy for relief of pain. Both of the novel 
techniques of logotherapy, namely, dereflection and paradoxical intention have as their 
main aim the relief of psychological suffering.91 However, one must remember that 
the stated goal of logotherapy is for persons to actualize meaning(s) or value(s). 
Ironically, Frankl's case studies repeatedly indicate that, if not brute pleasure, at least 
some kind of relief of suffering is what actually motivates human beings both to seek 
logotherapeutic treatment and may in fact function as the end goal of therapy itself. If 
91 It is not necessary that I be very careful about my language at this point 
because I am solely establishing that the techniques of dereflection and paradoxical 
intention in no way address an individual's search for meaning. By definition, these 
techniques only aim to relieve psychological suffering or pain. 
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this is actually the case, then theoretically some sort of psychological motivation would 
have to be presupposed on the part of those who seek logotherapeutic help. 
If on the other hand, Frankl's motivational account is really rooted in an abstract 
duty of conscience or if the objective realm of values itself provides the necessary 
motivation to seek meaning, then logotherapy, I would argue, really becomes 
something of an abstract, intellectual affair. Detailed, selection criteria of candidates 
would seem to be required; for, if clients fail to have a certain amount of intelligence 
to cognize "abstract/eternal" values, or if they do not understand their duties, then 
logotherapy, in principle could not be effective. In other words, certain kinds of 
clients, by definition, could not be treated by logotherapy. 
Either motivational accounts raise some curious issues for the practitioner of 
logotherapy. I have repeatedly cited Frankl' s assertion that the logotherapist is 
"neither a moralist nor an intellectual." If the first motivational account is correct and 
clients do seek relief from psychological suffering then, at the very least, I would 
argue that the logotherapist is both a moralist or an intellectual. For, expertise in the 
application of the techniques of paradoxical intention and dereflection is assumed, 
(hence, the intellectual role); and because a value is the aim of the technique, then that 
would be a sufficient requirement to demonstrate that the logotherapist is a moralist. 
However, even if the second motivational account is correct, then there is still 
reason to believe that the logotherapist is both an intellectual and a moralist. First, 
and as acknowledged earlier, it would be difficult to see why a client who has 
sufficierit intelligence and a sense of duty would be motivated to seek help from a 
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logotherapist. What, after all, would a logotherapist do for them? But, indeed, if such 
a client does seek such treatment in logotherapy, then the logotherapist would be 
acting as an "intellectual" or as Frankl sometimes says as an "opthamologist" by trying 
to get the client "to see the world as it really is. "92 In this way, the logotherapist is 
somehow clarifying the nature of the objective realm of experience. 
5) Bridge: What has been accomplished thus far? 
By way of a reminder to the reader, the purpose of this chapter has been to 
identify the philosophical assumptions in logotherapy and to demonstrate the normative 
force that they acquire in the context of therapy and for the goals of treatment. 
Indeed, much of the above analysis has shown how a clear understanding of the very 
philosophical notions has been difficult to achieve. This being the case, a coherent 
account of the normative force of these assumptions -- resembling perhaps a consistent 
ethic of logotherapy -- seems to be a pipe-dream. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I claimed that I would show how relativism, in a 
variety of senses, lurks beneath logotherapy. I have argued that consistently there is 
ambiguity in the meaning of logotherapy's foundational assumptions, specifically with 
respect to the purpose of this form of therapy, the definition of the nature of the 
person, the nature of the objective realm of values, etc. Recalling the architectural 
metaphor used at the beginning of this chapter, this kind of semantic relativism has 
two important implications for practice. First, the meaning of the assumptions is 
92 Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 51. 
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relative to the individual interpretations of the practitioners of logotherapy.93 
Secondly, the goals that clients are said to achieve at the end of therapy are relative to 
the practitioners understanding of the purpose and techniques of logotherapy. 
As they occur in the actual clinical encounter, these various senses of relativism 
will be explored in the remaining section of this chapter. The clients of logotherapy 
will be the next subject to be considered, specifically: a) analysis of clinical neurotics 
and b) analysis of existential neurotics. 
6) The therapeutic encounter 
6a) Treatment of the clinical neurotic 
It is important to stipulate at the outset that when I refer to the clients of 
logotherapy, I refer only to those individuals who are being seen for some extended 
period of time (more than 2 occasions) and on an individual basis by a practitioner of 
logotherapy. This stipulation is essential because Frankl admits that logotherapy may 
legitimately be said to have many different applications, in many different contexts and 
93 Some might wish to challenge my claim and say that Frankl acknowledges 
the fact that the particular individuality of the psychotherapist will enter into the 
confines of therapy. In The Doctor and the Soul, 280, he says: "All psychotherapy is 
ultimately something of an art. There is always an irrational element in 
psychotherapy. The doctor's artistic intuition and sensitivity is of considerable 
importance. The patient, too, brings an irrational element into the relationship; his 
individuality. . .. it is questionable whether there can ever be the 'correct 
psychotherapy.' Is there not rather a correct psychotherapy practiced by a particular 
doctor upon a particular patient? At any rate, psychotherapy resembles an equation 
with two unknowns -- corresponding to the twin irrational factors." However, Frankl's 
admission in no way challenges my claim that individual -- and perhaps "irrational" --
interpretations enter the confmes of therapy because of the theory itself. Fratikl would 
never admit to this. 
169 
for various numbers of people. 94 This stipulation, will allow for greater precision 
when selecting the case analyses to be discussed and greater clarity in seeing what are 
the goals of a an application of logotherapy. 
When delimited in this way, clients deemed suitable for logotherapy are those who 
suffer from "neurosis," either of the existential or clinical sort. 95 Irrespective of the 
distinction, and in light of Frankl's dimensional view of the person, it is the spiritual 
aspect of the person which receives focused attention in the confines of logotherapy. 
This is the hallmark of logotherapeutic treatment and differentiates it, in Frankl' s view, 
from other forms of psychotherapy. 96 
94 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 279: "In these cases logotherapy is a specific 
therapy; in other cases, it is a non-specific therapy. That is to say, there are cases in 
which ordinary psychotherapy must be applied and yet a complete cure can be effected 
only by logotherapy. There are also cases in which it is not a therapy at all, but 
something else which we term medical ministry. As such, it is to be used not only by 
the neurologist or the psychiatrist, but by every doctor. The surgeon, for example, 
needs to minister to his patient when he is faced with an inoperable case, or when he 
must cripple the patient for life by amputating a limb. The orthopedic surgeon faces 
similar spiritual problems; so does the dermatologist who deals with disfigured cases, 
the general practitioner who must treat permanent invalids." See also, Frankl, Man's 
Search, 127-33, on the opportunities for collective psychotherapy within the 
concentration camp. 
95 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, xvii: "In this sense despair over the meaning 
of life may be called an existential neurosis as opposed to clinical neurosis. Just as 
sexual frustration may -- at least according to psychoanalysis -- lead to neuroses, it is 
conceivable that frustration of the will-to-meaning may also lead to neurosis. I call 
this frustration, existential frustration." 
96 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 181: " ... for when one interprets the sympt<?m 
ultimately as a mode of existence, as a sort of spiritual attitude, the 
groundwork has been laid for logotherapy as a specific treatment." 
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We may begin by focusing on clinical neurosis. A cursory list of the names of 
these kinds of mental illness may ring familiar, for they appear to be standard 
psychological descriptions of illness. They are: anxiety neurosis, obsessional neurosis, 
melancholia and schizophrenia. It is worthwhile to quote one description of this type 
of illness at length in order for the reader to get the flavor of how clients suffering 
from clinical neurosis may be viewed as potential clients for logotherapy: 
Like all other neurosis, obsessional neurosis also has a 
constitutional basis. Wexberg and others, whose interest lie 
mainly in the fields of psychogenesis or psychotherapy, have 
assumed that a somatic substructure ultimately underlies 
obsessional neurosis. A number of clinical pictures had been 
observed in which postencephalitic behavior showed striking 
similarities to obsessional neurotic syndromes. The mistake was 
made of confusing similarity in form with identity in nature. 
An "anankastic syndrome" was considered to be the hereditary 
element in obsessional neurosis; it was believed to have special 
genetic radical which was supposedly dominant. Finally, it was 
proposed that the term "obsessional disease" be used instead of 
"obsessional neurosis," in order to stress the constitutional quality 
of the illness. 
As far as therapy is concerned, these various views strike us as 
largely irrelevant. Moreover, to make much of the constitutional 
factors underlying obsessional neurosis does not relieve psychotherapy 
of its obligation, nor deprive it of its opportunities. For anankasm 
consists of nothing more than a mere disposition toward certain 
characterological peculiarities such as meticulosity, exaggerated 
love of order, fanatical cleanliness, or overscrupulousness -- traits 
which, in fact, must be recognized as culturally valuable. They 
do not seriously incommode the person who has them or those 
around him. They are only the soil in which the actual 
obsessional neurosis can grow, though it does not necessarily do 
so. Where such a constitution does give rise to a neurosis, 
human freedom is involved. Revealing the psychogenic nature of 
the particular neurotic content need not be therapeutically 
effective, nor is it indeed even indicated. On the contrary, 
detailed treatment of symptoms in obsessional neurotics would 
only give encouragement to their compulsion to brood over their 
symptoms. 
We must, however, distinguish carefully between such 
symptomatic treatment and palliative treatment by logotherapy. 
The logotherapist is not concerned with treating the individual 
symptom or the disease as such; rather, he sets out to transform 
the neurotic's attitude toward his neurosis. For it is this attitude 
which has built up the basic constitutional disturbance into clinical 
symptoms of illness. And this attitude, at least in milder cases or 
in the early stages, is quite subject to correction. Where the attitude 
itself has not yet taken on the typical obsessional-neurotic rigidity, 
where it is not yet infiltrated, so to speak, by the basic disturbance, 
a change in its direction should still be possible. 97 
There are several issues that are important to highlight from this one example of a 
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clinical neurosis. However, the most important feature to recognize is that all aspects 
of the human person are said to contribute to the neurosis -- physiological, 
psychological and spiritual components. Nonetheless, what is deemed important from 
a logotherapist 's point of view is the spiritual aspect of the illness -- both as a way for 
making the diagnosis and in circumscribing the proper focus of treatment. 
The exclusivity of logotherapy's focus is odd, indeed, when one considers that both 
the cause and the cure for the illness are rooted in a person's spiritual dimension of 
being. As stated above, "human freedom is involved" in the illness; yet, human 
freedom is precisely the aspect by which one's illness can be cured. As Frankl states: 
"Obsessional neurosis is not a psychosis; the sick person's attitude toward it is still 
relatively free. "98 The idea that there are somehow degrees of individual freedom is 
left unexplained and unexplored in Frankl's theory. 
97 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 184-185. 
98 Ibid., 195. 
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While the above point has been noted in previous sections, what has yet to be 
explored is just how the logotherapist actually engages a client's freedom while 
simultaneously avoiding being a moralist and an intellectual but rather, being like an 
opthamologist, correcting one's vision. At least in the case of clinical neurosis, these 
theoretical maxims are not even discussed. Rather, the logotherapist is positively 
encouraged, in terms of method and attitude to engage in suggestion and persuasion 
when treating the clinical neurotic. What Frankl fails to acknowledge is that these 
methods and attitudes ultimately impact the goals of treatment and threaten the 
disciplinary viability of logotherapy. Logotherapy, in its practical applications of 
treating the clinical neurotics, at the very least, says nothing about "achieving meaning; 
encountering a realm of objective facts and values." In my view, by encouraging its 
practitioners to encourage radically subjective goals for their clients could actually 
violate what "remnants" of freedom a client has at his disposal. 
Let us begin with the general description of the "unique" logotherapeutic methods 
that could be applied when treating the clinical neurotic. Of the choices available, 
namely paradoxical intention and dereflection, it is paradoxical intention that is 
recommended for treating the obsessional neurotic. By definition, "paradoxical 
intention means that the patient is encouraged to do, or wish to happen the very thing · 
he fears. "99 The goal of this method is to allow a client to overcome anticipatory 
anxiety or what Frankl sometimes calls, "hyperintension."100 What paradoxical 
99 Frankl, Will to Meaning, 101. 
lOO Ibid., 100. 
intention attempts to overcome (and by implication what the focus of logotherapist 
really is in the confines of therapy) is described as follows: 
In order to understand the therapeutic efficiency of this 
technique we must consider the phenomenon called 
"anticipatory anxiety." By this I mean that the patient 
reacts to an event with a fearful expectation of its 
recurrence. However, fear tends to make happen precisely 
that which one fears, and so does anticipatory anxiety. 
Thus a vicious circle is established. A symptom evokes 
a phobia and the phobia provokes the symptom. The 
recurrence of the symptom then reinforces the phobia. 
The patient is caught in a cocoon. A feedback mechanism 
is established. 
How can we break up the vicious circle? .... to unhinge 
the circle, one must attack it on the psychic pole (emphasis 
mine) as well as on the organic pole. And the first is precisely 
the job done by paradoxical intention. 101 
There are two important conclusions that I want to draw from this quote. First, 
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when using the technique of paradoxical intention, the focus of the logotherapist is no 
longer on the spiritual aspect of the person; but rather, on the psychic dimension of the 
individual. 102 Presumably, when effective, the client overcomes their psychic 
symptoms. 103 Having achieved a "proximate goal" of relief of psychological pain, the 
101 Ibid.' 102-3. 
102 Although not central to the discussion, an implication for clients who are 
said to need paradoxical intention is that the clients who come to a logotherapist may 
first and foremost (if not only and exclusively) be motivated to enter treatment for 
psychic suffering. Problems of meaning, or lack thereof, may not at the outset or ever 
be deemed a "legitimate" concern from the client's perspective. 
103 Frankl does describe an instance of when paradoxical intention was not 
successful. In The Will to Meaning, 109, he writes: "I had a man in my department, a 
guard in a museum who could not stay on his job because he suffered from deadly 
fears that someone would steal a painting. During a round I made with my staff, I 
tried paradoxical intention with him: 'Tell yourself they stole a Rembrandt yesterday 
and today they will steal a Rembrandt and a Van Gogh.' He just stared at me and 
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ultimate work of logotherapy may then be said to begin, namely, the search for 
meaning. However, case after case of practical applications of logotherapy terminate 
with the goal of psychological symptom removal. What I am suggesting is that in 
cases of clinical neurosis, the proximate goal of a therapeutic technique seems to 
function as the end goal of therapy. It is unimportant to me how this final goal be 
described, be it in terms of happiness, relief of psychological pain, etc. What is 
important to note is that logotherapists appear to overstep their disciplinary boundaries 
or at the very least, are inconsistent with what they purport treat in the confines of 
therapy. 
A second conclusion that was alluded to in earlier sections is Frankl' s incoherent 
account of how the three different dimensions of the person causally interact. The 
mechanism of anticipatory anxiety presupposes a causal relationship between the 
physiological and psychological dimensions of the person. It is precisely at the 
psychic pole of the aforedescribed feedback mechanisms where logotherapists are 
recommended to intervene. Successful applications of paradoxical intention result in 
symptom removal/behavioral change. Yet, in the description of obsessional neurosis, 
Frankl states that it is the spiritual dimension where logotherapists were "obliged" to 
intervene; for it is this "attitude which has built up the basic constitutional 
disturbance." Mysteriously, the three aspects of the person "effect" each other and 
said, 'But Herr Professor, that's against the law!' This man simply was too feeble-
minded (emphasis added) to understand the meaning of paradoxical intention.~' 
Apparently, there are some selection criteria for clients who seek this kind of 
treatment. Intelligence is clearly one of them. 
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result in changes for the client. In the absence of a coherent causal account, it 
certainly appears as if logotherapists are magically capable of effecting these changes. 
In his recommendations to logotherapists, Frankl adds to this already confused account 
as follows: 
To say a thing is "psychogenic" is not equivalent to 
saying psychotherapy is indicated." Contrariwise, psycho-
therapy can be indicated even when it is not causal therapy. 
In other words, it can be the therapy that solves the 
problem, even when it is not specific therapy. The case of 
logotherapy is similar. Logotherapy can be an entirely 
suitable therapy even though it is neither causal nor 
specific. 104 
If this is the case, one must wonder, what is the exp'!rtise of the logotherapist? 
A third conclusion follows from both the paradoxical intention quote and the 
description of obsessional neurosis. This implication concerns the language used to 
describe what it is that the logotherapist does when making a diagnosis and using 
logotherapy' s techniques. In the description of obsessional neurosis, the reader is told 
that the logotherapist " ... sets out to transform the neurotic' s attitude" and that this 
attitude is " ... subject to correction." In later passages on obsessional neurosis, it is said 
that the method for treating such a client may be by "re-education." 105 In addition, 
when addressing those aspects of obsessional neurosis that are impervious to change, 
Frankl instructs logotherapists as follows: 
That is, insofar as his illness does have some constitutional 
core, the patient should learn to accept the character structure 
104 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 281. 
105 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 191. 
as fate, in order to avoid building up around the constitutional 
core additional psychogenic suffering. There is minimal 
constitutional basis which in fact cannot be influenced by 
psychotherapy. The patient must learn to affirm this minimum. 
The more we train him to a glad acceptance of fate, the more 
insignificant will be the residues of symptoms which are beyond 
help (emphasis added, mine). 106 
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Again, I remind the reader to focus on the language in light of the preceding claims 
that the logotherapist is neither a moralist nor an intellectual, but rather like an 
opthamologist. .. For, certainly both the technique of paradoxical intention and other 
methods for treating the obsessional neurotic make it appear as if the logotherapist is 
engaged in a prescriptive task of some sort. 107 Nonetheless, with respect to the 
technique of paradoxical intention, Frankl devotes several passages in his books to 
denying this consequence. He says: 
Hans 0. Gerz has pointed out: "One often hears the argument 
that it is 'suggestion' that gets the patients better. Some of my 
colleagues have attributed the results to my 'authoritarian' approach. 
Frankl has been accused of having made paradoxical intention 
successful because he is the great authority, the professor, and 
helps his patients with 'massive authoritative suggestion.' The 
fact is, however, that many other psychiatrists have been using 
Frankl's technique successfully. Cases have been reported as 
remaining symptom-free for even decades." Our patients often set 
out to use paradoxical intention with a strong conviction that it 
simply cannot work -- and yet, finally succeed. In brief they 
succeed not because of, but in spite of suggestion. 
106 Ibid., 186-87. 
107 By way of clarification, I do not at this point, think it is possible to identify 
the exact normative project that logotherapists are be engaged in. Given the confusion 
surrounding the philosophical assumptions underlying this paradigm, a coherent 
account would seem to be rather impossible. In addition, to establish my claim, I 
need indicate that the therapist is minimally involved in some normative enterprise in 
order to demonstrate the inconsistency of Frankl's claims. 
This leads to another question -- namely, whether or not 
paradoxical intention belongs to the persuasive methods. As 
a matter of fact, paradoxical intention is the exact opposite of 
persuasion, since it is not suggested that the patient simply 
suppress his fears (by the rational conviction that they are 
groundless) but, rather that he overcome them by exaggerating 
them!1os 
Despite these attempts at defense, I do not think Frankl's arguments have any 
legitimacy to them. To begin with, simply because psychiatrist's have reported 
success with the technique of paradoxical intention does not in any way refute the 
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claim that the technique itself is suggestive. In short, these claims are wholly disparate 
and in no way even logically related. 
Second, it is vacuous to claim that "paradoxical intention works in spite of 
suggestion" because, at some point, the patients must have heeded the suggestion to 
employ paradoxical intention even though, at first, they thought it could not work. 
Thus, paradoxical intention at some level has to be construed as suggestive. Frankl, 
himself may have later realized this. When defending this technique in The Will to 
Meaning, he says: "On the other hand, the remarkable results obtained by paradoxical 
intention cannot be explained merely in terms of suggestion" [emphasis added, mine] 109 
Finally and with respect to Frankl' s retort that paradoxical intention is not a 
persuasive technique, I believe that Frankl misunderstands the concept of persuasion 
itself. It seems to me that the very notion of "persuasion" says nothing about the 
content of what a person is encouraged to do, nor to think or believe. In other words, 
108 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 238. 
109 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 110. 
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a person may randomly hold belief "x" and be persuaded by someone else to more 
forcefully adhere to that very same belief. Perhaps this is a semantic argument more 
than a substantive argument, but it seems to me that Frankl misunderstands the nature 
of persuasion. He suggests that paradoxical intention is not a persuasive technique 
because the person (is told!) to exaggerate the very symptoms he dislikes. This is 
simply no argument. 
By way of conclusion, Frankl offers no convincing arguments to show that 
logotherapy as applied to clients who have a clinical neurosis is not suggestive nor 
persuasive. As such, and for the purposes of my thesis, if the door is opened to 
suggestion (in the sense of subtle/implicit prescriptions), then contrary to what Frankl 
claims, logotherapists are engaged quite unwittingly and misguidedly in a normative 
endeavor. 
If this is the case, as I have tried to argue, then the goals of therapy with clients 
who suffer from clinical neurosis may be of one of two kinds: 1) if treatment 
terminates with the successful application of logotherapeutic techniques, then 
logotherapy may properly be said to afford an individual psychological relief as a goal 
in itself Frankl would not want to admit this; 110 for happiness, defined as pleasure, is 
only a by-product of achieving meaning. 111 It is not clarified in Frank.l's texts whether 
or not in this context, psychological relief is equivalent to happiness; yet, if this seems 
11° For an argument of this point, see part one of this chapter. 
m Frankl, Will to Meaning, 99-100, "When discussing the motivational 
theory of logotherapy I pointed out that the direct intention of pleasure def eats itself. 
The more an individual aims at pleasure, the more he misses the aim." 
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plausible, then one must acknowledge that logotherapists are not practicing consistent 
with their theory. 
But, a second kind of goal could equally result for clients suffering from clinical 
neurosis, namely the therapist subtly coerces (through suggestion, persuasion, the very 
making of the diagnosis itself) the client to adopt his particular philosophical vision. 
Although, the theory of logotherapy claims that the authentic self must choose/act by 
himself with reference to objective being, in its very real applications, the appropriate 
balance between the client's self and being and self is suggested, etc. by the 
logotherapist. Such a goal is beautifully exemplified in the following passages. We 
shall first begin with a passage on the obsessional neurotic and then move to the 
general remedies for various clinical neuroses: 
Obsessional neurosis is not a mental disease, let alone a disease 
of "the spirit"; the position the person takes on the disease is 
independent of the disease. He remains free to change his 
attitude. It is imperative for the therapist to make use of this 
freedom. For obsessional neurosis "seduces" the obsessional 
neurotic to a particular philosophical position, namely that world-
view of hundred-per-centness of which we have spoken above. 
. . . Because of the overdeveloped awareness that accompanies the 
obsessional neurotic' s acts of cognition or decision, he lacks that 
"fluent style" in which the healthy person lives, thinks, and 
acts." 112 
To sum up, we may say that the normal person desires a half-
way-secure world, whereas the neurotic seeks absolute security. 
The normal person desires to surrender himself to the one he 
loves -- while the sexual neurotic strives for orgasm, aims at that 
in itself, and thereby impairs his sexual potency. The normal 
person wishes to know a part of the world approximately --
while the obsessional neurotic wants a feeling of obviousness, 
112 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 191. 
aims at that and thereby finds himself being carried away on an 
endless moving belt. The normal person is ready to take 
existential responsibility for actual existence, while the neurotic 
with his obsessional scruples would like to have only the feeling 
(though an absolute one of a conscience at peace with itself. 
From the point of view of what men should desire, the 
obsessional neurotic wants too much; in terms of what men can 
accomplish, he wants too little. 113 
6b) The existential neurotics 
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A second class of clients is uniquely suited for treatment by logotherapists, namely 
those suffering from existential neurosis. Existential neurosis is characterized by 
"frustration of one's will to meaning," 114 and as such, is a uniquely spiritual illness. 
One would expect the treatment of existential neurotics to be well-within the proper 
sphere of activity of logotherapy. The kinds of identifiable existential neurosis are: 
those suffering from the existential vacuum, unemployment disease, the Sunday-blues 
disease, the executive disease, etc. 115 
In almost all of Frankl' s case studies, it is not at all clear that the clients are 
motivated to see a logotherapist because they are cognizant of the lack of meaning in 
their lives. 116 Typically, some other factors are the reasons for which clients seek 
113 Ibid., 194. 
114 Ibid., xvii. 
115 Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, 122-4. 
116 For an example, see Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 121, 124. When describing 
several cases of existential neurotics, Frankl attributes their reason for visiting a 
logotherapist to a feeling of despair, sometimes accompanied by the desire to- commit 
suicide. 
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treatment. At least in these cases, it is incumbent upon the logotherapist to inform 
clients -- or, to lead them to interpret their own suffering -- in existential terms and 
hence, as a lack of meaning. 
While paradoxical intention and dereflection are specific logotherapeutic techniques 
employed with those suffering from clinical neurosis; no specific techniques are 
advocated for the treatment of existential neurotics. However, Frankl is insistent that 
the personal values of logotherapists not impact a client's search for meaning -- the 
purported goal of treatment for the existential neurotic. He says: 
In this sense existential analysis also remains non-
committal on the question of "to what" a person should 
feel responsible -- whether to his God or his conscience 
or his society or whatever higher power. And existential 
analysis equally forbears to say what a person should 
feel responsible for -- for the realization of which 
values, for the fulfillment of which personal tasks, 
for which particular meaning to life. On the contrary, 
the task of existential analysis consists precisely in 
bringing the individual to the point where he can of 
his own accord discern his own proper tasks, out of the 
consciousness of his own responsibility, and can find the 
clear, no longer indeterminate, unique and singular 
meaning of his own life. 117 
Continuation of the treatment... so that it intrudes into 
the personal sphere of particular decisions, must be 
termed impermissible. The physician should never be 
allowed to take over the patient's responsibility to 
be shifted to himself; he must never anticipate decisions 
or impose them on his patient. His job is to make it 
possible for the patient to reach decisions; he must 
endow the patient with the capacity for deciding. 118 
117 Ibid., 275-6. 
118 Ibid., 276-7. 
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Within clinical practice, it is difficult to understand how a logotherapist actually 
engages a client's sense of conscience and responsibility without "imposing," on some 
level, his own values on the client. Examining actual descriptions of clinical 
encounters consistently leads one to the conclusion that in the endeavor for clients to 
find their own meaning, the logotherapist's personal values are indeed, either covertly 
or overtly suggested to the client. If this is the case, then logotherapists must admit 
that a search for meaning is never purely a client's own, individual endeavor; but 
rather, their personal search is strongly guided by the logotherapist himself. When one 
adds to this consideration that theoretically logotherapists unwittingly are told to 
believe that their own values are not operative in the context of logotherapy, this 
exponentially increases the possibility that uncritically analyzed personal values may 
impact the a client's search for meaning .. The following illustrates how this might be 
said to occur in practice. Moreover, I challenge to the reader to consider whether the 
client could really be said to have benefitted from treatment: . 
A patient was sent to a psychiatrist because she was 
troubled by an intense fear of syphilis. It developed that 
she was suffering from a general neurotic hypochondria. 
She misinterpreted neuralgic pains as signs of luetic infection. 
. . . In this particular case the patient did not have these 
sexual guilts. It was true that she had been the victim of 
rape, but she was sensible enough to have no guilt feelings 
about that isolated sexual experience. Her guilt feeling 
had reference to another aspect of the matter entirely: 
that she had not told her husband about the incident. Here 
she was again being sensible; she deeply loved her husband 
and had wanted to spare his feelings, since she knew him to 
be a distinctly suspicious person. Her confession compulsion 
was not a symptom at all. It therefore was not susceptible 
to the ordinary interpretations of psychotherapy; what was 
required was the logotherapeutic methods of matter-of-fact 
discussions, of taking the moral issues at face value. In 
fact, the confession compulsion promptly vanished the moment 
the patient realized that in the concrete case her continued 
silence was an obligation she owed to her love. She perceived 
that there was no need to make any confession since only guilt 
can be confessed, and she felt herself to be free of any real 
guilt. Moreover -- here we have an analogy to a case mentioned 
in another connection -- she would only have conveyed quite the 
wrong impression to her suspicious husband and would have been 
deceiving him with the truth. This patient, then, could only 
be reassured when her conscience was reassured. And her 
conscience was not troubled over the sexual incident, but only 
in regard to the dubious moral obligation to confess. 119 
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This example is a clear illustration of how and where a logotherapist's personal values 
actually do impact the goal of treatment. Much more than merely allowing a patient 
to clarify her particular meaning, the logotherapist deems her understanding of her rape 
and her decision not to tell her husband about it as "sensible!" More strongly, it is 
said that the client had an obligation to withhold this information from her husband so 
that he may not suffer. Frankl is quite right in suggesting that this is a case involving 
moral issues; however, it certainly seems as if the "decision" that was made by the 
client at the end of treatment was strongly guided by the logotherapist. Contrary to 
facilitating her contact with an objective realm of values and/or encouraging her to 
engage in value clarification, it was the logotherapist who succinctly judged her 
decisions to be "sensible." 
Some might suggest that such cases are not detailed enough to make sweeping 
claims. Let me be clear in saying that it is not incumbent upon this analysis to show 
how in all cases suggestion is operative; but only, that at least in some cases, 
119 Frankl, Doctor and Soul, 271-2. 
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suggestion is present. If this is the case, then indeed, logotherapists are acting in the 
capacity of a moral advisor and/or intellectual. Additionally, they are quite simply not 
practicing in accord with the theory of logotherapy. But most importantly, I leave it 
to the reader to judge whether or not clients are really led to discover their own 
meaning in this form of therapy. 
7) Conclusion 
Had Viktor Frankl written Man's Search for Meaning, solely to discuss the 
importance that "meaning" has in human life, I doubt that I would have devoted the 
preceding pages to an analysis of that inspirational message. Indeed, Frankl's tales of 
the concentration camps and his concomitant message that those who survived were 
those who had found meaning are extraordinary. As such, they deserve to be read by 
those who want to consider how Frankl's thoughts may enrich their own walk through 
life. 
However, Frankl purported to do more than offer life lessons. As was noted in the 
introduction, he developed this discipline of logotherapy to serve as a corrective to 
existential analysis. It was as a paradigm of psychotherapy, that I investigated 
logotherapy. Unlike any other paradigm of psychotherapy assessed in this dissertation 
and from the very beginning, I have demonstrated that logotherapy must be viewed as 
both inconsistent and incoherent. In other words, the fact that logotherapy's purpose 
was unclear -- sometimes viewed as a "supplement" and at other times a "substitute 
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for psychotherapy" -- led us down a long path of demonstrating the inconsistent 
meanings of its assumptions and as a result, of its applications. 
This analysis then, has important implications for those who write about the theory 
and purport to engage in the practice of logotherapy. Today, there is an independent 
journal called: The International Forum for Logotherapy. Contributors clarify the 
theory and report on its applications. In a recent article, entitled: "The Dynamic of 
Meaning," Jana Preble, a "diplomate of logotherapy" and associate professor of applied 
psychology cites three case examples of those successfully treated by logotherapy." 
After claiming that it was discovering a third grade boy's "world of meaning" that 
ultimately was the the key to success for teaching him how to read, Preble 
unabashedly claims: 
Logotherapy is consistent as a philosophy and a viable 
therapy. There is no need for manipulation, no forcing 
a client to fit a treatment, or a treatment to fit a client. 
All that is occasionally required is a shift in perception, a 
new way of seeing that expands persons rather than limits 
them.120 
As I have argued, considerations as to how, why and who is truly responsible for this 
"expansion" are extraordinarily ambiguous in logotherapy. For that reason, I find 
Preble's assurance of the consistency of logotherapy quite discomfiting. As I have 
attempted to demonstrate in this chapter, clients who are treated in this form of 
therapy may in the end say that they have found "meaning" -- but its nature, reality, 
120 Jana Preble. "The Dynamic of Meaning," International Forum for 
Logotherapy, vol. 14, no. 2 (Fall, 1991): 98. 
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and whether or not they, as free and responsible individuals have authentically chosen 
it is all but clear. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
CONSIDERATION OF THE STATE OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOTHERAPY: 
AN ANALYSIS OF SHORT-TERM DYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 
The three paradigms of psychotherapy analyzed in this dissertation no longer 
exclusively characterize contemporary theory and practice. As stated in the 
Introduction, the paradigms were selected for the following reasons: 1) historical 
significance and 2) an extensive literature that attempts to articulate the nature of the 
school of thought. These two factors made it possible to demonstrate competing 
metaphysical and normative commitments. Although many therapists today still 
adhere to aspects of these schools of thought, very few would define their practice by 
any one theoretical orientation. 1 Rather, there is growing evidence that 
psychotherapists are rejecting the limitations of particular schools of thought in favor 
of an eclectic orientation. 2'3 If this is indeed the case, one might claim that my thesis 
1 Council for the National Register of Health Service Providers, National 
Register, I-13: "Each Registrant may identify a primary and secondary orientation, 
neither, or only a primary or theoretical orientation. These choices were based upon 
the descriptions psychologists use and are by necessity limited. As a result, the 
orientations listed may not be entirely reflective of a Registrant's practice. The 
choices are as follows: Behavioral, Cognitive/Cognitive Behavioral, Existential/ 
Humanistic, Interpersonal, Psychodynamic, Social Learning Systems." 
2 Sol L. Garfield. Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 3: "While such popular orientation as 
psychoanalysis and its derivatives and behavior therapy have had a marked irifluence 
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is only of historical interest insofar as it describes the practice of psychotherapy of a 
day gone by. Given the trend of eclecticism, theoretical analyses of paradigm-specific 
practice could only be a caricature of actual practice. By implication, any attempt to 
distill the normative assumptions present in the practice of psychotherapy would be 
unrealistic. 
This final chapter is offered as a response to such objections. In part, I will 
explain why the current eclectic orientation in psychotherapy in no way renders my 
thesis obsolete. Values are still present in the theory and practice of contemporary 
psychotherapy. Eclecticism can only be said to make the project itself more 
complicated -- both in terms of identifying "possible" paradigms and investigating 
normative assumptions as they may appear in practice. 4 As a result of this 
on the developments within the field, a majority of practitioners do not appear to 
follow any particular school exclusively, or to limit themselves to the theories and 
procedures of just one theoretical orientation. For example, in a 1970's survey of 855 
clinical psychologists, over half of them indicated that they were eclectics (Garfield & 
Kurtz, 1976) Since that time, a number of additional surveys have been conducted, and 
although the percentage of individuals identifying themselves as eclectics has varied 
from study to study, the eclectic orientation has generally been the most popular. In a 
recent study of clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers and marriage and 
family therapists, 68 % of the sample of 423 individuals indicated an eclectic 
preference (Jensen, Bergin & Greaves, 1990). 
3 As stated by Dr. Lowy in Basic Principles and Techniques in Short-Term 
Dynamic Psychotherapy by Habib Davanloo. 1st ed. (New Jersey: J. Aronson, 1994), 
93: "What is remarkable about this meeting is the absence of a school of thought. It 
has been noted a number of times that schools are for minnows and fish and not for 
scientists, and it is really quite refreshing to have an absence of 'this school versus 
that school."' 
4 It is important to acknowledge at this point two possible reactions to my 
thesis: 1) Some therapists might claim that they adopt their ideas from so many 
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"complication" and unlike previous chapters, a brief foreward addressing the presence 
of paradigms in contemporary psychotherapy will be necessary. Exploring this issue 
will make it apparent as to why my thesis must be tempered. Given the nature of the 
paradigm I intend to investigate, namely Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy,5 and the 
manner in which it developed, I am only able to demonstrate where certain theoretical 
commitments might allow for a therapist's personal values to enter into the practice of 
therapy. 
Eclecticism and the problem of paradigm identification 
Since the 1960's, there has been a rapid growth in the number of new forms 
and techniques of psychotherapy. Recent estimates suggest that there are 450+ 
approaches to psychotherapy. This recent statistic viewed in light of the following 
paradigms that the very identification of a coherent normative project would be 
impossible. In this case, I would urge therapists to engage in critical reflection so as to 
decipher exactly which assumptions they adopt from which schools of thought. It may 
be the case that two assumptions are contradictory or imply contradictory normative 
claims. Both could negatively impact the client. 2) Some therapists might reject 
practicing from within any paradigm whatsoever (non-paradigmatic practice). Two 
responses are applicable: a) Values are still likely to enter into the practice of 
psychotherapy, but they are non-paradigmatic values (i.e. the therapist's personal 
values, religious values, etc.) orb) One could question the "legitimacy" of practicing 
psychotherapy in this way. As stated by Sol L. Garfield, in The Practice of Brief 
Psychotherapy. (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon, 1989), 19: "Needless to say, if this rate of 
increase continues [the growth of schools of thought], at some point we will have a 
different form of psychotherapy for every person in the United States. This 
manifestation of the free enterprise system, perhaps, may epitomize true democracy, 
but whether it is an ideal situation for psychotherapy is another matter." 
5 In this chapter, "Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy" is abbreviated as 
STDT. I will use STD in front of the term "therapists." 
quote seems to indicate that the sheer number of forms of therapy virtually doubles 
every ten years. As Garfield says: 
"By the mid-1960's, I had accumulated over 60 different 
approaches to psychotherapy ... In the 1970's, a report 
from the National Institute of Mental Health made 
reference to the existence of over 130 different forms of 
psychotherapy (Report of the Research Task Force of the 
National Institute of Mental Health, 1975). And, this 
burst of unusual creative efforts in psychotherapy has 
continued. Just five years later, Herink (1980) published 
The Psychotherapy Handbook: The A to Z Guide to more 
than 250 Therapies in Use Today. A few years later, 
Kazdin ( 1986) made reference to the existence of over 
400 therapeutic techniques. 6 
Ironically, psychotherapists have greeted this increasing diversity with a curious 
mixture of enthusiasm and concern. While many therapists welcome the creative 
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developments and new techniques for treating clients,7 others appear to be concerned 
that the diversity has caused a kind of disciplinary confusion for the field of 
psychotherapy. 8• 9 
6 Garfield, Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach," 1. 
7 Jeremy Holmes and Richard Lindley. The Values of Psychotherapy. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 9: "The convergence of the psychotherapies while 
retaining their separate identities is, in our view, one of the positive features of 
contemporary psychotherapy. The recent development of cognitive behavioral 
therapies, for example, means that behavior therapists now recognize the inner world 
of their patients, and are beginning to build bridges with analytic therapies." 
8 Garfield, Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach, 2: "Such diversity 
is confusing to people entering the field. It is equally confusing for individuals 
outside the field. There can be too much of a good thing. This diversity raises some 
basic and intriguing questions concerning what is really important in psychotherapy. 
In other words, what are the variables or processes that lead to positive change in 
psychotherapy? Does one school of thought have a more correct view of these 
fundamental processes, or are all approaches either viewing different parts of the 
elephant or characterizing similar phenomena in different ways?" 
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The overall effect that the proliferation of forms of therapy might be said to 
have on clients and for the discipline in general is not the central concern of this 
chapter. Rather, the question that concerns me is to what extent it is possible (or not) 
to identify paradigms amidst the many new "forms" of psychotherapy. One wonders, 
for example, if these 450 forms of therapy really share all or even most of the features 
of the three, historical paradigms analyzed at the beginning of this dissertation. That 
is to say, one wonders if they are defined by the fact that they were founded by a 
specific individual; advocate specific notions of reality and mental illness; and/or have 
an identifiable community of practitioners. Unfortunately, scholars writing on this 
topic have been notoriously vague regarding what constitutes a new "form" of 
therapy. 10• 11 Concerns of this kind, together with the sheer number of developments in 
9 See Light, Donald. Becoming Psychiatrists: The Professional Transformation 
of Self, 1st ed., (New York: Norton, 1980), 290. Light makes a distinction between 
"strong and weak paradigm development" within medicine. By paradigm development, 
he means: "the degree to which there is consensus among practitioners about the 
theory or paradigm underlying their work." He says: "The studies of residents in 
orthopedic surgery and psychiatry are particularly useful for looking at awareness of 
uncertainties because the strength, and to a lesser degree, the development of their 
paradigms contrast so sharply. Psychiatry is widely regarded as having weak and 
competing paradigms to guide its diagnosis, treatment and research; while orthopedic 
surgery has a strong paradigm with competing derivations," 290. 
10 Psychotherapists themselves writing on this topic have neither been very 
careful nor consistent about the language used to describe these forms of therapy --
whether they be schools of thought, paradigms, new techniques, etc. One of the most 
curious uses of language occurs in Holmes and Lindley, Values, 3. They say: 
"Psychotherapy is enormously diverse. The Psychotherapy Handbook lists over 300 
types of therapy ranging from Active Analytic to Zaraleya Psychoenergetic Technique. 
Most therapists follow a particular school or tendency, (emphasis added) and the 
authors are no exceptions." 
11 Garfield, Psychotherapy: An Eclectic-Integrative Approach, 1-2. 
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psychotherapy, make the task of paradigm identification difficult at best. 
Two additional phenomenon that add to this difficulty deserve to be mentioned: 
namely, the resurgence of the medical model in treating mental illness (the rise of 
psychotropic drugs) and a growing number of therapists that establish what is loosely 
defmed as the "helping professions." With respect to the first issue, I believe that the 
medical model does, in some sense, pose a problem for the present analysis. An 
increasing number of scientific studies suggest that a combined use of psychotherapy 
and psychotropic medication in the treatment of mental illness constitutes the best 
form of treatment. 12 The increasing popularity of combining neuroscientific and 
psychotherapeutic remedies further erodes attempts to identify "pure" normative 
projects in contemporary psychotherapy. 
Finally, the sheer growth in the variety and numbers of people in the "helping 
professions" also contributes to the problem of identification. It is interesting to note 
that Freud, Sullivan and Frankl shared several features in common: all were medical 
doctors, all practiced psychotherapy at a time when the discipline was still young and 
relatively small13 and all adhered to psychoanalysis at some point in their lives. 
12 For an example see Lester Luborsky, Paul Crits-Christoph and A. Thomas 
McLellan. "Do Therapists Vary Much in Their Success? Findings from Four 
Outcome Studies." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 56 (October 1986): 
501-12. 
13 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 115th Ed., (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Commerce: Economics & Statistics Administration, Bureau of"Census, 
1995), 411: Statistics comparing the years of 1983 and 1984 verify the staggering 
growth in terms of numbers and kinds of individuals involved in this profession. (Data 
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Today, the field of psychotherapy has extended beyond the realm of medical practice 
and includes social workers, marriage and family therapists, school psychologists, 
pastoral counselors, occupational therapists, etc. In terms of differences in licensing, 
educational background and variable contexts under which these practitioners claim to 
treat the mentally ill, the contemporary scene of psychotherapy has grown and altered 
considerably. 
In light of these three factors, some stipulations need to be provided at the 
outset of this chapter. First, when I refer to a paradigm of psychotherapy, I will only 
be referring to it in its "pure" form. That is to say, the paradigm discussed in this 
chapter will be reviewed on its own terms and without reference to how drugs might 
interfere with or change its ideology. Fusing two distinct schools of treating mental 
illness in practice carries with it the possibility of substantively affecting the 
underlying assumptions implicit in a school of thought. For these reasons, neither a 
pure medical approach nor a combined neuroscientific and psychotherapy approach 
shall be discussed in what follows .. 
Second, I have chosen to confine my analysis to a relatively new "form" of 
therapy which today functions as a paradigm of sorts. Short-Term Dynamic 
per 1000 individuals employed): 
Therapists: 
Counselors: 
Psychologists: 
Social Workers: 
1983 
247 
184 
135 
407 
1994 
430 
237 
280 
667 
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Psychotherapy is arguably a suitable focus for this chapter because it shares many 
important features with the historical paradigms assessed earlier. Short Term Dynamic 
Therapy (STDT) seems to meet many of the criterion of Kuhn's conception of 
"paradigms." For example, STDT at least has a history of some twenty or more years 
in which it was developed and gained acceptance in the psychotherapeutic community. 
One sign of evidence for such acceptance is that STDT has at least one academic 
journal developed to researching and further articulating the paradigm. 14 
There are some features, however, of STDT which impede its analysis as a 
paradigm. As the analysis will show, the manner in which Short-Term Dynamic 
Therapy developed as a paradigm of sorts is relatively complex. The number of 
thinkers to whom proponents owe their allegiance are various. In addition, and in a 
different spirit from the historically based paradigms assessed in the first three 
chapters of this dissertation, contemporary modes of psychotherapy tend to strike one 
as consisting of a potpourri of techniques. This should hardly be surprising. 
Typically, as a discipline develops, new paradigms develop in reaction to and yet as 
an outgrowth, often times, of previous modes of thought. When and where 
metaphysical assumptions are operative, very rarely is there a theoretical explanation --
that is, notably of the nature of the self, worldview, and even of mental illness. 
Nonetheless, where at least Freud, Frankl and Sullivan attempted to explain the 
assumptions in their theories, it seems as if contemporary paradigms tend to ignore 
14 See, The International Journal of Short-Term Psychotherapy (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.), vol. 1 (1986--). 
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addressing these issues altogether. 15 
Finally, my analysis of this paradigm will be limited to the approach taken and 
the explanations provided by either clinical psychologists or psychiatrists. While 
social workers and counselors may purport to adopt a psychodynamic orientation, 
other factors indicate that their operative normative assumptions and goals may be 
decidedly different from psychologists and psychiatrists. These factors are: the 
contexts within which they do their work, their respective clients and the education 
they have received. Additionally, it should be noted that social workers and 
counselors have not been the creators of these paradigms themselves, but rather, 
clinical psychologists and psychiatrists have largely been responsible for their 
articulation in the past and at present. 
There are a variety of possible methods for exploring my thesis in this chapter 
in light of these difficulties.16 In the following analyses of STDT, I will attempt to 
15 I suspect that one reason for this is because these approaches are seen as 
historical developments of previous theories. Perhaps, then, there is a sense that these 
issues have been adequately addressed by previous theorists. A second reason may be 
due the fact that contemporary theories seem to place much more emphasis on 
techniques, goals of therapy, etc. at the expense of "factual notions" (and hence 
normative notions attached to these). Whatever the case may be, the choice of the 
appropriate methodology for exploring the thesis of this dissertation is undoul;>tedly 
made more complex in virtue of these two issues: 1) the "eclectic" feel of the theories 
themselves along with 2) an apparent disregard for the metaphysical assumptions 
underlying the historical theories to which they appeal. 
16 Given the above considerations, one possible mode of exploring STDT 
would be to distill this paradigm to its ultimate origins. For example, STDT has its 
theoretical roots in the dynamic theories of Freud, Klein, Rank, and more recently 
French & Alexander, etc. If a reductionistic account could be achieved, then; one 
could argue that STDT is simply a briefer version of traditional psychoanalytic 
theories and as a result, shares most, or even all, of its normative assumptions. 
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distill the general features of the paradigm itself and attempt to crystallize its unique 
and/or foundational tenets. By such a distillation of these ideas in their own right, 
perhaps one will be able to judge if in fact from these features alone (the features that 
are most discussed), discemable metaphysical features can be noted or not. If this 
exists as a possibility, then obviously one will be able to move on to the normative 
assumptions contained therein. Once these two moves have been accomplished, 
connections which exist between the contemporary paradigm and those that have 
historical ties will be noted. The advantage of this methodology is that one can still 
preserve the uniqueness of the contemporary paradigms (and thereby avoid 
reductionism) as well as highlight what is novel about STDT. In addition, though, if 
indeed points of "real" contact exist between the metaphysical assumptions and 
historical paradigms, this can duly be noted. 
The origins of short-term dvnamic therapy 
In the book, Basic Principles and Techniques of Short-Term Dynamic Therapy, 
Despite its appeal, this methodology suffers from a major flaw. Even though the 
proponents of this theory acknowledge their indebtedness to past thinkers, and 
paradigms, they are often eager to emphasize the novelty of their school of thought 
and hence, would seem to be unwilling to acknowledge a strict reduction to 
foundational paradigms. By way of an example, STDT's recommend that therapists 
take an active, even confrontational, approach towards their clients in order to have 
successful therapeutic outcomes. This stands in marked contrast to Freud's 
recommendation to analysts. More than representing a mere variance in their 
approach, STD therapists claim to be doing something new by theoretically articulating 
the role of the therapist. This novelty, by their own admission, could not possibly 
admit of a reduction to the metaphysical, and as a consequence, to the normative 
assumptions involved. In the end, this approach is not choiceworthy. 
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H. Davanloo and J. Mannor provide forewords to the proceedings of the First and 
Second International Symposiums on Short-Tenn Psychotherapy held in 1975-76. 
Both claim that the ultimate origin of the paradigm hearkens back to Freud's 
psychoanalysis (insofar as this is an instance of dynamic therapy), and also to the 
work of Alexander and French in the 1940's.17 
The writings of Alexander and French serve as an interesting bridge between 
Freud's psychoanalysis and the development of STDT. As Mannor tells us, Alexander 
and French began to experiment and modify standard Freudian psychoanalytic 
principles, particularly as they concern the length, frequency and regularity of intervals 
that the client was seen. In addition, they began to experiment with the concept of 
transference with the hope that a more active role of the therapist could produce faster 
results. Their seminal work, Psychoanalytic Therapy (1946) was greeted negatively by 
the analytic community. Although Marmor does not tell us why this was the case, 
presumably it had to do with the very idea of modifying an already accepted scientific 
paradigm of therapy namely, Freud's psychoanalysis.18 
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, at least three psychiatrists (H. Davanloo, D. 
Malan and P .E. Sifneos) continued the experiments with the techniques of traditional 
psychoanalytic therapy. The impetus behind their research was largely a practical 
concern, as Sifneos claims: 
17 Franz Alexander and T.M. French. Psychoanalytic Therapy: Principles and 
Application. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press), 1946. 
18 Davanloo, Basic Principles, 2. 
(STDT) was developed nearly forty years ago in order to 
meet the demand for psychotherapeutic help which far 
exceeded the availability of trained therapists, and to 
counteract the prevailing -- and I feel absurd -- idea that 
long-term psychotherapy was the only way to change 
human attitudes and behaviors. 19 
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An economic explanation for the paradigms development can be noted here: supply of 
therapists and the prevailing demand for therapy created the need for shorter forms of 
psychotherapy that nonetheless could yield significant and long-lasting improvements 
for the client. Some might be tempted to claim that the paradigm itself, then, only 
differs from psychoanalysis in virtue of its limited duration. Again while the brevity 
of treatment was a foundational concern to the originators of STDT, substantive 
differences in terms of technique, role of the therapist, selection criteria of clients were 
explored in each of their forms of treatment. In the early 1970's, the American 
psychiatrists, Davanloo and Sifneos, met and discussed their fmdings. A little later, 
they became acquainted with the English psychiatrist, D. Malan, who had for some 
years been exploring briefer forms of psychotherapy. Motivated by a similar concern, 
yet pursuing their work independently of each other, they agreed to meet in the mid-
1970's in order to discuss their work. 
This, in brief, is the history of STDT. In what follows, we will explore the 
theoretical commitments of STDT with the hope of identifying where, at the very 
19 Peter E Sifneos. Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Psychotherapy: A Treatment 
Manual, (New York: Basic Books, 1992), x. See also: "The Current Status of 
Individual Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy and its Future: An Overview," 
American Journal of Psychotherapy, vol. 38, no. 4, (October, 1984): 472. 
least, normative assumptions may appear. This will be done keeping in mind the 
historical ties that STDT has to Freud's psychoanalysis. For if it is the case that 
STDT is simply a briefer version of psychoanalysis, then it could be the case that 
many of its normative assumptions are the same as those identified in Chapter 1. 
The logic of short-term dynamic therapy 
In practice, it is true, there is nothing to be said against a 
psychotherapist combining a certain amount of analysis 
with some suggestive influence in order to achieve a 
perceptible result in a shorter time -- as is necessary for 
instance in institutions. But one has a right to insist that 
he himself should be in no doubt about what he is doing 
and should know that his method is not that of true 
psychoanalysis. 20 
567. But, after all, the game is supposed to be defined by 
the rules! So, if a rule of the game prescribes that the 
kings are to be used for drawing lots before a game of 
chess, then that is an essential part of the game. What 
objection might one make to this? That one does not see 
the point of the prescription. Perhaps as one wouldn't see 
the point either of a rule by which each piece had to be 
turned round three times before one moved it. If we 
found this rule in a board-game we should be surprised 
and should speculate about the purpose of the rule. ("Was 
this prescription meant to prevent one from moving 
without due consideration?")21 
As noted in the previous section, STDT appeared roughly at the same time 
199 
albeit by three key persons working independently of each other. Because of this, by 
2° Freud, SE 12: 118. 
21 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1963), 150-1. 
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the time First International Conference on STDT was held, what I would like to call 
"private language games"23 were already rather well-developed. Sifneos, working at 
the Beth Israel Medical Center, coined his version of psychotherapy as "Short-Term 
Anxiety-Provoking Psychotherapy (STAPP)." By contrast, Davanloo developed what 
he called, "Broad-Focused Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy (BFSTDP)." The 
individual theoretical differences along with different research methods and outcomes 
prompted the desire to search for common ground in the mid-1970's.24 
In spite of the individualized manner in which STDT emerged, I will attempt to 
explore the general logic behind versions of STDT in this section. This is possible 
because several structures are broadly recognized in STDT. As I will argue, these 
structures appear to function like the "rules' of a game. Each one of the categories 
discussed below is logically, even necessarily linked to another. This structure, in 
some sense, indicates how this form of psychotherapy is to be practiced. Yet, despite 
the apparent formal nature of the rules, as we work through each category it will 
23 I make this point about there being "private language games" existing in the 
realm of STDT to highlight yet again, a difficulty noted at the outset of this chapter. 
As I suggested earlier, focusing a discussion of major paradigms in contemporary 
psychotherapy is a problematic task. One wonders if the differences, let us say, 
between Sifneos' version of ST APP and Davanloo's BFSTD are of such qualitative 
import so that they do in fact constitute different paradigms altogether. So, another 
stipulation is in order. I will treat STDT as a paradigm unto itself and yet, when 
focusing in on, a feature that is unique or more highly noted in one theory as 
opposed to another, I will alert the reader to this fact. 
24 Walter V. Flegenheimer. Techniques of Brief Psychotherapy. (New York: 
Jason Aronson, 1982): Other versions of STDT identified are: Intensive Brief Therapy 
of David Huntingford Malan; Time-Limited Psychotherapy of Mann; Eclectic-
Integrated Therapy of Walberg, etc. 
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become increasingly apparent that the rules (and the overall game) operate according 
to the individual interpretations of the therapist. Thus, in my view, Short-Term 
Dynamic Therapy is a form of therapy that appears to have built-in warrants for its 
practitioners to rely on personal values. 
Selection criteria of clients 
Unlike any other contemporary paradigm, STDT theorists are quite specific in 
defining the kind of patient that qualifies for treatment. As we will soon see, this 
highly specific and limited number of individuals largely sets the pace for how this 
kind of treatment works. 
In his book, Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Psychotherapy~ Sifneos offers the 
most comprehensive list of selection criteria for clients. In brief, clients must be: 
intelligent and/or psychologically-minded; have exhibited meaningful relationships in 
the past; present with a focused problem; and relate flexibly to the examiner, with 
positive and negative feelings exhibited appropriately.25 Each criterion is significant 
because it determines not only the substance of the following categories/rules but also, 
the success or failure of the practical application of the paradigm. 
To begin exploration of some of these features, at times, there is a tendency to 
subsume them under a general heading that clients must exhibit a "strength of 
25 Criteria distilled from Peter E. Sifneos. Short-Term Anxiety Provoking 
Therapy: A Treatment Manual (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 19. See also: 
Davanloo, Basic Principles, 9-34. 
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character. "26 Whether or not these features alone are constitutive of character or not, 
the operative word in this phrase does indeed seem to be "strength." Clients who are 
admitted into STDT must possess both cognitive and emotional resilience. If strength 
of this nature is a prerequisite for "treatment" of a "mental illness," of course, one 
naturally wonders what mental illness constitutes on these terms. This of course, will 
be explored in the next section. For now, let the following remarks suffice as to the 
criteria of selection of patients. 
In STDT, persons who are intelligent are those "with a highly developed 
capacity to deal with complicated concepts."27 According to Malan, the most 
important way of exploring a client's intelligence is to see how the client responds to 
"tentative confrontations and classifications. "28 Interestingly, the degree to which 
clients use sophisticated language does not indicate their level of intelligence for 
clients, it is said, may not fully understand the meaning of their words. Appeals to 
other forms of testing intelligence, (i.e. IQ tests, work status, level of education, etc.) 
are not mentioned by these theorists. The underlying and obvious conclusion to be 
drawn is that intelligence of a client upon entry into STDT is solely a function of the 
extent to which she can absorb the clarifications/interpretations offered by her 
therapist. If this is how intelligence is construed in practice, this may indeed be an 
area where normative judgements enter into STDT. In the absence of objective 
26 Sifneos, Short-Term, 20. 
27 Ibid., 36. 
28 David Malan. The Frontier of Brief Psychotherapy, (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1976), 36. 
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measures for determining intelligence, the ultimate standard by which competence is 
judged is by the individual therapist. 
In addition, a client's emotional fortitude also constitutes part of the generic 
term, "strength of character." "Psychological mindedness" falls under this category. 
By and large this consists of a) one's capacity at introspection and b) ability to 
withstand the various techniques of STDT.29 This latter category consists of: 
confrontation, clarification, exploration, manipulation, abreaction, interpretation and 
anxiety-provoking techniques. 3° Clients who are not capable of withstanding these 
techniques are not deemed suitable candidates for STDT. As Malan notes in his 
recent book, Individual Psychotherapy & the Science of Psychodynamics: 
There are two classes of patients with whom purely 
dynamic psychotherapy tends to be ineffective: 1) those 
who are very fragile or badly damaged emotionally; and 
2) those who either start with massive resistance or else 
develop subtle forms of impenetrable resistance during 
their therapy. 31 
As point 1) of the above quote indicates, strength to withstand emotionally charged 
techniques delimits STDT candidates; but also, I would urge one to pay specific 
attention to issue 2) of the above quote. It is not an arbitrary fact that those clients 
who present with what is deemed as "massive resistance" are also rejected -- resistance 
perhaps to acknowledging/giving credence to a therapist's interpretation. 
29 Davanloo, Basic Principles, 17. 
30 Ibid. 
31 D. Huntingford Malan, Individual Psychotherapy and the Science of 
Psychodynamics, 2nd ed., (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1995), 273. 
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A third feature, namely, that persons have had a meaningful human relationship 
during childhood is the most curious selection criterion. Sifneos offers the most 
comprehensive explanation. He says: 
Making a sacrifice for another person at the expense of 
one's own pleasure is evidence of altruism. A child's 
demonstration of altruism at an early age denotes a 
capacity to interact flexibly with another person in a 
give-and-take way. Such a relationship is "meaningful." 
Why should one go about investigating so thoroughly the 
existence of one meaningful relationship in early 
childhood? Altruism and the capability of expressing 
feelings for another person in a give-and-take way are 
evidence that the patient reached a level of psychological 
maturity at an early age. Such an individual is not likely 
to become psychotic or develop a borderline or 
narcissistic personality later in life. In this sense the 
second criterion attempts to rule out these more serious 
conditions and gives the evaluator an opportunity to 
pursue an investigation of the patient's character strengths 
and suitability for STAPP.32 
This passage has important implications not only for the logic of STDT but also, as I 
will argue, for the normative assumptions that this kind of therapy might involve in 
practice. With respect to the logic, it will be shown that the criterion that one has had 
a meaningful relationship directly bears upon the second rule of the game of STDT, 
namely diagnosis. In principle, neither psychotic, narcissistic, or borderline personality 
disorders are treatable illnesses within the confines of STDT. More than a way of 
delimiting treatable categories of mental illness, though, altruism greatly colors the 
kind of therapeutic relationship that is considered valuable in STDT. For, depending 
upon how the therapist interprets the meaning of "altruism" and "give-and-take 
32 Sifneos, Short-Term, 23-24. 
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interaction" with others, the extent to which there exists an asymmetrical balance of 
power between the client and the therapist as well as the degree to which the personal 
values of the therapist may impact the practice of STDT will be indicated. 
Let us take a closer look at what Sifneos might mean by the terms, "altruism" 
and "give-and-take interaction with others." Sifneos seems to understand the term 
"altruism" as the ability of one to make sacrifices for another. I would venture to say 
that this is a rather extreme way of defining the term --- the term "sacrifice" implying 
that one might do something for others at the expense of their own interests and/or 
their own well-being. Nonetheless, even if we were to understand "altruism" in a less 
extreme sense, (i.e. altruism as opposed to egoism as typically distinguished in ethics), 
at the very least, altruism implies that one has "other-centered" interests in contrast to 
merely attempting to satisfy one's own self-interest. Now, if this latter definition were 
to be what Sifneos means by the term, "altruism," one might still argue that this usage 
of altruism implies something radically different than a "give-and-take interaction" 
with others. 
A simple example m~y easily illustrate my point: Mother Teresa's work with 
the poor in Calcutta is typically called altruistic -- her self-less and untiring labor for 
the sake of others has been well established. Now, while it may be the case that 
Mother Teresa might claim that she receives more personal gratification, etc. as a by-
product of her work, it is highly unlikely that one would claim she is really engaged in 
a type of "give-and-take relationship" with those whom she helps. The latter clearly 
implies an egalitarian relationship, one based on the expectation that reciprocal 
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interests and needs will be satisfied. In sum, the term, altruism could be said to have 
at least three different meanings: sacrifice, taking into account the interests of others, 
and "give and take interactions." 
Now, to some, it may seem as if I am belaboring a trite issue. However, I 
explained the various meanings of this term because I believe that the criteria of 
having had at least one "meaningful" childhood relationship has far more importance 
than simply delimiting those diagnoses that are non-treatable in STDT, namely: 
narcissism, borderline and psychotic disorders. In my view, if one follows the logic of 
the rules of the game of STDT, altruism (narrowly defmed as sacrifice) is a pre-
requisite of candidates of STDT because, from the therapist's point of view, it makes a 
therapeutic relationship possible. In other words, it is not an arbitrary fact that clients 
must have evidenced "altruism" in the past because, and in a very real sense, STDT 
requires that clients will have to establish a similar "meaningful and altruistic" 
relationship with the therapist. In addition, the manner in which the individual 
therapist interprets "altruism," that is, as sacrifice, etc. covertly obliges the client to 
manifest differing levels of motivation. In this way, the therapist exerts different 
levels of power/control over the client. In conclusion, what seemingly reads as a 
descriptive feature of STDT has actually been shown to take on a normative force in 
the context of treatment. The following case example of a college student suffering 
from psychoneurosis beautifully illustrates what a sacrifice might look like in STDT 
but also what might happen when a client "changes her mind" regarding this sacrifice: 
[Initial Evaluation:] She seemed to be motivated to 
understand the reasons for her symptoms and to realize 
that she had to work hard. When asked what sacrifices 
she was prepared to make, she answered that she was 
willing to cut some of her classes in order to keep her 
appointments in the clinic, despite the difficulties this 
might create for her. 
[Second Visit:} Patient: ... Now what about the change 
of the hour (of the appointment)? Doctor: I understand 
that you have a conflict of interest, but my schedule is 
somewhat rigid, and this is the only hour I have. 
One may view the therapist's attitude on this point as 
inflexible; but, in his judgment, he has to assess the patient's 
manipulative tendencies and her somewhat contemptuous 
attempt (emphasis mine) to make psychotherapy rank 
second to her studies. He, therefore, decides at this early 
point to draw the line. 
Doctor: What I said stands. If you want to see me it 
would have to be at this hour. Patient: You are going to 
become the reason for my flunking my exam. Doctor: 
Oh, come now, Miss N., I am surprised at you! After 
telling me that you are such a rational person and that 
you come from such a rational country, after emphasizing 
that you and your mother always think logically, after 
viewing me in a derogatory way, how could it be possible 
that I would be held responsible for your failing your exam?33 
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I believe that even D. Malan, who is not so adamant as the others that motivation is 
of paramount importance as a selection criteria (and especially as evidenced in the 
initial interview) may subtly be lending evidence to my thesis in the following 
passage: 
... (the client) must show adequate motivation to attempt 
to solve his problems by achieving insight. This is an 
additional -- and equally important reason for giving 
interpretations during the assessment period; since in this 
way the patient has been provided with a foretaste of the 
kind of therapy he will be offered. It is not necessary for 
his motivation to start high as long as it increases during 
his exposure to the clinical situation; correspondingly, 
33 Ibid., 198, 200-1. 
decreasing motivation is a poor prognostic_sign 
(emphasis added, mine). 34 
The interpretative connection that I am trying to establish here is that "signs" of 
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altruism as evidenced in the therapeutic relationship/transference will eventually (as 
Malan notes above) emerge over the course of therapy and the expectation for what 
constitutes valid signs of altruism depends, in large part, on the level of patient 
motivation that is expected in therapy. 
As a final point of historical interest concerning a meaningful relationship as a 
selection criteria of patients, it is important to note that it is here where, STDT sharply 
diverges from Freud's psychoanalysis. Like Freud, many dynamic theorists believe 
that childhood relationships are significant because the patterns in which they occur 
will invariably be repeated in the transference neurosis. Nonetheless, nothing is said 
about "altruism", let alone, of "give and take interactions" being a significant feature, 
according to Freud, in these early childhood relationships. As a result, they do not 
function as selection criteria for clients. 35 
The full ramifications of the above analysis of "altruism" will not fully be 
recognized until the third category, therapeutic techniques, has been explored. But at 
the least, a door has been opened to suggest that normative values, of a highly 
personal and covert nature, are operative in STDT. 
34 Davanloo, Basic Principles, 59. 
35 Davanloo, Basic Principles, 9-10. 
209 
Client diagnosis 
Assuming that the client satisfies the aforementioned criteria of selection, let us 
move on to the second rule of STDT, diagnosis. From the therapist's perspective, this 
category largely acts as the final determiner for recommending STDT to a client. As 
stated previously, clients exhibiting certain kinds of illness are not deemed to be good 
candidates for this kind of therapy, and as such, their treatment is not amenable to the 
therapeutic techniques of STDT. For this reason, I believe that this second category is 
logically tied to both the selection criteria of clients and hints at the kinds of 
therapeutic techniques that are used in STDT. 36 
The way in which STD therapists arrive at a diagnosis could complicate this 
analysis. Borrowing concepts freely from psychoanalysis, and interpersonal, 
neuroscientific and even to some extent, behavioristic schools of thought, STD 
theorists attempt to establish a unified diagnosis. Whether or not a unified or 
coherent diagnosis is possible in spite of the variety of the schools of thought upon 
which they base their thought is only peripheral to my thesis. 
In this section, I will focus on a standard accusation leveled at proponents of 
STDT, namely: that the kinds of mental illness treated by STDT, as well as its cure, 
36 For some acknowledgement of this fact in contemporary research on STDT 
see Leonard Horowitz, Saul E. Rosenberg and Kim Bartholomew, "Interpersonal 
Problems, Attachment Styles and Outcome in Brief Dynamic Psychotherapy," The 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol. 61, no. 4, (1993): 549-560. 
"Some types of interpersonal problems seem to be more difficult to treat than others, 
and people who complain primarily of the more difficult types of problems would 
seem to be poor candidates for brief dynamic psychotherapy" 549. 
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are limited in nature and in scope. 37 What I would like to do now is to turn to a 
consideration of this matter: does STDT only offer superficial treatment for illnesses 
of a rather recent temporal onset, such as adjustment disorders? 
A scientifically sound way of attacking this charge would be to demonstrate 
empirically that STDT can impact "characterological disorders."38 There is at once an 
urgency on the part of STD therapists to claim that characterological change can and 
does occur in their form of brief therapy and at the same time a noted 
acknowledgement that STDT lacks outcome studies demonstrating such deep-level and 
long-term transformations. 39 
It is consistently noted that outcome studies must take into consideration the 
selection criteria of clients. That is to say, positive or negative outcome in all forms 
of therapy depend upon the kind of client that one treats, the nature of the presenting 
problem, etc. For this reason, just as Freud claimed that psychoanalysis requires that 
clients have a "reliable character," so too, and as noted earlier, STDT requires that 
37 Davanloo, Basic Principles, 93. 
38 I have in mind here those illnesses that are identified in the DSM-IV as Axis 
II personality disorders. 
39 See David Malan "Exploring the Limits of Brief Psychotherapy" in Davanloo 
Basic Principles, Ch. 4; Lester Luborsky, Jacques P. Barber and Larry Beutler: 
"Introduction to Special Section: A Briefing on Curative Factors in Dynamic 
Psychotherapy," Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, vol. 61, no. 4, (1993) 
539-41; Coughlin Della Selva, Intensive Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy, 
particularly Ch. 7 on character change and p. 14 in which she notes the lack of 
outcome studies regarding character change; Manuel Trujillo and Leigh McCullough, 
"Research Issues in Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapies: An Overview," in ·Clinical 
and Research Issues in Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy" ed. by Arnold 
Winston (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc.) 1985. 
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clients have a general "strength of character." Invariably, the diagnosis acts in much 
the same way. For this reason, it may be useful to consider a list of those kinds of 
clients that are, in principle, not deemed as good candidates for positive outcome in 
STDT. They are:40 
- Suicidal Patients 
- Substance Abusers 
- Long-Term Hospitalized Patients 
- Chronic Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
- Chronic Phobias 
- Patients treated by ECT 
- Self-Destructive Persons 
* Narcissistic & Borderline Personality Disorders 
* Psychotics 
It strikes me as curious that while STD therapists are seeking to make a 
broader claim that their form of therapy can impact "characterological disorders," in 
principle, they are excluding from treatment two kinds of "characterological disorders," 
notably narcissistic and borderline personality disorders. The curiosity increases, 
when one considers that from an historical point of view, Freud claimed that 
psychoanalysis was capable of treating the narcissist.41 
One possible explanation for the exclusion of some of these illnesses is the 
40 See David Malan, "Exploring the Limits of Brief Psychotherapy," Chapter 4, 
in Davanloo, Basic Principles. 
41 My inquiry in this section is limited to only those diagnoses that Freud 
thought psychoanalysis was capable of affecting. For this reason, I shall not address 
"self-destructive" clients; as stated, it is too vague of a description to be certain if 
Freud treated such clients. In addition and obviously due to advances in technology, 
the comparison can not be made for patients who underwent ECT treatmentsr The 
clearest example of a diagnosis which Freud claims to treat and STD therapist exclude 
is the narcissist. For that reason, my investigation will be limited to this diagnosis. 
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length, strength and number of symptoms that a client possesses. If these are 
considered too severe to be overcome in brief therapy, then, the patient is not deemed 
a suitable candidate. Indeed, one could make the case that it is exactly this kind of 
reasoning that is employed in STDT's decision to treat persons with OCD or phobia 
but not those with chronic OCD or chronic phobia. 
However, I think the above is a shallow explanation precisely because it does 
not account for the exclusion of narcissists and borderline clients from treatment. 
Rather, I wish to suggest an alternative explanation that might function as the real 
rationale for why such persons having these characterological disorders are deemed 
unacceptable candidates for this kind of therapy. In brief, by definition of the 
disorders themselves, both narcissists and borderlines have severe problems forming 
relationships with others. 42 The therapeutic relationship that is necessary in STDT is 
of such a kind as to require the client -- immediately and unequivocally -- to willingly 
accept the therapist's interpretation of what the proper focus of treatment should be. 
Only when this is accomplished can the therapist employ the techniques of STDT and 
move on, if you will , to the next "rule of the game," namely the techniques of 
therapy. I believe that both the importance and clarity of this thesis emerges when 
one compares Freud's reasons for claiming that psychoanalysis can be a successful 
form of therapy for narcissists. It is Freud's underlying notion of the therapeutic 
relationship that accounts for his claim to do so. In the end, what will be 
42 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual- of 
Mental Disorders, 4th ed., rev., (Washington, D.C.: APA, 1994), 650, 654. 
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demonstrated is how radically different STD therapists understand the nature of this 
relationship and how, to a much greater degree than psychoanalysis, a therapist's 
personal values may be said to guide the course of therapy. 
A place to begin this analysis lies with the kind of client that both Freud and 
STD therapists would agree could not be treated, namely the psychotic. On several 
occasions, Freud stated that it is impossible to treat the psychotic - the clearest 
instance of the person with "loose" connections with reality. In An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis, Freud says: 
If the patient's ego is to be a useful ally in our common 
work, it must however hard it may be pressed by the 
hostile powers, have retained a certain amount of 
coherence and some fragment of understanding for the 
demands of reality. But this is not to be expected of the 
ego of a psychotic; it can not observe a pact of this kind, 
indeed it can scarcely enter into one. It will very soon 
have tossed us away and the help we offer it and sent us 
to join the portions of the external world which no longer 
mean anything to it. Thus, we discover that we must 
renounce the idea of trying our plan of cure upon 
psychotics - renounce it perhaps for ever or perhaps only 
for the time being, till we have found some other plan 
better adapted for them. 43 
What is important about the above quote is that, in some sense, it is not the diagnosis 
per se of being a psychotic which does not allow for such individuals to be treated 
with psychoanalysis; but rather, from the therapists point of view, the diagnosis has a 
meaningfu.l implication for the possibility of establishing a "viable" therapeutic 
relationship. Establishing the appropriate kind of relationship is a necessary 
43 Freud, SE 23, 173. 
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requirement for the very possibility of "doing" psychoanalysis. As Freud says, if a 
client can not be a "useful ally" and form a "pact" with the therapist, it is the therapist 
that must "renounce" psychoanalysis as a form of cure for the client. 
By contrast, Freud did think that narcissists could fulfill the above 
requirements. Provided that the individual has not broken off all connections with the 
external world, as is the case with schizophrenics, Freud believed that psychoanalysis 
could be a viable form of treatment for many individuals suffering from narcissism. 
He explains this distinction as follows: 
A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the 
conception of a primary and normal narcissism arose 
when the attempt was made to subsume what we know of 
dementia praecox (Kraeplin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler) 
under the hypothesis of the libido theory. Patients of this 
kind whom I have proposed to term paraphrenics, display 
two fundamental characteristics: megalomania and a 
diversion of their interest from the external world --
from people and things. In consequence of the latter 
change, they become inaccessible to the influence of 
psychoanalysis and cannot be cured by our efforts. But 
the paraphrenic's turning away from the external world 
needs to be more precisely characterized. A patient 
suffering from hysteria or obsessional neurosis has also, 
as far as his illness extends, given up his relation to reality. 
But analysis shows that he has by no means broken off his 
erotic relations to people and things. He still retains them 
in phantasy. .. . .. But the megalomania itself is no new 
creation; on the contrary, it is, as we know, a magnification 
and plainer manifestation of a condition which had already 
existed previously. This leads us to look upon the narcissism 
which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a 
secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism 
which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a 
secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that 
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is obscured by a number of different influences. 44 
Even with this severe symptomatology, the narcissist, for Freud, is an acceptable 
candidate for treatment in his psychoanalysis. Even though, his capacity to form 
interpersonal relationships is questionable, the narcissist is capable of forming a viable 
therapeutic relationship with the analyst. The narcissist is capable of the following: 
The analytic physician and the patient's weakened ego, 
basing themselves on the real external world, have to 
band themselves together into a party against the enemies, 
the instinctual demands of the id and the conscientious 
demands of the super-ego. We form a pact with each other. 
The sick ego promises us the most complete candor - promises, 
that is, to put at our disposal all the material which its self-
perception yields it; we assure the patient of the strictest 
discretion and place at his service our experience at 
interpreting material that has been influenced by the 
unconscious. 45 
And how, one might wonder is candor evidenced within the therapeutic relationship, 
according to Freud? One sign would be the client's pledge to "to obey the 
fundamental rule of analysis."46 This, of course is free association, a main technique 
of psychoanalysis. 
I spent some time quoting Freud at length because it seems to me that his 
sense (at least in these passages) in explaining the nature of the therapeutic 
relationship emphasizes an important value that lies at the root of the therapeutic 
relationship. Candor allows for the possibility of the pact formation and enables the 
44 Ibid., 14: 74-75. 
45 Ibid., 23: 173. 
46 Ibid., 23: 174. 
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technique of free association to occur in the therapeutic encounter. But more 
importantly, the therapist informs the client that candor is required; indeed, the patient 
"pledges" to commit to such sincerity. Freud reasons that the narcissist, even despite 
the extreme nature of the pathology, is quite capable of willingly agreeing to be 
candid, and thereby free associating in therapeutic sessions. 
Unlike Freud, STD therapists offer vague descriptions of the therapeutic 
relationship that is necessary to successful outcome in their form of treatment. At 
times it is said that a "joint agreement" must exist between the client and the therapist. 
At other times, it is suggested that only "part" of the client can, in principle, jointly 
agree to therapeutic work while simultaneously another "part" of the client will 
actively resist any therapeutic endeavor.47 What concerns me is their repeated failure 
to acknowledge that STD therapy requires that the client possess other values, in 
addition to candor if this form of therapy is to succeed. More boldly and as will soon 
be made clear, STD therapists encourage clients to adopt certain "values" as opposed 
to others in the confines of therapy. For now it is sufficient to note that if candor 
were the only value that is necessary for the therapeutic relationship and if STD 
therapy can accomplish characterological change, as these therapists claim it can, then 
the narcissist should in principle be an acceptable candidate for treatment. And as 
noted, he is not. 
One reason why a discussion of client values/norms may be overlooked by 
47 Patricia Coughlin Della Selva. Intensive Short-Term Dynamic 
Psychotherapy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 14. 
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STD therapists is that the therapeutic relationship is typically discussed from the point 
of view of the therapist. The following quote illustrates this: 
According to Davanloo (1980, 1990), the therapist must 
abandon the passive stance and work actively to bring the 
patient's conflict into focus, intensifying the affective 
involvement and creating an intrapsychic conflict that makes 
rapid change possible .... In this way, the BFSTDP therapist is 
not neutral but adopts a therapeutic stance that advocates 
openness and honesty, (emphasis added) even when painful. 
The therapist communicates a serious but dedicated approach 
to getting at the truth (Malan has referred to this as "the iron 
hand in the velvet glove"). It is clear to the patient from the 
outset that the therapist is working diligently and is presenting a 
challenge to the patient to join in and work at his or her highest 
level of ability.48 
In the above passage, the therapist admits that her stance is "non-neutral" insofar as 
she "advocates" openness and honesty on the part of the client. One could easily 
interpret "openness and honesty" as equivalent to Freud's notion of candor. Again, if 
this were the only value that were assumed in this form of therapy, then the narcissist 
by definition (and given STD therapists' purported goals of affecting characterological 
change) should, in principle, be capable of treatment. However, I would urge the 
reader at this point to focus on the last part of the above quote. In addition to 
encouraging "openness and honesty," the therapist is also said "to challenge the patient 
to work. .. at his or her highest level of ability." In the abstract, the therapist, in her 
non-neutral stance is encouraging the client's motivation. As described in the 
foregoing section, it was noted that motivation is broadly evidenced in terms of 
"altruistic" behavior. The asymmetrical nature of the therapeutic relationship seems to 
48 Ibid., 14-15. 
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presuppose at least one (some) values in addition to candor. 
By way of concluding this discussion, we have seen that formulating a 
diagnosis in STDT is both a final determination of the selection criteria of STDT and 
hints at the kinds of techniques that will be used in this form of therapy. At the outset 
of therapy, the client is assumed to possess some other values, in addition to candor, 
or openness and honesty. If the client does not possess these, the therapist, in her 
"non-neutral" stance, may encourage clients to adopt values in the course of therapy. 
Even though both Freud's psychoanalysis and STDT are "dynamically" based theories, 
Freud allowed for treatment of the narcissist because his conception of the nature of 
the therapeutic relationship emphasized only the value of candor. STDT presupposes 
other values in addition to candor on the part of the client. This final point makes it 
obvious as to why STDT is fundamentally different from Freud's psychoanalysis (long-
term therapy). Free associative techniques imply a lengthier treatment of the 
individual and, at the very least, a more egalitarian notion of the nature of the 
therapeutic relationship. 
In the next section, I will explore the sense of therapeutic techniques that are 
made use of in STDT and see how this next rule may affect the actual and normative 
goals of this form of therapy. 
Techniques of therapy 
Following in the footsteps of Freud, STD therapists use interpretive techniques 
in the course of therapy. Even today, clients are said to have unresolved Oedipal 
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Conflicts and symptomatology is said to result from unconscious sexual wishes. 49 In 
this section, I choose not to focus so much on the content of the interpretations; but 
rather, on the following issues: 1) the appropriate time to offer interpretations in the 
course of therapy, 2) the various classes/categories of interpretation that therapists 
may use and 3) the way in which therapists are trained to use these techniques. 
Discussing the timing of interpretations may seem, to some, to be a relatively 
unimportant topic. However, it is one of the ways in which STD establishes itself as a 
novel version of dynamic therapy. Freud has much to say about the timing of 
interpretations and the impact that this may have for the outcome of therapy. For this 
reason, consideration of Freud's comments on this point may be a useful tool with 
which to further assess the impact that this could have upon the goals of therapy. 
In numerous texts, Freud cautions therapists against making use of 
interpretation too soon in the therapeutic process. Based on his own clinical 
experience, Freud warns of the negative consequences of this form of therapeutic 
technique. For example, in On Beginning the Treatment, he says: 
It is true that in the earliest days of analytic technique we 
took an intellectualist view of the situation. We set a high 
value on the patient's knowledge of what he had 
forgotten, and in this we made hardly any distinction 
between our knowledge of it and his. We thought it a 
special piece of good luck if we were able to obtain 
information about the forgotten childhood trauma from 
other sources - for instance, from parents or nurses or the 
seducer himself - as in some cases it was possible to do; 
and we hastened to convey the information and the proofs 
of its correctness to the patient, in the certain expectation 
49 For discussions of specific cases see Davanloo, Basic Principles, 316. 
of thus bringing the neurosis and the treatment to a rapid 
end. It was a severe disappointment when the expected 
success was not forth-coming. How could it be that the 
patient, who now knew about his traumatic experience, 
nevertheless still behaved as if he knew no more about it 
than before? Indeed, telling and describing his repressed 
trauma to him did not even result in any recollection of it 
coming into his mind (emphasis added, mine).50 
It is clear from the above comment that Freud's early observations of imparting 
interpretations too quickly led to some unpalatable consequences: 1) the inability to 
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distinguish between the content of the knowledge achieved (at the conscious level) as 
being that which is proper to the therapist or the patient and 2) rushing a suggestion 
further repressed unconscious. Taken together, one could argue that at least in this 
passage Freud was concerned with a client's autonomy; presumably, it is important for 
clients to possess their own knowledge and this, of course, would presuppose that 
unconscious material has been dealt with at the conscious level. But let us consider 
some other negative effects. Freud notes that: 
It is not difficult for a skilled analyst to read the patient's 
secret wishes plainly between the lines of his complaints 
and the story of his illness; but what a measure of self-
complacency and thoughtlessness must be possessed by 
anyone who can, on the shortest acquaintance, inform a 
stranger who is entirely ignorant of all the tenets of 
analysis that he is attached to his mother by incestuous 
ties, that he harbors wishes for the death of his wife 
whom he appears to love, that he conceals an intention of 
betraying his superior, and so on. I have heard that there 
are analysts who plume themselves upon these kinds of 
lightning diagnoses and 'express' treatments, but I must 
warn everyone against following such examples. Behavior 
of this sort will completely discredit oneself and the 
5° Freud, SE 12: 141. 
treatment in the patient's eyes and will arouse the most 
violent opposition in him, whether one's guess has been 
true or not; indeed, the truer the guess the more violent 
will be the resistance. As a rule the therapeutic effect 
will be nil; but the deterring of the patient from analysis 
will be final. 51 
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The above probably represents the most curious passage, especially in light of 
the techniques of STD therapists, for there are several different nuances within Freud's 
cautioning against rapid interpretations. There is a level in which Freud seems to be 
implying that such treatment between "strangers" simply violates the established rules 
of etiquette; but most importantly, it does in fact, increase the resistances present on 
the part of the patient. Again, irrespective of the content of the interpretation, Freud 
claims that there are at least four possible negative consequences that the timing of an 
interpretation may be said to have for the client. One wonders, how might STD 
therapists respond when faced with such consequences? 
Interestingly, many of Freud's concerns are lessened by the selection criteria of 
clients. For example, Freud's noted worry about possibly alienating the patient from 
psychoanalysis -- and therapy in general -- is mitigated by the fact that STDT ensures 
that clients are highly motivated individuals who possess a "strength of character." 
Potential alienation of the client because of a stranger imposing a strange myth upon 
the patient, again, because of the selection criteria seems to be highly unlikely, and 
may in the end say more about Victorian etiquette rather than our own.52 Similar in 
51 Ibid., 12: 140. 
52 See Coughlin Della Selva, Intensive, Ch. l. 
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vein is the fact that Freud argues that early interpretation may misconstrue diagnosis. 
This is clearly not a concern of STD therapists who believe that diagnosis can and 
ought to occur within the initial interview. 
What is curious, though, is Freud's concern that early interpretation can (and 
negatively for the goals of therapy) deepen a client's resistances. Many STD therapists 
(notably Peter Sifneos) seem to relish the fact that resistances are strong and that they 
can only be combated by anxiety-provoking measures. Perhaps, at this time, it is 
appropriate to make the transition to this seemingly novel and odd (on psychoanalytic 
terms) technique and ask the question: What is the justification for anxiety-provoking 
or even "highly confrontational, almost adversarial techniques?"53 
In some sense, the justification for all or any of the techniques used in STDT 
rests, once again, with the selection criteria for clients. Consider the following claim 
by Sifneos: 
... staying within the designated and agreed-upon 
focus increases anxiety and brings about resistance. 
When that happens, the therapist is faced with a 
dilemma. Should one persist in making the patient 
more and more anxious and thus resistant, or should 
one become more supportive and try to diminish the 
effect - in short, become anxiety-suppressive? 
The ST APP therapist persists in making anxiety-
provoking confrontations and clarifications. Here 
again the therapist counts on the patient's motivation 
for change. Despite unpleasant emotions, the patient 
will understand the need to come to grips with the 
53 Ibid., xiii. Also: A general list of these techniques has been distilled from 
Davanloo's, Basic Principles. They include: interpretation, clarification, confrontation, 
suggestion, manipulation. 
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anxiety once and for all, for the sake of recovery. 54 
An case example of a therapist employing this technique is useful to consider. Sifneos 
cites the following and the reader will soon see why it is worth quoting at length: 
If a patient brings up information about some form of 
acting out which seems to be antitherapeutic, the therapist 
might say: "It appears to me that your action is 
completely contrary to what we have been talking about. 
Under these circumstances, therefore, I think that there is 
no need for us to go on, because it is clear that you are 
not interested in solving your problems if you act out 
against your own therapy." 
Such a statement usually will produce a great deal of 
anxiety because the patient's motivation for change has been 
challenged Patients usually vehemently deny that they want to 
discontinue their therapy, and they also agree that acting out 
will be counterproductive. 
If, on the other hand, the patient has used acting out as 
an excuse to terminate treatment because it is too anxiety 
provoking, it would be concluded that the original evaluation 
of the patient's motivation for change was faulty and that the 
patient was not an appropriate candidate for STAPP.55 
By now, the analogy made between a game and its rules and the logic of STDT 
should be apparent. According to Wittgenstein, the rules of a game define the 
parameters of success/failure within the game. But what I would truly like the reader 
to notice in the above passage is that if one compares STDT to a game, the players in 
this game do not occupy "equal" positions. Quite simply, the client does not have the 
same opportunity nor power, as does the therapist, to make use of the "rules." 
Because of this, within the boundaries of STDT, the client is really a powerless player 
54 Sifneos, Short-Term, 108. 
55 Ibid., 109. 
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in his own treatment. The above passage offers an excellent example of this theme. 
If a client persists in certain behavior (in this case, what is considered by the therapist 
to be a form of "acting out,") then, within the game of STDT, the client has only one 
choice: namely, to change the behavior. Persons who have only one choice in a 
certain situation, in a very real sense, have no choices at all. I suspect that STD 
therapists could say: Ah, but the client could leave and find another therapist. 
Admittedly, this is true. But note, if a client were to make this "decision," he is 
forced to step outside of the game of STDT in order to experience any "real choice" 
whatsoever. The utter significance that this point has is when one realizes how a 
STD therapist, such as Sifneos, might explain a client's decision to leave therapy. For 
if this were to occur, the therapist bears no responsibility for this decision. Rather, the 
therapist need only chide himself for having made an initial error in selecting the 
client for treatment because the client is said to have lacked (all along!) the necessary 
"level of motivation" for treatment. The therapist need only take responsibility for an 
initial error in his judgment -- but nothing else. 56 
Before leaving the above cited passage, one other issue deserves to be 
mentioned. An implication of the passage is that client's who "acquiesce" to the 
anxiety-provoking comment and/or do not see it as a viable option to terminate 
therapy, are said (and from the therapist's point of view) to have bolstered their sense 
56 Undoubtedly, when the success rate of this form of therapy is considered in 
the next section, the reader would do well to remember this point. As we will see, to 
a large degree the success/failure rate of this form of therapy rests with the therapist's 
clinical observations of the client. 
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of "motivation" to continue to explore the central issue of therapy. The obvious 
question that this leaves us with is: When using anxiety-provoking techniques, is it 
really the case that therapists have augmented the motivation of their clients? Or 
rather, have STD therapists really fostered a sense of passivity (a decrease of 
autonomy) within their clients to accept the interpretation offered? A plausible 
argument could be made which claims that, as part of their selection critetja, STD 
therapists ultimately choose to treat clients who lack confidence in themselves or their 
ability to make autonomous choices.57 Unfortunately, a complete examination of this 
claim would take me too far afield at this point; yet, one must remember that within 
the game of STDT, it is the therapists who have the sole power to interpret and use 
the rules of the game. 
By way of concluding this section, I wish to briefly consider how technique is 
said to depend upon a therapist's "individual style." Perhaps unlike any other 
paradigm explored in this dissertation, STDT touts the fact that techniques of therapy 
should be chosen based upon the individual personality of the therapist. As cited 
earlier, Sifneos has stated that a therapist's "individual style" can neither be "taught or 
described." Even beyond this, STD therapists seem to be comfortable in claiming that 
a choice of techniques may have to do with a therapist's unconscious motivations. In 
57 Again, the reader should remember this claim in light of the forthcoming 
paragraphs. STD therapists suggest that the ultimate choice of a therapist's techniques 
are often based on unconscious "reasons" or "motivations." If this is so, one can not 
help but wonder if therapists are unconsciously selecting clients who are passive or 
weak-willed. 
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the end, though, individual style is not something to avoid in STDT; if anything, it is 
strongly encouraged. However, after reading about the preferred techniques of the 
leading thinkers in this field, one wonders to what extent the individual styles which 
have "worked so well" can ever be replicated by anyone else who hopes to learn this 
form of therapy. I believe that two very important issues depend upon whether or not 
techniques can in principle be "imitated" or "taught:" 1) If techniques can be taught, 
one can speak consistently and honestly about STDT as constituting a discipline. 
There is certainly a dearth of evidence which suggests that STD therapists see 
themselves as theoretically articulating and practicing from within an established 
discipline/school of thought. 2) However, if the techniques of this form of therapy can 
not, in principle, be taught to those new to the field, then the disciplinary status of 
STDT is rendered questionable. In light of this last claim, consider the following 
passages: 
My own perception of Davanloo as a therapist has always 
been that of a leopard, or other wild animal in his natural 
environment, guided by infallible instinct who, at any 
given moment, knows exactly what direction to take and 
which strategical moves are best suited to accomplish his 
aim... (emphasis added, mine) 58 
... there is not much point in imitating Davanloo's visible 
moves, hoping to be as effective without understanding 
and assimilating the underlying theory, so as to adapt it 
to one's own personality. Clearly, not all of us are 
leopards, and trying to imitate one, even by using a 
therapeutic manual, would be not only ridiculous but a 
58 Feruccio Osimo, "Method, Personality and Training in Short-Term -
Psychotherapy," International Journal of Short-Term Psychotherapy, vol. 9, (1994), 
180. 
gross oversimplification. Conversely, each of us has got 
his own unconscious and, even while we are trying to 
follow a certain model, we should never overlook its 
signals. 
This having been said, it remains evident that 
Davanloo's technical interventions are often totally 
original, and differentiate his approach from all the 
others.59 
In 1995, I wrote that perhaps Davanloo's most important 
contribution has simply been the demonstration that 
widely applicable brief psychotherapy is possible, so that 
other therapists are encouraged to use some of his ideas 
to find equally effective methods that suit their own 
personalities. Dr. Coughlin Della Selva has 
unquestionably done this, and the next step will be much 
easier; namely, for yet other therapists to adapt her 
technique to suit their personalities -- in which process, 
the publication of this book will play an essential part. I 
hope the result will be a chain reaction by which the 
whole status of psychotherapy may ultimately be 
transformed (emphasis added, mine).60 
I imagine that Malan envisions a positive transformation for psychotherapy. I am 
wary of such optimism. With techniques taught in this manner to individuals who 
want to learn STDT, I can only envision a "chain reaction" that leads to a further 
enslavement for potential clients of this increasingly subjective "discipline." 
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59 Ibid. See also: D. Malan, foreward in Intensive, by Coughlin Della Selva, 
xiii-xiv: "The reasons seem to include above all, the extreme difficulty of learning 
Davanloo's technique, with the result that only a handful of therapists other than 
Davanloo himself can use it effectively. This partly stems from his use and advocacy 
of a highly confrontational, almost adversarial, style. Although such an approach is 
extremely effective in his hands, many other therapists do not feel comfortable with it. 
Moreover, there has never been any textbook to facilitate the learning proces8." 
60 Ibid., xv. 
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Goals of STDT 
If it is indeed the case that individual style is a laudable means for therapists to 
choose their techniques, then one has to wonder how the goals of treatment are to be 
assessed in this form of therapy. Specifically, one wonders if there can be 
generalizable results of this form of treatment. Davanloo claims that the "individual 
personality characteristics and the empathy of the therapist" are "crucial for the 
outcome of therapy. "61 The literature suggests that STDT aims at the following 
plethora of possible "outcomes" for the client: 
- insight; characterological change; psychodynamic 
change; insight into emotional conflicts and understanding 
symptoms in dynamic terms; main (circumscribed focal) 
conflict has been accomplished; patient feels better; new 
attitudes have been developed; increase in self-esteem.62 
Let us begin by focusing on what is not listed as a possible goal:, namely a 
.change in clients behavior and/or symptomatology. This will lead to a further 
consideration of the criteria that is used to assess client goals of STDT. 
Since its inception in the late 1960's and early 1970's, there has been a surge of 
interest in generating (presumably, replicable) outcome studies of what is actually 
achieved within STDT.63 Curiously, Sifneos notes that while his version of STDT has 
had great success in provoking increased patient insight, actual "change in 
61 Davanloo, Basic Principles, 31. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See Winston, Clinical and Research, Ch. 7. 
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symptomatology has not been impressive."64 Whether or not therapists can 
empirically demonstrate a necessary causal link between "interpretation" and change in 
behavior/symptomatology is beyond the scope of this present analysis. However, what 
is of concern is whether or not STD therapists assume responsibility for informing 
their clients that "increased insight" may or may not result in changes in their 
symptomatology. It seems to me that many clients seek therapy precisely because 
they are suffering from certain symptoms and/or behavioral difficulties. If statistical 
studies do not adequately -- even to STD therapists requirements for adequacy --
demonstrate that changes in symptomatology do occur, it would seem that a therapist 
must assume the obligation to inform clients of this fact. As I have shown, STD 
therapists are eager to talk about establishing a "joint agreement" with the client 
regarding the "central focus" of the therapy, to encourage a client's motivation in the 
course of therapy, to require that the client make "sacrifices" for therapy, etc. 
Unfortunately, there is a noted absence in the literature regarding a STD therapist's 
obligations to inform the client both of the possibilities and the very real limitations of 
this form of treatment. 65 
64 Ibid., 40. 
65 Unfortunately, space does not permit a complete development of the ethical 
importance of this observation. My thesis is limited to a demonstration of where 
normative assumptions might occur in STDT in virtue of examining its theoretical 
commitments. The reader, however, should bear in mind that by saying therapists 
have an obligation to tell clients of the limitations of this form of treatment, the 
justification for this obligation arises from a therapist's knowledge of this panicular 
paradigm. It may be the case that therapists with other theoretical orientations may not 
have this obligation (i.e. clients who seek treatment from behavioral therapists may 
experience better/more noticeable changes in their symptomatology. As such, 
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Some therapists might object and argue that most clients who seeks STD 
therapy will somehow "improve" at the end of treatment. That is to say, most clients 
will benefit even though the actual benefits may not be capable of empirically 
confirmation. This may be true; but, I would argue that one will never know the 
extent to which a client benefits from this form of therapy so long as a therapist's 
perspective is privileged in generating the data for the outcome studies. All too often, 
STD therapists privilege their perspective. Consider the following claims: 
Davanloo claims to have done systematic follow-up of his 
patients, no systematic follow-up has really been published, 
so that the true quality of the majority of his therapeutic results 
is not accessible to us. 
Hopefully, the potency of this model will be 
confirmed also by outcome studies of the therapies carried 
out by therapists (other than Davanloo) applying his method. 
The lack of published clinical studies, reporting the relevant 
material and a discussion of exactly what changed and what 
did not change, is a shortcoming that should be filled. 66 
Another important difference from psychoanalysis is that 
technique, selection criteria, content of interpretations types 
of interpretation, are more often based on direct cumulative 
evidence from previous empirical observations and outcome 
research data, rather than on purely metapsychological assumptions. 
In a way, Malan's metapsychological position is that he neither 
accepts passively nor thoroughly rejects some of the metapsychological 
foundations of psychoanalysis, but rather, he bases his clinical 
behavioral therapists may not be obliged in the same way as are STD therapists). This 
is one important implication. But there is a second and more important consequence 
that follows. Both therapists and philosophers who purport to write about "psychiatric 
ethics" should recognize that the therapist's obligation in this context is not derived 
from an abstract code of ethics. That is to say, there are obligations and 
responsibilities in psychiatry that receive their specific content from the sch09l of 
thought from which they are derived. 
66 Osimo, Method, Personality, 182-3. 
judgement only on those metapsychological aspects which can be 
empirically validated by virtue of clinical observations. 61 
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The issues concerning the criteria for assessment are, indeed, highly suspect. On the 
one hand, Davanloo, a founder of STDT, is portrayed as having no discemable 
outcome studies. On the other hand, Malan, who has outcome studies available, bases 
his clinical judgments on his own clinical observations. There is something oddly 
circular about this criteria. The circularity that I see might be made clearer by an 
analogy. One might imagine a college professor who evaluates students' performance 
based solely upon his own observations of individual students. Such a professor might 
administer tests, quizzes or even assign papers; however, the method by which he 
chooses to grade the assignments is his personal reaction to the work. If professors 
determined students' grades in this way, I believe that students would scoff at the 
unfairness of this approach. In this example, there exists no objective measures that 
both the student and professor could appeal to in order to evaluate the student's 
performance (i.e. mastering the material in a textbook, following the assignment for 
the paper, etc.). 
I believe the above analogy pinpoints what is wrong with the criteria of 
assessing STDT. Clinical judgments of a therapist based on clinical observations that 
issue from the therapist create a radical subjectivity in the domain of STDT. Outcome 
of a client's success is again, a matter of therapist interpretation. 
In his book, Short-Term Anxiety Provoking Therapy, Sifneos offers the 
67 Ibid., 183-184. 
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following account of judging "successful/non-successful" outcomes. In some sense, it 
could be considered a way of circumventing the radical subjectivity involved in 
Malan's technique. He says: 
During the past fifteen years, I have had the opportunity 
to present in workshops, conferences, and seminars all 
over North and South America and Europe, my work 
about a kind of short-term dynamic psychotherapy called 
STAPP (short-term anxiety-provoking psychotherapy). 
I am pleased to find that a great deal of interest has 
been aroused among the participants. There are two 
reasons for this. The first has to do with the many years 
of investigation surrounding this kind of psychotherapy of 
brief duration, as well as the systematic studies of the 
results obtained. Second, we have made extensive and 
systematic use of video-tapes to demonstrate this work, 
allowing evaluation and techniques to be observed and 
outcome findings to be assessed objectively by the 
participants. It is they who watched critically the nature 
of the patient-therapist relationship and it is they who 
could decide whether the patients had improved.68 
Video-taping has transformed the hitherto private therapeutic relationship into a 
publicly observable event. But, while the use of video-tapes is a step in the right 
direction toward infusing STDT with a modicum of objectivity, the fact of the matter 
is that the criteria of success or failure of ST APP is still highly infused with 
subjectivity. Community consensus of therapists determines the overall sense of the 
client's improvement. An equally disturbing notion is that "improvement" here defined 
is limited to the number of video-taped therapy sessions -- leaving it a completely 
unexplored issue as to whether or not "improvement" transcended the confines of 
therapy. 
68 Sifneos, Short-Term, ix. 
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Given the above, I maintain that evaluating the outcome of STDT by using the 
criterion of a therapist's own clinical observations or a community of therapists' 
observations (as in the case with video-taping) is highly suspect. The reader should 
note that I do not believe that any paradigm of psychotherapy admits of the kind of 
measures of objectivity that one might expect in other sciences. However, in order to 
ensure the disciplinary viability of STDT as a paradigm of psychotherapy, I do believe 
that something less subjective or something that takes into account more than simply 
the therapist's perspective is desperately needed. 
In her recent book, Intensive Short-Term Dynamic Psychotherapy, Patricia 
Coughlin Della Selva would appear to agree with that claim. Discussing the 
importance of outcome data, she says: "Such data are essential to determine whether 
our interventions are truly curative. "69 At the close of her book, she summarizes two 
methods for evaluation which do take into account the client's perspective. These 
methods were proposed by Malan and Davanloo respectively: 
The Tavistock group developed a rating scale to 
categorize patient response to treatment both at 
termination and follow-up. (Malan, 1963) The criteria for 
success were as follows: 0 indicated no change; a score 
of 1 represented some symptomatic improvement but no 
evidence of greater coping skills in the area of the core 
conflict; a score of 2 reflected meaningful symptomatic 
improvement plus evidence of new coping strategies for 
dealing adaptively in previously conflictual situations; 
and a score of 3 indicated broad change beyond the 
specific conflictual area to reflect greater coping in 
relationships with both men and women and better 
performance at work. 
69 Coughlin Della Selva, Intensive, 226. 
Davanloo (1978) reported that of 130 patients deemed 
suitable for ISTDP, 115 were successfully treated in an 
average of 20 sessions. These positive results were 
maintained in follow-up interviews conducted between 2 
and 7 years posttreatment. Davanloo engaged patients in 
active reassessment of the process at follow-up. Both 
patient and therapist watched videotaped segments of 
treatment. Davanloo engaged patients in an active 
reassessment of the process at follow-up. Both patient 
and therapist watched videotaped segments of treatment. 
Davanloo asked for feedback from patients and elicited 
their comments about what they had found helpful. Of 
significance was a frequently reported perception that the 
patients had done most of the work themselves. They 
tended to report feeling "free" or "like a new person," 
attesting to the dramatic changes that had occurred as a 
result of their hard work. 70 
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While both of these kinds of evaluation represent a move toward greater objectivity in 
STDT by taking into consideration the client's perspective, the reader should still be 
wary of both kinds of these methods.. A careful consideration indicates that the 
client's perspective is solicited only with respect to what he/she found "helpful" about 
therapy. In short, both the questionnaire and the follow-up interviews ask clients to 
address what worked about therapy. Only in the first example is the client asked to 
report about aspects of his/her life in which there is "no change." However, one must 
wonder: should not the client's perspective be required about aspects of his/her life 
which might have been "negatively" affected? Posing the questions in this way 
makes it seem as if therapy can either "affect no change in the client's life" or "affect 
change for the better." I believe that there is a third category that is woefully missing 
from the methods of evaluation, namely: "negative affect." With "negative affect" not 
70 Ibid., 226-227. 
even being an option, it is no wonder why STDT reports such a high percentage of 
successful outcomes. 
Conclusion 
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At the beginning of this chapter, I compared the paradigm of STDT to 
functioning like a game. I did so in order to see where and how the normative force 
of this paradigm's assumptions might enter into treatment. Having analyzed the many 
rules of this game: the meaning of the many selection criteria of clients, the kinds of 
illnesses treated, the treatment techniques and the goals/outcomes of therapy, it seems 
rather obvious that all of these categories encourage the therapist's personal values to 
enter into treatment. Any attempt to generalize what these values are would be risky; 
for, as we have seen, they literally depend upon each individual therapist's 
interpretation of the rules. An implication of this is that any attempt to generate a 
coherent, rational plan of action that benefits the client is sadly out of reach. The 
theory of this paradigm itself demonstrates that the utterly powerless players in their 
own treatment -- the clients -- must literally make a leap of faith in their therapist and 
hope that he/she is a good soul. 
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